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Abstract 
Most large cities have waste crises at some time or other. MSW 
(municipal solid waste) is a major component of the waste stream of cities, 
the bulk of which derives from residents (households) rather than businesses. 
Since MSW is an increasing function of per capita GDP, MSW typically grows 
with development, and many cities in the fastest-growing economies have 
had to find ways to regulate the solid waste generated by households. This 
thesis set up a household waste disposal model in order to evaluate the 
scope for MSW management using instruments that change household 
waste disposal decisions. The model is estimated by a panel of data on 
MSW disposal in 18 cities in Taiwan and Japan. The estimations are then 
used to test the effectiveness of a number of policy options. 
The model shows that households elect to trade off storing/composting 
waste against the three main waste discarding options: legal dumping, illegal 
dumping and recycling. It is also shown that the household's decision to 
discard a unit of waste is based on each disposal option's marginal cost, 
including tariff, labour and disutility for storing/composting waste. The study 
confirms that the higher the frequency of non-recyclables collection, the less 
recycling and more waste dumping would be. This may be caused by a 
reduction in the marginal cost of dumping. For cities with garbage collection 
more than 5 times per week, decreasing the garbage collection frequency 
increases recycling and decreases garbage dumped. 
It is also shown that the higher the price of non-recyclables collection 
(price of unit-pricing) the higher the recycling rate would be. The short run 
price elasticity of non-recyclable collection demand is estimated to be 0.069. 
In the long run, at higher unit-prices, the price elasticity is estimated to rise to 
0.346. Applying a penalty on illegal dumping (fine) can prevent illegal 
dumping from increasing after unit-pricing is adopted. In Taiwan, the 
prosecuted penalty (fine) per 1000 residents has a significant positive effect 
on the dumping of non-recyclables. This is because the penalty decreases 
illegal dumping, which may increase non-recyclables. 
Mandatory recycling policy is also shown to increase recycling and to 
decrease non-recyclables. The adoption of a transparent garbage bag 
policy also helps to increase recycling by lowering inspection costs. This 
has the effect of increasing paper recycling and decreasing non-recyclables. 
Because all Taiwanese cities now have both on-time collection and 
mandatory recycling, they should consider requiring residents to use 
transparent bags for garbage collection, which facilitate mandatory recycling. 
Cities that have not adopted unit-pricing or mandatory recycling should 
consider adopting unit-pricing, with the price being no less than 0.086 
USD/101itres which has higher social benefits than costs. Cities in Taiwan 
should consider a unit-price of no less than 0.144 USD/10litres which can 
fully cover the cost of treatment. It is argued that the unit-pricing policy 
provides waste management authorities with more options than mandatory 
recycling which has only one-off effects. 
The models in the thesis show that some troublesome waste, such as 
kitchen waste, involved a high disutility of storage may become a household's 
first choice of illegal dumping if composting and recycling aren't available. 
Besides, the more kerbside recycling materials (recycling categories) 
increases recycling and the categories are increased by materials entered 
kerbside recycling later, such as kitchen waste recycling for public compost in 
Taiwan. Cities that haven't provided kerbside paper, plastics and kitchen 
waste should consider doing so. 
Finally, it is shown that population density increases all kinds of 
recyclables. This is probably because the marginal cost of illegal dumping 
(expected fine) rises in high density areas. Greater population density also 
significantly decreases non-recyclables, which might be because households 
in high population density areas possess fewer commodities and generate 
less waste. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Management of municipal solid waste (MSW)' is one of the most 
serious environmental issues in the world. Most large cities have waste 
crises, and the majority of MSW comes from residents (households) rather 
than businesses. For example, 74% MSW in England in 2002/03 derives 
from households2. Moreover, since MSW is an increasing function of per 
capita GDP the problem grows with development. The thesis focuses on 
this aspect of the MSW problem, analysing both the economic factors that 
determine the volume of residential waste, and policies for residential solid 
waste (RSW)3 reduction and recycling. 
1.1 Origin 
Municipal solid waste is a serious environmental issue because, unlike 
most water and air pollutants, it does not decrease as per capita incomes rise. 
There is no turning point4 in the relationship between per capita income and 
municipal solid waste, as there is with many other indicators of environmental 
stress (Cole et al., 1997; Shafik, 1994). This means economic growth, or 
factors associated with economic growth, cannot stop the growth in solid 
waste production. Arrow et al. (1995) said: 
Economic growth is not a panacea for environmental quality; indeed, 
it is not even the main issue. What matters is the content of 
growth... This content is determined by... the economic institutions... 
These institutions need to be designed so that they provide the right 
incentives for protecting the resilience of ecological systems. 
' MSW excludes wastes from agriculture and forestry, industry, and construction etc. 
2 DEFRA (2004) pp. 11. 
3 RSW is solid waste from residents. In some cities, RSW is the same as MSW if solid 
waste collection system for residents and small business are the same. 
4 The hypothesis of environmental Kuzets curve (EKC) - the notion that environmental 
impact increases in the early stages of economic development followed by declines in the 
later stages and the turning point is the per capita income at which environmental impact, 
such as the concentration of SOx (sulphur dioxide), starts to decline as income increase. 
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Besides the growth of waste generation, in many decentralized countries, 
owing to the "not-in-my-backyard" 
(NIMBY) effect, a densely populated city 
cannot export its waste to other jurisdictions, and it is hard to find new landfill 
or incinerator sites in its territory. The problem, from an economic point of 
view, lies in the fact that the increasing waste burden has a number of 
external environmental costs (externalities) that are not taken into account by 
those who generate the wastes. These include that some older landfill sites 
are sources of pollution with uncontrolled leakages (leachate) which may 
pollute soil and groundwater, landfill gas can be hazardous since the largest 
component, methane, can reach explosive concentrations, and the emission 
of incinerator may have an adverse effect on health (Williams, 2005). 
Finding effective solid waste management policies (institutions) for these 
cities is very important. Existing waste policies will be evaluated and ways 
to improve them considered. 
Amongst the waste policies considered will be the use of price-based 
incentives. These are frequently recommended as mechanisms to address 
the external environmental effects of a wide range of economic activities, 
including waste management. Taxes to correct market externalities have 
been popular with economists since they were advocated by Pigou (1920). 
A growing number of communities use unit-pricing policy6 as a strategy for 
encouraging waste diversion and waste reduction. Nevertheless, the 
garbage price in most communities, including Taipei City, does not entirely 
reflect costs of waste disposal and treatment (price content on Appendix 8, 
pp. A91). Most communities use mixed residential solid waste policy, such 
as unit-pricing policy on garbage and free mandatory recycling', or free bulk 
5 Baumol and Oates (1988) defined externality by two conditions. The condition 1 is that an 
externality is present whenever some individual's (say As) utility or production relationships 
include real variables, whose values are chosen by others without particular attention to the 
effects As welfare. The condition 2 is that the decision maker, whose activity affects others' 
utility levels or enters their production functions, does not receive (pay) in compensation for 
this activity an amount equal in value to the resulting benefits (or costs) to others. In Taipei 
City, the land cost of incinerator and landfill, and externality are not included in the price of 
unit-pricing. 
6 Garbage collection and treatment fee are based on, or partially based on, volume or weight 
of waste, rather than a fixed fee or based on other proxies which have no direct relation with 
waste amount. 
Garbage hauler or police fine residents whose garbage bag contains announced recyclable 
materials. 
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and yard-waste collection8. 
The thesis asks what kind of mixed RSW policy 
is most cost effective, and which minimises illegal dumping? 
What makes a pricing policy effective? Most empirical studies of 
unit-pricing are from American communities. For example, Miranda and 
Aldy (1998) found nine American suburban communities reduced waste 
generation (non-recyclables) by about 20% after unit-pricing was adopted, 
but Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) found that the price elasticity of garbage 
collection was only 0.076 in Charlottesville, Virginia. In Taipei City, which is 
the capital of Taiwan and has 2 million residents, the introduction of a 
unit-pricing policy9 decreased RSW by 32.79% and increased the recyclable 
materials by 98.87% in the first two years (Figure 1.1 and 1.2). Besides 
unit-pricing, Taipei also has kerbside recycling and a "no garbage in the 
street" policy10. Do these kinds of collection polices make Taipei City's 
unit-pricing policy better than those of other cities? 
Both planning and design of solid waste management systems require 
accurate quantity and quality prediction of solid waste generation. For 
example, while unit-pricing decreased RSW in Taipei City by more than 30%, 
it took more than two years to convince residents near incinerators to accept 
a waste disposal cooperation agreement with Keelung City". In the 
agreement, the Taipei City government uses its excess incinerator capacity to 
burn some of Keelung's waste, while the burnt ash is returned to Keelung's 
landfill, which also accepts some of the ash from Taipei's incinerator, 
extending the lifespan of Taipei's landfills. 
Conventional forecasting of amounts of solid waste generation uses 
demographic and socioeconomic factors to predict changes in waste 
production (Grossman et al., 1974) or uses a time series model for historical 
8 Based on the nature of waste, RSW can be classified as non-recyclable, recyclable, 
hazardous, and bulky waste. Non-recyclable waste is also called as un-sorted waste, 
mixed waste, or rubbish and garbage for colloquialism. Recyclable waste also called 
recycling are collected recyclable materials. 9 Residents in Taipei have to buy an authorised garbage bag to throw garbage and the price 
of a bag includes its garbage collection and partial treatment cost. 10 Residents in Taipei can only dispose garbage and recyclable materials via handing to a 
municipal waste hauler when they come at some specific time kerbside. 11 'Taipei Mayor Ma said the waste disposal cooperation agreement is mutually beneficial to 
both Taipei and Keelung City, " Central News Agency, June 21 2003. 
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waste data (Katsamaki et al., 1998). These models do not include policy 
variables, and so are unable to predict waste generation under different 
policies. Because decisions about residential waste disposal are made by 
households, the aim of this thesis is to build and calibrate a model in order to 
predict household waste disposal behaviour under different policy options. 
Residential Solid Waste (Non-recyclable Waste) of Taipei City 
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Fig 1.1 Monthly amount of residential solid waste in Taipei City from July 
1999 to July 2002 
Note: Due to a serious flood in Taipei in Sep. 2001, there was a sharp increase in garbage 
collection at that time. Source: Environmental Information System, EPA, Taiwan (ROC). 
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Aggregate Recycled Materials of Taipei City 
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Fig 1.2 Monthly amounts of recyclable materials in Taipei City from 1999 to 
2002 
Note: The data only includes recyclable materials collected by city government (municipal 
waste haulers). Source: Environmental Information System, EPA, Taiwan (ROC). 
1.2 Aims of the Thesis 
The aims of this thesis are to answer the following questions. 
a. How does a household decide on waste disposal? 
b. How do waste management policies change household's behaviour on 
waste disposal and how are the quantity and quality of waste changed 
after various policies are adopted? 
In order to answer these two questions, the following components are 
included in this thesis. 
a. A theoretical model (based on microeconomic theory) of a household's 
solid waste disposal decision. 
b. An empirical model (based on the theoretical model) using data to 
analyse the effects of waste pricing, collection, recycling and 
enforcement/inspection policies. 
c. A policy simulation to estimate costs and benefits of applying various 
5 
policies some cities. 
d. Recommendations to make solid waste pricing and recycling more 
effective based on the findings of the theoretical and empirical studies. 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
The thesis advances the following ideas that differ from those in 
previous studies of RSW policy. Firstly, the disposal option of waste storing 
or composting is considered in this thesis. Many cities had started to 
promote composting in house and many households do store useless or 
recyclable items in house. This option is introduced into the household 
waste disposal model in this thesis, which improves the knowledge of 
household waste disposal behaviour. 
Secondly, waste management characteristics associated with dumping 
labour and illegal dumping prevention are considered in this thesis. The 
total cost of waste disposal includes tariff and labour cost, but previous 
studies only used price and/or dummies for garbage charging as variables in 
household waste disposal models. The cost of illegal dumping, such as 
enforcement and penalty (fine), haven't been included in previous empirical 
studies. This advance should improve the design of RSW management 
schemes and reduce illegal dumping. 
Thirdly, the effect of recycling programs and unit-pricing on different 
recyclable materials is treated directly. Most previous empirical studies 
regard recyclable materials as uniform goods and use aggregate data on 
recycling. However, since each recyclable material has a unique nature, a 
household would make a different choice for each material for waste policies. 
Knowing the effects of waste policies on all kinds of recycling materials can 
contribute not only the design of comprehensive recycling policies, but also 
the design of a waste treatment system, such as the design of an incinerator, 
because the various effects change the quality of waste (composition of 
waste). 
Finally, except for the case of Korean cities discussed by Hong (1999), 
unit-pricing policy in East Asian cities has not been evaluated. The results 
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of the thesis may be compared with those from several previous studies in 
Western countries and show whether the pricing effect differs in different 
cultures. 
The thesis comprises a literature review, the development of theoretical 
models, calibration of the models, policy analysis and conclusions. Chapter 
1 will discuss the origin of the problem; chapter 2 will review existing literature, 
including theoretical and empirical research about solid waste disposal; 
chapter 3 will introduce a theoretical household model; chapter 4 will present 
the applied model and the data survey; chapter 5 will evaluate existing 
policies including estimation of waste disposal demand elasticity; chapter 6 
reports some policy experiments; and chapter 7 offers conclusions which 
propose some effective solid waste policies including pricing and recycling 
schemes. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
Currently, most households in urban areas pay for waste removal 
through a flat monthly or quarterly fee, or through local property or income 
taxes. For example, since 1982, all communities in Taiwan have been 
charging households and small businesses for solid waste collection on the 
basis of each household's bi-monthly consumption of tap water. The 
scheme has a very low administrative cost. Tap water consumption is 
nearly universal in municipalities providing solid waste collection services in 
Taiwan, and is positively correlated with the volume of solid waste produced. 
However, the cost to the waste producer of one more bag of garbage is 
nearly zero. The cost tö society is not. Because waste disposal needs 
capital and may cause foul odour, pollute groundwater, create an eyesore 
etc., the social marginal cost of extra bags is greater than zero. In order to 
internalize the external costs of waste production, economists have 
suggested several tax and subsidy schemes. 
2.1 The Optimal Policy for Residential Solid Waste Management 
Since the pioneering study of Pigou (1920), there are many economic 
studies of mechanisms to encourage a decentralized economy to achieve an 
efficient allocation of resources for waste management. There are two 
categories of externalities 12 related to waste generation. The first one 
includes the external cost of waste disposal which may cause ground water 
pollution by landfill or air pollution by incinerator. It also includes the external 
costs of illegal dumping, which involve both soil and water pollution, but also 
a heightened risk of pests and pathogens. The second one is external benefit 
of recycling which can conserve virgin material and avoid at least some of the 
external costs of waste disposal. Kinnaman and Fullterton (2001) 
summarized previous studies of five kinds of waste policies including taxing 
on each unit of garbage disposed, subsidy for recycling effort, paying an 
12 See footnote 5. 
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advanced disposal 
fee at the time of purchase, taxing on virgin material when 
goods produced, or subsidizing use of recycled materials 
for production. 
This section will review these theoretical waste management studies. 
For the externality of waste disposal, Shinkuma (2003) indicated that the 
social optimum can be achieved in the decentralized first-best economy 
(ignoring transaction costs) through a combination of unit-pricing, advance 
disposal fees and recycling subsidies. Choe and Fraser (1999) and 
Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995) reported similar results. The latter showed 
that when illegal dumping can be taxed (fined), the tax or fine for legal 
dumping, illegal dumping and virgin material usage induced households to 
take externalities into account. If illegal dumping cannot be taxed directly, 
household consumption should be taxed to reflect the externality of illegal 
dumping, the tax being refunded when the waste is dumped legally or 
recycled (Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1995). This is effectively a deposit- 
refund system, which is also second-best policy for toxic waste in Sullivan 
(1987) (first best policy is direct taxation of the externality). Compared with 
advance disposal fees, taxing garbage directly requires information on the full 
social cost of each bag of garbage (Dinan, 1993). 
Taxing virgin materials in combination with a user fee (unit-pricing) is not 
generally efficient, since the same material is effectively taxed twice (Dinan, 
1993). For the same reason, taxing waste-intensive goods only would not 
be efficient when dumping could be taxed directly (Kinnaman and Fullterton, 
2001). 
Because different kinds of waste have different social costs, a uniform 
tax on all types of garbage may be inefficient (Dinan, 1993). In the real 
world, different waste policies apply for different type of waste. For example, 
many countries apply the deposit-refund system for refillable bottles and 
hazardous products: deposits are paid when products are sold and refunds 
given when they are recycled. However, for residential solid waste, few 
communities in the world adopt unit-pricing and free kerbside recycling. 
There are many empirical studies of unit-pricing trying to find the effect of 
such a policy. 
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2.2 The Household Model and Empirical Research 
Most empirical studies of unit-pricing are based on a household 
behaviour model. This section reviews the household model and the results 
of associated empirical studies. 
" Model for household's behaviour of waste disposal 
The model of household behaviour of waste disposal originated in Smith 
(1972), who introduced a dynamic model of social waste accumulation which 
involved a household choice between waste disposal (legal dumping) and 
recycling. Papers discussing household waste disposal focused on these 
two options until Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995) added illegal dumping as the 
third option in their general equilibrium model. However, the household 
utility function in their theoretical model includes disutility from aggregate 
waste disposal and virgin material usage. There is no evidence that 
household's utility is directly affected by these. 
Based on the paper of Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995), Shaw and Tsai 
(2002) built a household utility maximisation model with illegal dumping as an 
option. The household utility function is u(x, B) which is in terms of 
consumption (x) and aggregate illegal dumping (B). Key factors are the 
price for consumption (px), price for garbage collection (pg), compensation 
price for recycled material (pr), wage rate for labour (w) and non-labour 
income (a). If the household dumps its garbage illegally, it has to face an 
expected fine based upon the amount of illegal dumping times the chance of 
been prosecuted (i) and the fine (Pb). Assume that the household time 
endowment is k and it spends kb, kr and kl on illegal dumping, recycling and 
leisure. The labour costs for illegal dumping and recycling are function of 
the amounts (kb = g(b), kr = h(r)). The household's income includes labour, 
non-labour income and subsidy from recycling, which should be equal to 
expenditures on consumption, garbage dumping and expected fine for illegal 
dumping. Then, the household budget constraint becomes 
a+ iv(k - g(b) - h(r) - kl) + prr = psx+ pdd+npbb 
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The household maximises its utility subject to the budget constraint by, ------- 
choosing d, b, r. From the first-order conditions for maximisation of this 
objective, household's decision for waste disposal depends on the price of 
unit-pricing and sum of cost/compensation and labour for illegal and recycling 
disposal. 
Although the labour committed to illegal dumping and recycling is added 
into the household waste disposal model, the labour committed to legal 
dumping and disutility from dealing with garbage are disregarded. The 
labour committed to legal dumping is relatively small. Households in 
communities with different garbage collection policies may be expected to 
commit different amounts of labour to classification, storing waste or 
preparation for dumping. Using only one price for recycling is inappropriate 
because it's usually variable. In most cases, the expected fine for illegal 
dumping is not based on the amount dumped. There is no dynamic model 
for households' three waste disposal options, legal dumping, illegal dumping 
and recycling. 
" Empirical studies from aggregate municipal data 
Although a household's disposal decision depends on the price and 
labour committed to each disposal method, most empirical studies of 
unit-pricing and recycling policies do so through price or policy dummy 
variables only. 
Due to insufficient quantity or variety of data, some studies of 
unit-pricing use descriptive statistics on aggregated communities' waste data, 
including those of Miranda et al., (1994), Seguino et al., (1995), and Miranda 
and Aldy (1998). These authors grouped communities according to different 
policy characteristics and compared communities' mean values of per capita 
garbage and found most communities with unit-pricing have about 20% less 
waste. However, because of the limitation of the methodology used, these 
studies cannot separate the reduction caused by unit-pricing from other 
characteristics of communities. 
Miranda et al. (1994) found 7 out of 9 communities with unit-pricing 
decreased landfilled and incinerated waste by 20 to 50%, and all 
11 
communities saw a 30 to 100% increase in recycling. Communities using 
average cost pricing had greater reduction in landfill and incinerated waste 
than two-tier pricing communities. Unit-pricing communities with mandatory 
or voluntary kerbside recycling programs experienced greater reduction than 
communities with voluntary drop-off recycling programs. Seguino's paper 
found per capita waste in unit-pricing (pay-by-the-bag) communities was 56% 
lower than that in communities without it. Both unit-pricing and mandatory 
recycling programs in non-unit-pricing communities can significantly 
decrease garbage. Moreover, net municipal solid waste management costs 
were lower in unit-pricing communities than in others. Miranda and Aldy 
(1998) showed most communities had at least 20% reduction in waste and 
30% increase in recycling after unit-pricing being adopted, and communities 
with an average costs pricing system, smaller minimum sized container and 
higher unit fee reduce waste more. Moreover, these three studies found 
residents displayed source reduction after unit-pricing and illegal dumping 
was not significant in these communities. 
The most popular method of data analysis in these studies is 
multivariate regression. This kind of empirical study uses panel or 
cross-sectional data to determine the unit-pricing policy effect using a 
multivariate regression model. All studies show unit-pricing policies 
decrease garbage and increase recycling. The demand elasticity for 
non-recyclables waste collection service is between -0.12 to -0.39 for 
American cases (see the upper half of Table 2.1). Note that the estimation 
from Strathman et al. (1995) should be excluded because it is for a tipping fee 
to landfill rather than unit-pricing on residential solid waste. The estimations 
from Wertz (1976) and Jenkins (1993) are lower than those by others, which 
may be explained by the pricing system used. The other three American 
cases found a higher elasticity (0.2- 0.39) from tag and bag pricing systems. 
A study in the Netherlands also found a high elasticity (0.71) for a bag system 
which is even higher than the value for a weight system (0.67) and volume 
system (0.12) (Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2004). Callan and Thomas (1997) 
found towns using unit-pricing without kerbside recycling would increase 
recycling rate by 6.6 percentage points, towns using unit-pricing and kerbside 
recycling by 12.1 percentage points, and towns with only kerbside recycling 
12 
by 4.15 percentage points. Unit-pricing with kerbside recycling has greater 
impact on recycling. 
For garbage (un-sorted or non-recyclables) collection services, Table 
2.2 shows most studies found that more people in the household (increase in 
household size) decreased per capita garbage generation. The coefficient 
of squared household size being positive means waste generation is an 
economy of household scale (Podolsky and Spiegel, 1998). Garbage 
generation showed a positive relation with both the percentage of 18-49 
year-old residents and household income, suggesting that increasing income 
or economic activity raises consumption. The income elasticity is 0.272 and 
0.279 in Wertz (1976), 0.57 in Podolsky and Spiegel (1998) and 0.262 in 
Kinnaman and Fullerton (20.00). Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2004) inferred that 
the reason why the total and un-sorted waste increased with population 
density is the cost of occupied space increased with population density. In 
addition, higher temperature (summer), rain, and percentage of owned house 
in a community generate more garbage. 
In Table 2.2, all studies found that unit-pricing (higher price) and 
kerbside recycling increased recycling. Carroll (1995) analysed the 
community's per household recycling cost of 57 Wisconsin towns with 
kerbside recycling. The result shows town's recycling costs decrease 
when population density is higher and if a town has private-contract 
collection. The kerbside recycling collection frequency and drop-off 
program had no significant impact on recycling cost. Besides policy 
variables, education level and household size had a positive effect on 
recycling. Small or rural village communities seem have higher recycling 
rates. 
Miranda and Bynum (2002) is the only empirical study of illegal dumping 
(undesired diversion) which includes littering, burning, dumping in 
commercial dumpsters, charitable dumping, 'wrong' recycling, and carrying 
to other jurisdiction (totting). They found that the provision of kerbside yard 
waste collection, the rural population percentage, and the 18-24 year-old 
percentage significantly increased illegal dumping. This result shows 
illegal dumping may not be increased by unit-pricing. 
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" Empirical studies from household surveys data 
Empirical studies from household survey data reveal a low elasticity of 
non-recyclables dumping, especially in the US case of can/volume system 
(see tower half of Table 2.1). It was insignificant in Hong et al. (1993), 0.058 
in Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996), and 0.013 in Hong and Adams (1999). 
This is much lower than results from bag and weight systems (Hong, 1999; 
Houtven and Morris, 1999; Linderhof eta/., 2001). The cross-price elasticity 
for recycling is similar. 
Although these estimates are for different pricing systems, the 
difference cannot be explained by estimation methods because two of Hong's 
papers (1993 and 1999) for the US cases corrected for the disposal price. 
The differences in elasticity values may be ascribed to the nature of the 
pricing system and to life styles. The can/volume, tag/sticker and bag 
system in the US are based on a large standard volume, about 32 gallons 
(121 litres), which is much larger than the bag system in Japan or Taiwan 
which uses 10,20 or 30 litre bags. Households in the large block pricing 
system decide the disposal volume without direct price signals because the 
charge of disposal is the same no matter how full the garbage bag or can is. 
The pricing effect happens on the breakpoints in the collection service 
payment schedule (Hong et aL, 1993). Households use source reduction or 
recycling to meet the predefined volume. Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) 
used direct measure and found a huge discrepancy between the 
arc-elasticity 13 for volume (0.226) and weight (0.058), which shows 
households in can/volume systems stomp their waste to decrease the 
collection payment. Nestor and Podolsky (1998) compared bag and can 
pricing systems and found the bag system increases kerbside recycling 
significantly more than the can system., The weight system in the 
Netherlands resulted in a much higher elasticity over both short and long 
terms (Linderhof et al., 2001), probably because the pricing unit is kilogram 
which is smaller than dozens of litres in bag or can system. An important 
13 When there is no price difference, only zero (flat fee) in advance and one price 
(unit-pricing) afterward, the elasticity (point-elasticity at unit-pricing price) cannot be obtained 
but arc-elasticity at mean price (half of unit-pricing price) can be calculated. 
16 
result in Hong 
(1999) is that the source reduction falls (total waste generation 
increases) when recycling is increased by free kerbside recycling and 
unit-pricing policies. This result is partially consistent with the household 
waste disposal model which shows household trade-offs between options. 
For garbage (un-sorted or non-recyclables) collection services, most 
studies found more people in the household (increased household size) 
increased the household's dumping, and households with more children, 
infants, women, less elders, and less people staying at home would generate 
more garbage (Table 2.3). Shaw and Tsai (2002) found both unit-pricing 
and mandatory recycling can significantly increase household's time 
spending on recycling but only unit-pricing can decrease garbage dumped. 
Household income has variable effects on waste generation. It is negative 
in Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) but positive in Richardson and Havlicek 
(1978), Hong et al., (1993), and Hong (1999) (0.242,0.049 and 0.055). The 
marginal effect of income is quite small which means garbage generation is 
income inelastic. Households in urban areas, those with smaller living area, 
and those having garages are found to generate less garbage. Hong and 
Adams (1999) found households generate more garbage in Spring. 
Linderhof et al. (2001) found more compostable disposals when temperature 
was high, which may be ascribed to more yard waste. In this research, he 
also found that less garbage is generated in the third quarter, which might be 
the effect of vacations or at least fewer people or less time spent in house. 
For recycling activity, most studies found more people in the household 
(increased household size) would increase the household's recycling, and a 
household with more income, higher education, and less elderly people 
would do more recycling (Table 2.3). Households with less full-time working 
members - which means lower value of time - would do more recycling. In 
the community without unit-pricing, households don't have money incentives 
to reduce waste disposal and/or recycle. The time costs of recycling might 
be a dominant economic consideration. Bruvoll et al. (2002) surveyed in 
Norway and found that sorting at source involves significant extra use of time 
and energy (e. g. using warm water to clean the materials) in the households. 
Jakus et al. (1996) found households respond to the time cost of recycling 
17 
paper but not glass. Since time cost is the main consideration for household 
recycling, Shaw and Tsai (2002) used time spent to represent household 
recycling efforts. 
Besides policy (money) incentives and time costs, some households 
recycle without direct economic incentives. The meta-analysis of 67 
empirical studies done by Hornik et al. (1995) found that the strongest 
predictors of recycling are internal facilitators: specifically, consumer 
knowledge and commitment to recycling best predicts propensity to recycle. 
Shaw and Tsai (2002) introduced many attitude variables and found that 
having more recycling knowledge can increase household recycling time, and 
environmentally friendly attitudes can decrease garbage and increase 
recycling time, which is consistent with results in Houtven and Morris (1999). 
The only empirical study for illegal dumping behaviour with household 
survey data is Reschovsky and Stone (1994). That research asks whether 
respondents burned their trash, and showed that unit-pricing had no 
significant impact on illicit burning but single-family and family in rural area 
dwellings tended to do so. 
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" Empirical studies with recyclable material-specific data 
There are fewer empirical studies focusing on recycling than those on 
garbage, and only Reschovsky and Stone (1994), Sterner and Bartelings 
(1999), Jenkins, Martinez et al. (2003) and Kipperberg (2006) used household 
material-specific recycling data to analyse the effect of recycling program 
features and unit-pricing. The summary of these studies is in Table 2.4. The 
first one surveyed 1422 households in Tompkins County, Ithaca, New York 
asking them whether they recycle (dichotomous variable). The combination 
of mandatory recycling and kerbside recycling increased the probability of 
recycling newspaper and glass by 22 and 37 percent respectively. Kerbside 
recycling with unit-pricing (tag system) significantly increased the probability of 
recycling glass, plastic and cardboard but unit-pricing alone had no significant 
impact on probability of recycling. Respondents who are married, have a 
higher education level, and include more females in the household recycle 
more waste. This is similar to studies on aggregate recycling. However, 
income has a negative effect on glass and plastic recycling, and household 
size also has a negative effect on newspaper recycling, which contradicts 
studies on aggregate recycling in Table 2.3. In addition to recycling, this 
study estimated that income elasticities of solid waste collection demand were 
0.23 and 0.22 for volume and weight respectively. 
Sterner and Bartelings (1999) surveyed 600 households in 3 Swedish 
communities, 200 in each, asking them what percentage they recycled for 
selected materials. The municipality dummies are only significant in glass 
recycling regression. Eda and Mark have higher recycling percentage. than 
Amal, excluding household variables' effects. Respondents from municipality 
Eda have the highest average percentage of paper and glass recycling. This 
result probably because Eda adopted unit-pricing (weight system) and raised 
the price by 12% during the survey. The previous recycling experience and 
the ease of recycling have positive effect on most materials. 
Jenkins et al. (2003) surveyed 1939 middle and upper-middle income 
households in 20 metropolitan areas with recycling programs in the US asking 
them what proportion of selected materials be recycled, within pre-selected 
ranges (0-10%, 11-95% and over 95%). They found both drop-off and 
20 
kerbside recycling programs significantly increased recycling of all five 
materials, newspaper, glass bottles, aluminium, plastic bottles and yard waste, 
and increases for bottles and yard waste were larger, probably because 
recycling these materials has higher transportation and storage costs. Length 
of program life also increases the intensity of recycling effort for newspaper 
and yard waste. The number of materials collected at kerbside has positive 
effect on newspaper, plastic bottles, and yard waste recycling. Kipperberg 
(2006) used similar household material-specific recycling intensity survey to 
study the recycling behaviours in Norway and compare with Jenkins' paper. 
He found that disposal fee provides higher recycling incentive than it does in 
the US but recycling options, such as kerbside and drop-off recycling, have 
lower incentive than they do in the US. Jenkins' paper proposed two 
explanations for insignificant effect of disposal fee. The respondents of their 
survey are higher income and the disposal price is too low to affect behaviour, 
or the volume subscription pricing system provides discontinuous price signals 
which only make households reduce trash to the pre-decided volume rather 
than increase recycling. 
These empirical studies disagree on whether unit-pricing significantly 
increases recycling, but got a consistent result that unit-pricing with kerbside 
recycling has the greater impact on recycling. Both Reschovsky and Jenkins' 
papers (cases in the US. ) found that mandatory recycling did not have 
significant impact on the level of recycling but Kipperberg's paper (cases in 
Norway) found it can significantly increase metals and food waste recycling. 
Household survey studies use self-reported recycling participation and 
only two or three recycling proportions are given, which are highly uncertain. 
The result may be biased if respondents were more likely to be recyclers, or if 
respondents tend to give high recycling proportions as `social correct' 
responses (Reschovsky and Stone, 1994). For example, an English case 
(Burnley) shows 80% households claiming to recycle paper on survey but the 
community's recycling rate is only half the national average of 12% (Martin et 
a/., 2006). Reschovsky's paper also found information for recycling and 
adequate space for storing recyclable materials increase amount recycled for 
almost every recyclable. However, information and adequate space might be 
21 
endogenous for respondent's behaviour because households that do not 
recycle may be more inclined to cite inadequate storage space or lack of 
information (Podolsky and Spiegel, 1998). The information and ease of 
recycling variables in Sterner's paper have the endogenous problem as well. 
Sterner's paper found that households with experience on recycling tend to 
recycle more for almost every kind of material, but this result cannot be 
inferred directly to accustoming to recycle because the experience variable 
also naturally picks up a large share of the relevant individual characteristics. 
For socioeconomic variables, these studies found that higher education 
and elder have significant positive effect on most recyclable materials. 
Income was only significant for some materials. Finally, characteristics of 
garbage collection and illegal dumping prevention were not included in these 
studies. 
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2.3 Policy Simulation 
The variables obtained from empirical studies can be used for policy 
simulations. Morris and Holthausen (1994) built a household solid waste 
generation model and calibrated it with per household data of expenditures 
and waste in Perkasie, Pennsylvania. From this model, they estimated the 
arc-elasticity of price changing from $0.05 to $0.075/lb to be 0.51 and from 
$0.75 to $0.10/lb to be 0.60. However, if the data contains variation in waste 
disposal prices, elasticities can be estimated directly. Using the estimated 
price elasticities, it is possible to simulate the household waste generation or 
recycling under various policy combinations. 
2.4 Literature Review Summary 
The price elasticity of garbage discards is between -0.2 to -0.28 in most 
multivariate regression studies for bag and tag system, which means this kind 
of unit-pricing decreases garbage but is quite inelastic. Almost every 
empirical study found kerbside recycling can promote recycling. However, 
most estimates based on household survey data were lower than those based 
on aggregate data. Besides the policy variables, empirical studies also found 
higher temperature, households with more income and household size would 
increase household's waste generation. Households with more income, 
education, time of staying in house, and environmental friendly attitudes favour 
greater recycling. These findings are consistent with expectations and with 
household waste disposal models. 
According to the review of household waste disposal models, households 
have at least three disposal options, the decision depending on the cost of 
each option including price and the labour cost of disposal. However, 
previous studies still lack many important features and factors including: 
a. Since the value of time significantly effected recycling, which means the 
labour for recycling is significant, the labour for dumping should be included 
as well. 
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b. Some papers, like that by Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000), used population 
density as a proxy for difficulty of illegal dumping and got insignificant result. 
However, the direct illegal dumping prevention policies, such as fine, 
enforcement and collection rules etc., are all absent in previous studies. 
c. For garbage generation, Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2004) referred to the 
significant positive coefficient of population density as increasing cost of 
storing. The coefficient of having garage is found significant negative 
(Hong and Adams, 1999). These results infer households may have 
another disposal option- storing or composting in house, which did not 
include in pervious household model. 
d. Aside from a few material-specific recycling studies, the literature surveyed 
above regards garbage and recyclable materials as uniform goods and 
uses aggregate amounts of recyclable materials for empirical evaluation. 
Nevertheless, every material is found to have unique effects of drop-off and 
kerbside recycling policies (Jenkins et al., 2003). In most countries, 
different recycling policies are applied to distinct materials, such as 
deposit-refund system on bottles, trade of scrap paper, mandatory recycling 
on hazardous waste and so on, which should be included in 
material-specific recycling studies to design adequate systems for each 
material. 
All of these drawbacks will be treated in this thesis, and some will be 
corrected. 
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Chapter 3 Household Waste Disposal Models 
In order to study the characteristics of different waste management 
policies, this chapter adapts models developed by Kinnaman and Fullterton 
(2001) and Smith (1972). However, issues not fully considered before, such 
as the fourth disposal option - storing or composting, recycling-specific models 
and the labour costs of legal dumping, illegal dumping and recycling, are all 
discussed in models of this chapter. Individual household models and social 
model, and the policy implications of them, are also discussed. 
3.1 Background of Building Household Waste Disposal Models 
According to the literature review, the labour for dumping has not been 
considered in previous literature. However, there are two main reasons why 
dumping labour is important for households in some highly populated cities 
and why, therefore, it should be considered in household waste disposal 
models. Firstly, most households in Taiwanese and Japanese cities live in 
flatslapartments or high-rise building and have to bring their garbage down to 
kerbside garbage collection points which may be around a block away from 
their building. Automatic waste collection systems are very rare because 
dumpsters which usually work with automatic collection systems are not 
allowed for residential waste collection in some cities. Secondly, households 
in flats/apartments have limited storage capacity even for temporary waste 
storing probably because of the smaller living space and/or high garbage 
collection frequency in some cities. When the amount of garbage is larger, a 
household would need more labour for temporary storing and preparing 
disposal. 
Labour for garbage disposal is thus required by households, the same is 
true for recycling. In most households in Taiwanese and Japanese cities, the 
wife, children or elderly relatives in the household take care of waste disposal. 
That takes their time for household production. 
27 
3.2 Models for a Household 
A household's solid waste management decision can be modelled in 
many ways. In a city with n households, at time t, the representative 
household (i) consumes goods (x1), a portion of which (ax, ) becomes useless 
goods (potential waste). If the city has a solid waste and recycling collection 
service, a household's waste must either be discarded as garbage for 
collection (d, ), recycling (rt) or dumped illegally (b, )14. Waste not discarded in 
these three ways must be stored or composted (s, ) in house. If waste is 
composted, it has decomposition rate (0). The waste in house can still be 
discarded in the future. These together imply that the change of s, or mass 
constraint, is 
Ds / at = ax, - d, - b, - r, - Os, (3-1) 
If the waste is durable or stored without composting, the decomposition rate (¢ ) 
is zero, which implies that the mass constraint becomes 
ax, -d, -b, -r, -s, =0 (3-2) 
Although storing/compost option is added into the model, the storage capacity 
in most dwellings in city area where empirical study will be taken is very limited. 
Assuming that the waste accumulation doesn't transfer to successive time 
periods, household waste disposal behaviour will be modelled as time-static 
choice. 
The household obtains utility from consumption, and disutility from storing 
waste in the house because, for example, it has foul odour or takes space. 
n 
The aggregate level of illegal dumping 
, 
(B1 = Yb1) imposes a cost on all 
households, in terms of the disutility of odour, sight, the increased risk of pests 
and diseases and so on. Assume that the marginal utility of consumption, the 
disutility of storing garbage and the disutility of illegal dumping are diminishing, 
which means ii >0, u<0, tts <0, it i SS <01 11B <0 and t'BB <0. 
Illegal dumping is a public non-depletable externality. If the household's 
14 Define as any waste disposal outside a resident's house but not via municipal garbage and 
recycling collection services. 
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discount rate is J, the i household's utility is 
L ll'(X'r, Sr, Bt di 0 (3-3) 
Assume that the household labour time endowment is L and that the 
household spends Ld, Lb, Lr and Ls on legal dumping, illegal dumping, 
recycling and composting (classifying, preparing, bringing materials to 
discarding points and composting). Assume that the labour committed to 
waste disposal is a function of the amounts, Ld(d), Lb(b), Lr(r) and Ls(s). 
The marginal effect of dumping amount is positive and diminishing, implying 
that Ldd >0 and Lddd <0. However, because the household's budget 
constraint is different under different waste management policies, so is the 
model of household waste disposal. 
3.2.1 The household model with flat fee garbage collection services 
Marginal costs for garbage and recycling dumping are zero when prices 
are not based on the amount of waste disposed of (disposal is either free or 
subject to a flat fee). The first model considers a household in a high 
population density area in which composting is not available. Waste can only 
be disposed or stored in house. Storing waste is assumed to require no 
labour and the decomposition rate is zero. Therefore, given the price for 
consumption (px) and wage for labour (w), the household budget constraint 
becomes 
w(L - Ld(d1) - Lb(b, 
) 
- Lr(r, 
)) = Pxx, (3-4) 
The household maximizes its utility (3-3) subject to the budget constraint 
(3-4) and mass constraint (3-2) by choosing xi, d1, b,, r1 and st. The Lagrangian 
function for this system is 
Lh = u'(x,, s,, B1) + 
A, [w(L-Ld(d, )-Lb(b, )-Lr(r, ))-Pxx: ]+22(ax1 -d1 -b, -r, -sr) 
while the first-order conditions for optimization of the Lagrangian function 
include 
ux - px2, + aß, 2 =0 (3-5) 
w(Lddjlº +' 2=0 (3-6) 
- uB + w(Lbbr A+ A2 =0 (3-7) 
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{Lr 
l 
)2, + AZ =0 (3-8) 
us - A2 =0 (3-9) 
ax, - d1 - br - rl - sr =0 (3-2) 
14L - Ld 
(dl) 
- Lb(b, ) - Lr(r1)) - pxx, =0 (3-4) 
The second derivative of L,, on x1, d,, r, and s, are z, , w(Lddd)2 , 
. A, 
is the multiplier of budget constraint which is the w(Lr)A1 and it IS 
marginal utility of income (the shadow price of income) and is positive. 
Replacing the 22 with us (Eq. 3-9), ý is equal to (au' +uz)/Ps 
Because the wage (w) must be positive, and u' , Lddd , Lrr, and tiSS are 
negative, these second derivatives ensure that Eq. 3-5,3-6,3-8 and 3-9 can 
maximise L,,. The second derivative of Lh on b is - uB'B + w(Lbbb) a1, which is 
negative only when i4B > w(LbbbA . 
With this constraint, a household's 
utility can be maximised, and the first-order conditions have following 
interpretations. 
a. Equation 3-5 shows that when a household pays the price (px) to consume 
a marginal unit of goods, it gets marginal utility (us) plus a unit of waste. 
b. Equations 3-6 and 3-8 show that a household has to spend labour cost, 
w(LddJ2I, to discard a unit of waste by legal dumping or #,; ) )A. 1 for 
recycling a unit of waste. 
c. Because illegal dumping is a public non-depletable externality, it' is the 
disutility from a household increasing a unit of aggregate illegal dumping. 
Equation 3-7 shows that when a household spends labour, w(Lbb, )'% , to 
discard a unit of waste by illegal dumping, that also generates disutility 
from increasing aggregate illegal dumping (u') to itself. 
d. From Equation 3-9, the marginal change of useless goods amounts (A2) 
should be equal to res which is the marginal cost of storing a unit of waste 
in house. 
e. The equilibrium condition for a household's waste disposals can be found 
by Equation 3-6,3-7,3-8 and 3-9, which is 
(3-11) w(Ldd) = w(Lbb) - 
LB 
= w(Lr,., ) Al Al 
This equilibrium condition shows that the equilibrium is achieved when a 
household's marginal total cost on each disposal option is equal. 
When composting is available, the household budget constraint becomes 
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w(L - Ld(d, 
) 
- Lb(bt) - Lr(r, 
) 
- Ls(s, 
)) = Pxx, (3-4a) 
The problem now takes the form: 
Lh = u'(x,. s Br)+ 
A, [w(L - Ld(d, ) - Lb(b, 
) 
- Lr(r, 
) 
- Ls(s, 
)) -px, 
]+ 22 (axt - d, - b, - r, - ¢sj 
The first-order conditions for x,, d,, br and rr are exactly the same as Equations 
3-5,3-6,3-7 and 3-8, but for s, becomes 
- us + w(Lss, 
)2, + 022 =0 (3-9a) 
AZ =225 - (-0) (3-1Oa) 
Equation 3-9a shows that when a household uses labour, w(Lss1)21 , to 
compost a unit of waste, that also generates disutility (us) to itself. The 
second derivative of L,, on s is - ti's + w(Ls)21, which is negative only when 
U'. > w(Ls5S)2,. With this constraint, a household's utility can be maximised, 
and the equilibrium condition between disposals becomes 
1, i 
w{Ld dl) = w(Lbb, 
) 
-t= w(Li", t) = 
[w(Lsst) 
- 
us ! r¢ (3-11 a) A, 
This equilibrium condition (Eq. 3-11a) is similar to the previous one (Eq. 3-11) 
except for the marginal cost of composting or storing. Compared with storing, 
composting demands household labour of w(Lss1) but benefits by reducing a 
part (¢) of stored waste. 
These two models, models with and without composting option, support 
the following propositions. 
In a town with only flat fee kerbside garbage collection service, a 
household would have only a small incentive to illegal dumping, recycling, 
composting and storing because these options have higher marginal cost 
than legal dumping which only contains labour for bring garbage to 
kerbside. 
II. In a city with flat fee kerbside garbage and recycling collection services, a 
household recycles more waste than those without kerbside recycling 
does because kerbside recycling lowers the labour for carrying 
recyclables. 
III. In the city where composting is not available, a household with higher 
wages (iv) stores more waste than those with lower wages because 
dumping and recycling demand more labour than storage (from Eq. 3-11). 
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3.1.4 The household model with unit-pricing policy on waste collection 
Some waste management authorities want to internalise the externalities 
of garbage collection. Given prices for garbage and recycling collection arepd 
and p,. When composting is unavailable for the household, the budget 
constraint becomes 
w{L - Ld 
(d1) - Lb(b, ) - Lr(r, 
)) = Psx, + Pdd, + Prr: (3-4b) 
The Lagrangian function is 
Lh = t['(x:, s1, Br)+ 
Ai[w(L-Ld(d, )-Lb(b, )-Lr(rr))-Pxx, -Pdd, - Prrf] +22(ax, -d, -br -r -seý 
and the first-order conditions for x,, b, and s, are exactly the same as for 
Equations 3-5,3-7 and 3-9, but Equation 3-6 and 3-8 become 
(w{Lddf) + PJ2, + A2 =0 (3-6b) 
(w(Lrrt) + PrA + 22 =0 (3-8b) 
The second derivative of Lh on dd and rr are w(Lddd )2, <0 and w(Lr )21 <0 
which ensure Eq. 3-6b and 3-8b can maximise L,,. Equation 3-6b and 3-8b 
show that the marginal cost of household dumping includes both labour and 
the price of collection. When composting is available, the first-order condition 
for s, is the same as in with Equation 3-9a. The equilibrium conditions under 
flat fee and unit-pricing policies are listed in Table 3. IA. 
Equilibrium conditions in Table 3.1A have some policy implications. 
Assume that a household's legal dumping level is d* whilst its illegal dumping 
is b*. The equilibrium condition between legal and illegal dumping is 
w(Ldd. ) = w(Lbb$) - 
(iq. /, 11). From proposition I, w(Ldd. ) is small and b* is 
close to zero. When the unit-price, pd, is applied, the household's dumping is 
d' and illegal dumping is b', w(Lbb. ) - 
((B. / 2, ) > w(Lbb. ) - 
(iti. / 2, ) because 
Pd + w(Ldd. ) > w(Ldd, ). Since aLd / ad > 0, the household engages in more 
illegal dumping than before (b'> b *). Using this method, two propositions 
can be found in Table 3. IA. 
IV. A household under unit-pricing policy (garbage and/or recycling collection) 
does more illegal dumping than under a flat fee because the marginal cost 
of dumping and/or recycling are increased by unit-pricing. 
V. A household under a unit-pricing policy composts or stores more waste 
than under a flat fee because the marginal cost of dumping and/or 
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recycling are increased in unit prices. 
Thhle 3. IA Eauilibrium conditions under various solid waste policies 
waste management policy equilibrium conditions 
between legal dumping (d, ) and illegal dumping (b1) 
flat fee w(Ld d, 
) = tiv(Lbb, ) - 11B 
unit-pricing on d1 and ri pd + w(Lddr) = w(Lbbr) - uB 
between illegal dumping (b, ) and recycling (rr) 
flat fee w(Lbb, ) - uB / Al = tiv(Li;, ) 
unit-pricing on dt and rt w(Lbb, ) - uB /A, 
)= iv(Lrr, ) + pr 
between legal dumping (di) and recycling (rl) 
flat fee w(Lddf) = w(Lr, ) 
unit-pricing on d, and rt Pb + w(Ldd, ) = w(Lr, ) + Pr 
between storing (st) and legal dumping (d, ) 
flat fee w(Ld1) = -us / 1a, 
unit-pricing on d, and r, Pb + w(Ld, ) = -us 
between composting (s1) and legal dumping (d, ) 
flat fee w(Ldr) = w(Lsr) - u, / ý, l¢ 
unit-pricing on dr and rl Pb + w(Ld1) = w(Ls, 
) 
- us / A, / 
In proposition IV, households under unit-pricing on garbage collection do 
more illegal dumping. Therefore, some authorities apply penalties for illegal 
dumping and maybe provide free recycling collection (p, = 0). Assume the 
nominal fine for illegal dumping is Pb and the chance of being prosecuted is 7V 
which is function of enforcement (Eb) and dumping amount (b). The marginal 
effect of illegal dumping and enforcement on )r are positive and diminishing, 
such as ; rb >0 and . rbb <0. When composting is unavailable for the 
household, the budget constraint becomes 
qL 
- Ld(d1) - Lb(b1) - Lr(rr)) = pxx¬ + pdd, + ir(Eb, b1)Pb + prr, (3-4c) 
The Lagrangian function is 
Lh =u'(xr, s,, B, )+ 
A [iv(L-Ld(d, )-Lb(b, )-Lr(r, ))- prx, -Pad, -ir(Eb, b, 
)Pb - Prr, 
I+ 
Ajax, -d, -b, -r, -sj 
The first-order conditions for xl, dt, rt and st are exactly the same as in 
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Equations 3-5,3-6b, 3-8b and 3-9, but Equation 3-7 becomes 
- uB + 
(w(Lbbt) + 7rbtPb)"I + Az =0 (3-7c) 
The second derivative of L,, on b, is - uBB + (w(Lbbb) + '7bbPb)AI which is 
negative only when (tiv(Lbbb) + lrbbPb)2, < 11B . With this constraint, a 
household's utility can be maximised. 
When composting is available, the first-order condition for s, is the same 
as in Equation 3-9a. The equilibrium conditions between composting, storing 
and legal dumping are the same as Table 3.1A. The equilibrium conditions 
for unit-pricing with penalties for illegal dumping and free recycling are listed in 
Table 3.113. Comparing the equilibrium conditions in Table MA and 3.113, 
yields the following proposition. 
VI. If the marginal expected fine (7cbpb) is the same as the price of unit-pricing 
(pd), the equilibrium condition between legal and illegal dumping is the 
same as under flat fee. With this condition, a household would not 
increase illegal dumping after unit-pricing is adopted. 
Assume that a household's dumping is d* and recycling is r* when 
household's utility is maximised under flat fee policy. The equilibrium 
condition between dumping and recycling is w(Ldd. ) = w(Lr,, ) . From 
proposition I, r* is small. When the unit-pricing price, pd, is applied and the 
household's dumping is d' and recycling is r', #r,. ) > #r,. ) because 
pd + w(Ldd, ) > w(Ldd, ). This results in the following proposition. 
VII. When policies of unit-pricing on garbage collection, fining illegal dumping 
and free recycling collection are adopted, a household recycles more 
waste than it does in the flat fee policy. 
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irnhIP 3.1 B Equilibrium conditions under various solid waste policies 
solid waste policy equilibrium conditions 
between legal dumping (d1) and illegal dumping (b, ) 
flat fee w(Lddt) = w(Lbb, ) - uä / A., 
unit-pricing 1,2 Pd + w(Lddt) = tiv(Lbbt )- ttB` /+ ;r btPb 
between illegal dumping (b1) and recycling (r, ) 
flat fee tiv(Lbb, ) - UB /2= w(Lrrt 
unit-pricing 1 2rbtPb + lv(Lbbr) - uB / Al = tiv(Lr) + Pr 
unit-pricing 2 KbtPb + w(Lbbr)- tit' /A,, = w(Lrrt) 
between legal dumping (d1) and recycling (rt) 
flat fee w(Lddl) = iv(Lrt ) 
unit-pricing 1 Pb + w(Lddt) = w(Lrt) + Pr 
unit-pricing 2 Pb + w(Ldd, ) = w(Lrr, ) 
Note: ' unit-pricing is applied on dt and r,, and fine on b1; 2 unit-pricing is applied on d1, fine on b,, 
and free kerbside recycling is provided (pr = 0). 
The equilibrium conditions in Table 3. IA and Table 3.1B show how 
policies influence the household's waste disposal choices, but the function of 
each disposal and policy variables must be found by solving the optimisation 
system. Because the effort for legal, illegal and recycling dumping are 
functions of the amount of waste disposal, the function forms can be assumed 
to be Ld = 0.5ad 2, Lb = 0.5ßb2 and Lr = 0.5yr2 . a, ß and y are 
legal 
dumping, illegal dumping and recycling labour factors. Many papers including 
Kinnaman and Fullterton (2001) and Shaw and Tsai (2002) have a similar 
quadratic assumption for function form of labour cost. The first-order 
conditions for x,, d1, r1 and st, Eq. 3-5,3-6b, 3-7c, 3-8b, and 3-9, become: 
ux - psi., + a112 =0 (3-5) 
(wad, + Pd )2 + 22 =0 (3-6b') 
- uB + (1vßb1 + IrbtPbA + 22 =0 (3-7c') 
V Pt + PJ2 + 22 =0 (3-8b') 
of - 22 =0 (3-9) 
Solving the first order conditions yields the household waste disposal choices 
which are summarised by: 
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d, =V- 
Pd 
, 
bf ? Cb1Pb + us r -_ - 
P. (3-12) 
wa w/3 ivy 
The yr in Eq. 3-12 is 
( 
usps)/(iix + aus which is the marginal disutility of 
storing useless items measured in the income's shadow price. Each waste 
disposal decreases as its tariff (pd, 'biPb, Pr ), wage (w) and/or labour factor 
(a, ß, y) increased. 
3.2.3 The household model with mandatory recycling policy 
In order to promote recycling, some cities adopt mandatory recycling 
policy with fines for households dumping recyclable materials as 
non-recyclable garbage. Assume that the chance of being prosecuted (p) 
increases with enforcement (Er), and decreases with recycling (1/r), and the 
fine for insufficient recycling p, n. To prevent illegal dumping, fining of illegal 
dumping may be applied. When composting is unavailable for the household, 
the budget constraint becomes 
w(L - Ld 
(dr) 
- Lb(bt) - Lr(r, 
)) = pxx, +p Er, 
1 
p, ý + ; r(Eb, 
br )pb =0 (3-4e) 
r 
The Lagrangian function is 
Lh = u' (x, , s, , B, 
) + 
A, lv(L - Ld (d, 
) 
- Lb(b, ) - Lr(r, )) - PzxI - It Er, 
Y 
pm - ir(Eb, b, )Pb, + 
'2 
(ax, 
-d, -bt -rr - s, ) 
The first-order conditions for x,, dl, b1 and st are exactly the same as in 
Equations 3-5,3-6,3-7c and 3-9, but Equation 3-8 and the equilibrium 
condition becomes 
" lLYrt /1P. + 
22 =0 (3-8e) 
The second derivative of L,, on r, is 
(w(Lr, ) - 2p, r 
/ r3)A1, which is negative 
only when w(Lrr, ) < (2p / r3 
). With this constraint, a household's utility can 
be maximised. The expected fine decreases as more recycling and the 
marginal cost of recycling is decreased. When the composting is available, 
the first-order condition for sr is the same as Equation 3-9a. The equilibrium 
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conditions under various solid waste policies are listed in Table 3.1 C. 
Table 3.1 C Equilibrium conditions under various solid waste policies 
solid waste policy equilibrium conditions 
between legal (d1) and illegal dumping (be) 
flat fee w(Ldd, ) = iv(Lbb, ) - uB / A., 
unit-pricing (fine on b and p, = 0) Pd + w(Ldd, ) = w(Lbbr)- uB 7tb(Pb 
mandatory recycling w(Ldd, ) = tiv(Lbb, ) - uB /'0+)rb: Pb 
between illegal dumping (be) and recycling (r, ) 
flat fee w(Lbb, ) - uB / A, = w(Li,! ) 
unit-pricing (fine on b and Pr = 0) irb, Pb + w(Lbb, ) - uB / ý, = w(Lrr, ) 
mandatory recycling 7rb(Pb + w(Lbb, ) - 
(UB 
w(Lr«) - Prg pm rt 
between legal dumping (d1) and recycling (r, ) 
flat fee w(Lddf) = w(Lrr1) 
unit-pricing (fine on b and Pr = 0) Pb + w(Ldd, ) = w(Lr, ) 
mandatory recycling w(Ldd, ) = w(Lrr, ) - p,, p, n 
/ r, 2 
between storing (s, ) and recycling (rt) 
flat fee - us / Al = *rl ) 
unit-pricing (fine on b and Pr = 0) - us w(Lr, 1) 
mandatory recycling - u' / Al = w(Lr,, ) - , unPm / rte 
between composting (st) and recycling (r1) 
flat fee w(Ls, ) - us 
unit-pricing (fine on b and Pr = 0) iv(Ls, ) - us / Al /O= w(Lr, ) 
mandatory recycling iv(Ls, ) - us / ý1,1 0= tiv(Lr l) - P, rPm / rr2 
The equilibrium conditions in Table 3.1 C support following proposition. 
Vlll. A household under mandatory recycling (including fines for illegal 
dumping) recycles more waste, has less illegal dumping, and 
stores/composts less waste than under a flat fee policy, because the 
marginal cost of recycling is decreased by the expected value of the fine 
(urlpm / r, 2) and the marginal cost of illegal dumping is increased by 
expected fine (7rbfPb). 
Assume the function form of labour cost is also quadratic. Then, Eq. 
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3-8e becomes 
WA-2 Pm "7 -i- /12 = (3-8e') 
The function of each disposal and policy option can be found by solving the 
first-order condition set, Eq. 3-5,3-6b', 3-7c', 3-8e', and 3-9. Eq. 3-8e' can be 
further sorted out as 
rr2 
(1'vlryt 
- V/) = Prpm 
(3-8e") 
The household's recycling (r, ) is function of the marginal fine (pr pm ), the wage 
rate (w), recycling labour factor (y) and the disutility of storing waste measured 
by the shadow value of income (yr) (r, =f (iv, y, pr pm, V)). 
3.2.4 The model with more disposal options 
In many cases, households have more than four disposal options, 
including recycling, such as kerbside recycling, recycling (reuse) in house and 
selling to private collectors. Assume waste can be recycled into K recycling 
streams (rkt) and the price for each is (pk). The mass constraint becomes 
x 
ax, - d, -b, -1] rkt -st =0 (3-2f) 
k=1 
The labour for recycling is assumed to be function of the total amount, 
Lr(> rk). Then the budget constraint becomes 
w(L - Ld(d, 
) 
- Lb(b, 
) 
- Lr(ý rj) = px1 + 
1: Prk rkt + Pd dr +'(Eb, b, )pb (3-4f) 
The first-order conditions for xt, d,, b, and s1 are exactly the same as Equation 
3-5,3-6,3-7c and 3-9, but Equation 3-8 becomes 
(w(Lrrk$) 
+ Prk )", +'2=0 (3-8f) 
This condition is the same as Eq. 3-8b except for the subscript of specific 
recyclable material. A household's recycling behaviour depends on each 
material's marginal recycling labour cost and tariff. 
This model shows the various recycling ways make equilibrium change. 
For example, a household chooses between kerbside recycling and recycling 
in house (on-site recycling). The price for kerbside recycling is p,. The 
equilibrium condition becomes w(Lio) = i#r,, R) + PKR . If the labours for 
both are similar, a household does more recycling in house. Labours of 
recycling, such as garbage classification and reuse, depend on the nature of 
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material and knowledge/technology of doing. 
3.2.5 The model for specific waste materials 
Most previous models treat waste and recycling as a uniform material. 
However, in most cities, there are many different recycling policies applied on 
materials, such as deposit-refund systems on glass bottles, trade in scrap 
paper, mandatory recycling on hazardous waste and so on. Assume that 
there are J kinds of consumption goods (x; ) and each of them can be disposed 
by legal (d; ), illegal (b; ), recycling (r; ) and storing (s; ) after be used. The mass 
constraint becomes 
ajxjg -dlf -bj, -rj1 -sj, =0 (3-19) 
Assume that a household spends a certain part of its income on a kind of 
consumption good (I; ) which is independent of waste treatment labour. The 
total cost, including tariff and labour, of dumping a particular kind of waste via 
legal (Cdj), illegal (Cbj) and recycling (Crj) options are function of the quantity 
of waste involved. Then the budget constraint then becomes 
Ij = pj_rxjr + Crj(r,, )+ Cdj(djl)+ Cbj(b1r) (3-4g) 
The Lagrangian function for this system is 
Lh = ui 
kt, 
Sig , 
Bit)i 
2 [Ii -Crj(r11) -Cdj(di, 
)-Cbj(bi1) 
- PftxirI + 22(aixi, -dit -bir -rir - si, 
The first-order conditions are similar to those obtained before and the 
equilibrium condition becomes 
Cdjdj = Cbjbj -'= Cr ._-t 
(3-11 g) 
A household's waste disposal choice is based on marginal cost of each option, 
even for one material. This result has a number of implications for household 
responses to various policies applied on recycling materials. For example: 
a. When unit-pricing garbage collection and free kerbside recycling are 
provided, a household prefers to recycle materials which have low labour 
cost of recycling and lower than the disposal price. 
b. The deposit-refund system on plastic and glass bottle makes the price for 
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recycling bottles negative, but the labour to bring bottles to recycling points 
is generally higher than where there is kerbside recycling. Usually the 
subsidy or the deposit on the material is small. Thus, the labour required 
for recycling, including bringing waste to the recycling point, is the most 
important factor. This is reduced when the density of recycling points is 
high. 
c. For bulky waste, the disutility of storage is high. The price for bulky waste 
collection is positive in most cities, and there is no recycling choice. If the 
labour cost of illegal dumping in rural areas and the expected fines are not 
high enough, illegal bulky waste dumping may be favoured by households. 
d. For kitchen waste (or food consumption), if there is no composting space 
and recycling is not an option, household's disposal choices are legal 
dumping, illegal dumping and storage. If the frequency of garbage 
collection is low, which means the labour of preparing legal dumping is high, 
illegal dumping may be the household's first choice, especially when the 
garbage collection is charged (unit-pricing) and/or the expected fine for 
illegal dumping is not significant. If free kitchen waste collection for public 
composting is provided and the frequency of collection is high enough, 
which can be regarded as a way of recycling kitchen waste, household's 
disposal options would be similar with other consumption goods. 
3.3 The Social Model for Local Government 
In most countries, solid waste management is the responsibility of local 
governments. In a local area, the decision made by solid waste management 
authority usually cannot affect prices of either commodities or labour. This 
section therefore introduces a partial equilibrium model which describes how 
the local government waste disposal decisions are made. 
Assume the social welfare function is the aggregate household's utility: 
r f 
u'(x1)s1, B1)e-&dt 
ý_ý t=o 
(3-13) 
Assume that household i is representative. Aggregate illegal dumping is 
B, = rib,. The authority can tax or subsidise legal dumping with the price of td, 
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subsidise recycling with the price of tr, and/or fine illegal dumping (ic(Eb, b, 
)Pb ). 
When composting is unavailable, the household budget constraint becomes 
w, (L - Ld(dl) - Lb(b, 
) - Lr('"ý)) = Pxxt + tr'1 + (Pd + to), + 7r(Eb, b, 
)Pb (3-14) 
The authority gets the fees, fines, tax revenues and benefits from treating 
waste, and spends on garbage and recycling collection, and treating waste. 
The labour costs of garbage and recycling collections are functions of the 
quantities involved (G = G(nd, ) = nG(dr) and H= H(nrf) = nH(r1) ). If the 
city has garbage treatment facilities, like incinerators and landfills, they should 
take account of both the social costs and benefits from treating garbage. For 
example, incinerators can both generate electricity and produce air pollution. 
Assume that the net social benefits and costs from treating garbage are a 
function of aggregate legal dumping ( E1 = E(nd, ) = nE(d, ) and 
P= P(ndt) = nP(d, ) ). The authority also can get the benefit from selling, 
using or exporting a part of recyclable materials, which is also function of 
aggregate recyclable materials (R1 = R(nrr) = nR(r1)). The marginal cost and 
benefit of dumping is assumed to be positive and diminishing, such that 
Ed >0 and Edd < 0. The authority's budget constraint is 
n[trr, + (Pd + td)dr + r(Eb, bt )Pb ]= iv(G, + Hf) + E1 +P+ Rr (3-15) 
The social decision problem is to maximise the aggregate utility of 
households (3-13) subject to the constraints, Equation (3-14), (3-2) and (3-15). 
The Lagrangian function for this system is 
L5, = nu` (xr sr, B1) 
]} + 23 {n[w(L - Ld 
(d, ) 
- Lb(bt) - Lr(r, 
)) 
- p,, x1 - trr, - 
(Pd + td Adt - ir(Eb, b, 
)Pb 
+24{n[axr -dr -br -rr -s, U 
+A5{n[trr +(pd +td)dl +; r(Eb, br)pb]-1v(G, +H, ) -E, -P -Rt} 
The first-order conditions for xt, d,, bt, r,, s, are 
uX - px'. 3 + aA. 4 =0 (3-5h) 
- (w{Ldd, J + Pd + td). 
t3 
- 
A4 + 
(Pd 
- 1VGdt + td + 
Edt + PdtA =0 (3-6h) 
nuB - 
(w(Lbbt) + 7rbt Pb )23 - /14 + 
(irbt 
Pb 
)AS 
=0 (3-7h) 
- (ti#rrt) + t, )A3 - A4 + (tr + 1VH, t + Rrt 
). 
5 =0 (3-8h) 
4=0 (3-9h) us -A 
Comparing first order conditions of household models and the social 
model, Equation 3-5,3-5h, 3-9 and 3-9h, /%4 should be equal to A2 and 23 
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should be equal to A, . %5 
is Lagrange multiplier of the authority's budget. 
A5 is the shadow price of the authority's budget. Two policy implications are 
found. 
IX. By adding Eq. 3-7c and 3-7h, the expected fine for illegal dumping (7rbrpb ) 
should be equal to (n - 41,, /(A., - ). 5) which is the social cost of illegal 
dumping to other households (aside from the dumping household) in 
shadow price difference between the authority and a household's budgets. 
X. In the case of a city with unit-pricing policy and free kerbside recycling, the 
total of garbage collection charges reflects its labour cost, which means 
Pd - tivGd - WHr would be zero when Equation 3-6h is added to 3-8h. 
The optimal tax for legal dumping (td) should be (Ed + Pd)'ý5 /(/13 -115) 
which is the net social cost of aggregate waste (Eq. 3-6b and 3-6h). The 
optimal subsidy for recycling (t, ) should be RrA, 5 /(A3 - 25) which is the 
net social benefit of aggregate recycling (Eq. 3-8b and 3-8h). 
3.4 Summary of Theoretical Models 
According to the equilibrium conditions in Table 3.1C, the household's 
decision to discard a unit of waste is based on the marginal total cost of each 
disposal. Therefore, a household's waste disposal depends on solid waste 
management policies. Some of the household's preferences between 
disposal options under various solid waste management policies are the 
following: 
a. In a city where composting is not available, high income households will 
store more waste than low income households because legal dumping, 
illegal dumping and recycling demand more labour than storage, and the 
opportunity cost of their time is higher. 
b. In a city providing flat fee kerbside garbage collection, since the marginal 
cost of garbage disposal is close to zero, households have no incentive to 
recycle or to dump illegally. 
C. In a city with unit-pricing on garbage and recycling collection, a household 
does more illegal dumping and composting than it does under flat fee 
policy. Applying a penalty on illegal dumping (fine) can prevent illegal 
dumping from increasing after unit-pricing is adopted but the effect 
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depends on the enforcement and the level of the fine. 
d. Both unit-pricing with free kerbside recycling and mandatory recycling 
policies can increase recycling but the effect of mandatory recycling 
depends on the enforcement and nominal fine. 
e. When unit-pricing garbage collection and free kerbside recycling are 
provided, a household prefers to recycle materials involving low labour 
costs. 
f. Recycling materials which deposit-refund or compensation system are 
applied would be favoured when transportation costs are not higher than 
the unit-pricing price. 
g. Some troublesome wastes, such as kitchen waste, yield high disutility of 
storage. When a household doesn't have space for composting and 
kitchen waste recycling is unavailable, illegal dumping of kitchen waste 
may be its first choice. 
In the case of a city with unit-pricing policy and kerbside recycling, when 
the garbage collection charge only includes labour costs, the optimal tax for 
legal dumping and the optimal subsidy for recycling are their net social cost 
and benefit. The expected fine for illegal dumping equals to its externality. 
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Chapter 4 Applied Waste Disposal Models and the Data 
The theoretical model discussion in chapter 3 provides implications of 
household waste disposal behaviour under various waste management 
policies. In order to estimate the effects of a particular policy, it is necessary 
to transform the result of theoretical model to the appropriate empirical model. 
In this chapter, the reduced form applied models and the hypotheses of 
variables would be found, and the data survey is introduced. 
4.1 Empirical Models 
Eq. 3-12 in Chapter 3 shows the determinants of each disposal option 
when composting is unavailable (only storage). The amount of recycling (r') 
is function of wage (w), recycling labour factor (, v), price of recycling collection 
(Pr), consumption goods price (px), utility of consumption (ug), disutility of 
storing waste (us), and percentage of waste generation (a). Therefore, the 
reduced form model for a household's recycling decision is 
r, =f (tiv, y, p,, px, lls, Us, a). The legal dumping function is 
dt = f(w, a, pd, ps, ux, us, a) in which a is the dumping labour factor and pd 
is the price of garbage collection. The illegal dumping function is 
bf =f 
(w, ß,, rbpb, Pz) uX, US, UB, a) in which 7Lb pb is the marginal expected 
fine for illegal dumping and UB is the marginal disutility from aggregate illegal 
dumping. For households under mandatory recycling policy, the recycling 
function is r, =f (w, yurpur, px, uz, zus, a) in which pr p,,, is the marginal 
expected fine for insufficient recycling. 
Assume that consumption goods price (px) and percentage of waste 
generation (a) are fixed for a particular household, i. e. exogenous. The wage 
(w), marginal utility of consumption (zi) and disutility of illegal dumping (u8) 
would not be changed by waste management policy but those can be affected 
directly by household's socioeconomic factors (SE), such as income. 
Therefore, the reduce form of household recycling is 
''t = .f 
(Y, p,, prpm, u,, SE). The equilibrium condition for the material-specific 
model (Eq. 3-11g) confirmed that each recycling material is treated in the same 
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Way as aggregate recycling. The household recycling of each material (r;, ) is 
r1, =f 
(Yj, P, j, /2, P,,,, u j, SE). The legal dumping is df = f(a, pd, it,, SE), and 
illegal dumping is b, =f (A itb pb, i's, SE). These functions are consistent 
with microeconomic demand theory - the quantity of demand is a function of 
prices and income. 
The equilibrium conditions, Eq. 3-11 and 3-11 a, and Table 3.1 C in Chapter 
3 shows that households trade-off between four disposal options until the 
marginal cost of each disposal option is the same. This implies that the 
amount of recycling also depends on other alternatives. For example, every 
previous empirical study found that adopting unit-pricing or higher dumping 
price (Pd) can increase recycling (see Table 2.2,2.3 and 2.4). Households 
usually adopt some recycling behaviour when waste is generated. Instead of 
throwing waste into non-recyclables bins, they usually predetermine what is to 
be recycled. Hence, recycling should be estimated first. The variables 
affecting legal dumping, illegal dumping and storing have to be added into the 
function of recycling 
rjt f(/ j, Prj, PrPm; a, Pd; 
f3,2rbPb; h1s; E) ý4-1 ) 
Because the marginal labour cost of dumping (a, /3, y) cannot be observed 
directly, some proxies are introduced in this empirical study. One of the 
non-market valuation techniques, Travel Cost Method (TCM), indicates travel 
cost of a site ' (Cy) is function of distance costs for each individual "i" (DCU), 
time cost (TCy) and fee (F; ) (Fletcher et al., 1990), Cj; = C(DC;,,, TCU, F; ). 
Salkie et al. (2001) also found that travelling cost had significant negative effect 
on waste generation when households lose public waste removal services. 
Therefore, the concept of TCM is suitable in describing waste dumping or 
recycling behaviours. 
Waste dumping costs also can be separated into distance costs, time 
costs and tariffs. For Eq. 4-1, the price of garbage (non-recyclables) 
collection (PNR) can be used as pd (Pd = PNR ), and the dumping labour factor 
(a) can be separated into distance cost (DCd) and time cost (TCd). Because 
most cities provide kerbside garbage collection, the distance cost of dumping 
(TCd) is assumed to be similar for each household in a city. The lower the 
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frequency of garbage collection causes the greater the quantity of waste 
discarded at each collection, and the higher the labour cost of storing, packing 
and taking garbage out. Assume that the time cost of legal dumping (TCd) is 
function of preparation labour and that the garbage collection frequency (FNR) 
can be used as its proxy. Therefore, the labour cost factor of dumping is a 
decreasing function of the garbage collection frequency (FNR). 
a= f(TCd) =f (FNR) and a., wR _< 0 
(4-2) 
When unit-pricing is applied to a recyclable material, the price of recycling 
collection (PKR; ) can be used as pr; (prj = PKR J) in Eq. 4-1. If the kerbside 
recycling is provided without charge, the tariff of recycling collection is zero. 
When mandatory recycling policy is applied, the tariff of recycling becomes the 
marginal expected fine which is the nominal fine (pn) multiplied by the chance 
of being prosecuted (, u, ). Define the nominal fine as FIM. The marginal 
chance of being prosecuted (, u, ) can be assumed to be related to enforcement 
policies, including recycling enforcement (REN). For example, the policy of 
using transparent bags for garbage dumping can lower the inspection cost 
when cities adopt mandatory recycling. When the nominal fine is higher and 
more recycling enforcements are adopted, the marginal expected fine is higher. 
The marginal expected fine for non-compliance with mandatory recycling can 
be written as 
pm = FIM and (, crpm 
)Flbf >0 
, ur = f(REN) and 
(Pr )I 
N >_ 0 (4-3) 
The recycling labour factor (y j) can also be separated into DC,; and TCrj. The 
time cost of recycling (TCj) is assumed to be the same for a particular 
recyclable material. The distance cost of recycling (DCrj) decreases when 
kerbside recycling (KR; ) 15 is provided. DC,; is assumed to be function of KR;. 
Therefore, the recycling labour factor is function of whether kerbside recycling 
is provided (KR). 
Y= f(DCj)= f(KRj) and y, R S0 (4-4) 
The tariff on illegal dumping is the marginal expected fine, which is the 
nominal fine (Pb) multiplied by the chance of being prosecuted (Irb). Define 
15 Currently, there are two kinds of recycling collection policies, drop-off centre and kerbside 
collection. The latter one means residents can just bring recyclables to specific kerbside near 
their house for collection rather than go to recycling centre. 
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the nominal fine as FIB: Assume that both the chance of being prosecuted 
(sb) and the factor of illegal dumping labour (ß) are related to population 
density (DEN) and inspection (enforcement) effort (EN). The chance of being 
prosecuted and the marginal distance cost of illegal dumping are lower when a 
household is in a lower population density area. The chance of being 
prosecuted is increasing in inspection effort. 
Pb = FIB and (7CbPb)F, B ý0 
; rb =f (DEN, 
EN), (rb )DEN ý0 and (fib 
)EN ý0 
, 6=f(DEN) and ßDEN '- 0 (4-5) 
The marginal disutility of storing waste (ui) is assumed to be related to the 
population density (DEN) because the opportunity cost of space increases as 
density increases. 
u., =f (DEN) and aus / EDEN ?0 (4-6) 
With the assumptions of Eq. 4-2,4-4,4-5 and 4-6, the reduced-form model of 
each recyclable material depends on dumping policy variables (PNR and FNR), 
recycling policy variables (PKR;, KR;, FIM and REN), illegal dumping and 
storing variables (FIB, EN and DEN) and household's socioeconomic factors 
(SE). 
rj. t =f 
(PKRj, KR, FIM, RENS ; PNR, FNR; FIB, EN, DEN; SE) (4-7) 
The aggregate recycling (or total recyclables (TOR)) is summation of all 
kinds of recyclable materials 
TOR= I: 
_ 
r. and TOR, >0 (4-8) 
When recycling policies applied on each recyclable material are the same, 
variables effecting household's aggregate recycling remain the same as Eq. 
4-7. However, recycling categories (CR) should be added in because more 
recycling categories mean more materials can be recycled. The reduced- 
form of the aggregate recycling model is 
TOR =f (PKR, KR, FIM, REN, CR; PNR, FNR; FIB, EN, DEN; SE) (4-9) 
The recycling ratio is the ratio of the aggregate recycling and the total waste 
which is aggregate recycling (TOR) plus non-recyclables (NRW). 
RR _ 
TOR 
= f(PKR, KR, FIM, REN, CR; PNR, FNR, FIB, EN, DEN; SE) TOR + NRW 
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(4-10) 
Like each recyclable material, the household's dumping (dt, or NRW) 
depends on the total marginal cost of each disposal option. 
d, = .f 
(y, P., P. Pm; a, Pd; , rbPb Is; SE) 
(4-11) 
The assumptions for a, fl, r, and pr p,,, (Eq. 4-2,4-5,4-4 and 4-3) still can 
be applied on Eq. 4-11. Besides the variables in Equation 4-7, dumping 
demand is related to unit-pricing enforcement (UEN). For example, on-time 
collection policy is a kind of UEN which demands residents to hand garbage 
bags to haulers rather than just leave them at collection points. This lets 
haulers check paid bag usage. In this case, the reduced-form of the 
non-recyclables dumping and total waste generation (TOW = TOR + NRW) 
models become 
d, = NRW =f (PKR, KR, FIM, REN; PNR, FNR, UEN; FIB, EN, DEN; SE) (4-12) 
TOW =f (PKR, KR, FIM, REN; PNR, FNR, UEN; FIB, EN, DEN; SE) (4-13) 
4.2 Comparative Static Analysis and Hypotheses 
The theoretical model in Chapter 3 and the empirical model in the 
previous section show how waste disposal is affected by policy variables, 
which is the hypothesis of this thesis. Assume that the utility-maximised 
solutions for household's waste disposals are d*, b*, r* and s*. The 
comparative static results reported below are obtained by first substituting the 
solutions into Eq. 3-12 and the first-order conditions (Eq. 3-5,3-6b', 3-7c', 3-8b', 
and 3-9), then differentiating with respect to the exogenous variable of interest, 
and finally solving the system of differential equations of the comparative static 
terms. The set of hypothesis is listed in Table 4.1. 
4.2.1 The tariff for each disposal 
Firstly, differentiating the tariff for each disposal function in Eq. 3-12, 
shows that higher tariffs may be expected to decrease disposal. 
ädß 
= 
art. 
=-1<0 aPd = aPr 
The price of garbage collection (pd) and recycling collection (pr) are negatively 
related to garbage and recycling, respectively. According to the assumptions 
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in section 4.1, higher PNR and PKR have negative effect on non-recyclables 
collection and recycling, respectively. Almost every previous empirical study 
(see Table 2.2,2.3 and 2.4) has found that higher collection prices (PNR) or 
adopting unit-pricing decreases garbage and increases recycling. If 
unit-pricing enforcement (LIEN) can ensure the garbage collection price, then, 
UEN can decrease dumping as well. 
When a household is subject to a mandatory recycling policy, the impact 
of higher marginal expected fines (U, pm) on recycling can be find out by 
differentiating Eq. 3-8e". 
ar, ` 
_1>0 a/J. P. 
From Eq. 4-3, the higher the fine for non-compliance with mandatory recycling 
(FIM), and the more recycling enforcements (REN) adopted, the higher will be 
the quantity of recycling. The mandatory recycling policy has been shown to 
increase the time spent on recycling in Taiwanese households (Shaw and Tsai, 
2002), and to increase the quantity of paper, glass, plastic and cardboard 
recycling from households of Ithaca, New York, the US. (Reschovsky and 
Stone, 1994). 
Secondly, substituting the solutions into the first-order conditions (Eq. 3-5, 
3-6b', 3-7c', 3-8b', and 3-9) and differentiating the tariff of each disposal can 
show the effect of tariffs on other disposal. For example, when household's 
utility is maximised, Eq. 3-6b' and 3-8b' become wad, + pd = wyrr + pr . 
Sorting out d, and differentiating it with the price of recycling (pr) can show 
that the change in dumping attributable to a change in the price of recycling is 
ad, * 
1>0 apr 
Using the same method, it can be shown that 
ad, ärt` är, ' 
=1>0 öTrbPb DPd a16Pb 
The price of recycling (p, ) and the price of dumping (pd) have positive effects on 
dumping and recycling, respectively. The marginal expected fine (7rbpb) has 
positive effects on dumping and recycling. According to the assumptions in 
section 4.1, higher PNR and PKR have positive effects on kerbside recycling 
and on non-recyclables collection demands, respectively. Higher FIB, EN and 
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DEN have positive effects on non-recyclables and recycling collection. When 
a household is subject to mandatory recycling policy, the impact of higher 
marginal expected fine (, up,., ) on dumping can be find out by differentiating Eq. 
3-8e' and 3-6b'. 
adl 
=-1 <0 
aprpm 
According to the assumption of Eq. 4-3, higher FIM and more recycling 
enforcements (REN) adopted can decrease dumping. 
4.2.2 The labour factor in each disposal option 
Firstly, differentiating the labour factor in each disposal function in Eq. 
3-12, shows that higher labour factors can decreases disposal. 
ad' -1 and 
ar'* 
=-1 _<0 <0 as a2 öy r2 
The higher labour factors, a, ß and y, can decrease garbage, recycling 
and illegal dumping, respectively. According to the assumptions described in 
section 4.1, the higher frequency of non-recyclables collection (FNR) and 
providing kerbside recycling (KR) can increase garbage and recycling, 
respectively. Two previous empirical studies found that providing kerbside 
recycling (KR) significantly increases aggregate recycling (Callan and Thomas, 
1997; Kinnaman and Fullerton, 2000). Kerbside recycling can increase most 
recyclable materials except metal and composting (Jenkins et al., 2003; 
Reschovsky and Stone, 1994). 
Secondly, substituting the solutions into the first-order conditions (Eq. 3-5, 
3-6b', 3-7c', 3-8b', and 3-9) and differentiating the labour factor shows its 
effects on other disposal options: 
&, * 
_ lvr1= > 0, 
ad 
`= wb, > 0, 
ar` 
= wd >0 and 
ar` 
= wbi >0 ay a/ý as aß 
The labour factor in recycling has a positive effect on dumping. According to 
Eq. 4-4, providing kerbside recycling (KR) can decrease dumping. The labour 
factor in dumping has a positive effect on recycling. According to Eq. 4-2, the 
higher garbage collection frequency (FNR) can decrease recycling. The 
labour factor of illegal dumping has positive effect on dumping and recycling. 
According to Eq. 4-5, higher population density (DEN) can increase both 
50 
dumping and recycling. 
4.2.3 Income 
In this thesis, income (INC) is used as a proxy for household's 
socioeconomic variables (SE). When a household's utility is maximised, 
according to the mass constraint, Eq. 3-2, the household's consumption is x*. 
x1 = 
(dt* + b1 + rt` + s1 
)! 
a (3-2') 
The left hand side of a household's budget constraint, Eq. 3-4c, is the 
household's income (INC). 
INC = w(L - Ld (d, ) - Lb(b, ) - Lr(rt )) = pxx, + pdd, + ic(Eb, bt)pb + prr, ` (3-4c') 
Differentiating x* with income can get a positive result 
ax t* _1>0 aINC 
which means income can increase a household's consumption and increase 
dumping and recycling based on Eq. 3-2'. Almost every previous study (see 
Table 2.2,2.3 and 2.4) found higher income increased garbage and recycling 
except Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996). 
4.2.4 The disutility of waste storage 
In Eq. 3-12, us is negative which means that higher uS decreases each 
disposal. Differentiating the dumping and recycling in Eq. 3-12 shows that 
adt 
- 
arr 
=-1<0 aus aus 
According to Eq. 4-6, higher population density (DEN) can increase the 
marginal disutility of storage and decrease dumping and recycling. The 
reason is that a household consumes fewer commodities and generates fewer 
waste items when the marginal disutility of storing is high. Because the 
higher DEN can also increase the marginal cost of illegal dumping and 
increase dumping and recycling, the net effect of DEN is not unambiguous. 
Some previous empirical studies confirm these two hypotheses. They found 
that population density (DEN) significantly affects garbage generation, but in 
quite different ways (see Table 2.2,2.3 and 2.4). 
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Table 4.1 Hypothesises of empirical models 
effects on r; RR TOR NRW 
price of garbage collection (PNR) + + + - 
price of kerbside recycling (PKR) - - - + 
garbage collection freq. (FNR) - - - + 
kerbside recycling (KR) + + + - 
population density (DEN) +/- +/- +/- +/- 
household's income (INC) + + + + 
nominal fine for illegal dump (FIB) + + + + 
inspection effort for illegal dumping (EN) + + + + 
nominal fine for insufficient recycling (FIM) + + + - 
unit-pricing enforcement (UEN) na. na. na. - 
recycling enforcement (REN) + + + - 
categories of kerbside recycling (CR) na. + + na. 
4.3 Data 
There are two kinds of data used in the empirical study of Equation 4-7, 
4-9,4-10,4-11,4-12 and 4-13. The first is statistics of household dumping 
and recycling. The second is the solid waste management system variables, 
including KRK, PKRj, CR, PNR, DEN, UEN, REN, FIM, FIB, INC and FNR. 
These two kinds of data can either be obtained from aggregate cities' statistics 
or the individual household survey. Waste management system variables are 
the same in aggregate or household survey data. 
Aggregate data (city level data) are used for the empirical study. The main 
reasons are listed below. 
a. From the social model in Chapter 3, using aggregate representative 
households and maximising aggregated utility yield the same result as the 
individual household model when the illegal dumping externality is 
internalised. 
b. Most cities take full responsibility for treating garbage and recycling except 
for some non-regional externalities. This responsibility allows us to 
aggregate households. 
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it is hard to get real household garbage and recycling data from household 
surveys. Self reported data may have some biases (Reschovsky and 
Stone, 1994). By contrast, aggregate data yields real response 
predictions for policies. 
in order to study effects of waste management policies and to compare 
these with previous cases in Western countries and Korean cities (see Table 
2.2,2.3 and 2.4), this thesis will focus on specific dense urban areas in East 
Asia. Because many cities change policies over time, panel date from these 
cities is used for the empirical study. Table 4.2 lists the cities chosen in this 
thesis and their population density. The reasons for choosing these cities are 
the following. 
a. Choosing only dense urban area can eliminate some obvious differences 
in life-styles. Many empirical studies have found that household 
behaviour has significant differences in urban and suburban areas, such 
as Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2004), and Houtven and Morris (1999). 
b. The chosen city has unified waste management policy within the city. 
Some cities have various frequencies or methods of garbage and 
recycling collection within city, such as Tokyo City. 
c. Cities in Japan and Taiwan use several solid waste policies, such as 
unit-pricing in Taipei City and Fukuoka City etc., and mandatory recycling 
in Taichung City. 
d. Analyzing the effect of policies has to compare with control cities which 
are in the same country. Although categories of waste statistics are the 
same in Japan and Taiwan, two countries may have other systematic 
country difference. 
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Table 4.2 Chosen cities and their population density in 2002 
Country Japan Taiwan 
city name Sapporo 1646.60 Osaka 11225.09 Taipei 9720.39 
and density Sendai 1270.28 Kobe 2697.95 Hsinchu 3640.86 
(people/ Chiba 3257.53 Kitakyushu 2060.86 Tainan 4241.50 
km2) Yokohama 7995.17 Fukuoka 3864.42 Kaohsiung 9831.20 
Nagoya 6696.51 Nagasaki 1244.27 Keelung 2945.19 
Kyoto 2406.30 Naha 7831.70 Taichung 6100.64 
All data required for the empirical study were obtained from city and 
national statistics, and from a questionnaire to the waste management 
authorities in each city. The statistics on household dumping and recycling 
are obtained from online databases of Environmental Protection Administration, 
Taiwan and Ministry of Environment, Japan16. The data is available from 
1998 to 2003. Appendix 1 (pp. Al) lists per capita per day weights (g) of 
non-recyclables (NRW), total waste generation (non-recyclables plus 
recyclables, TOW), recyclable waste of each material (r, ): recyclable paper 
(PAW), recyclable metal (MEW), recyclable glass (GLW), recyclable PET 
bottles17 (PTW), recyclable plastics (PLW), other recyclable waste (OTH) and 
total recyclables (TOR) of all selected cities. Table 4.3 is descriptive statistics 
of these variables. Japanese cases have fewer per capita non-recyclables 
and more recyclables than Taiwanese cases except recyclable plastics. 
16 1. Environmental Database, Environmental Protection Administration, Executive Yuan, R. O. C. 
(Taiwan) (http: //edb. epa. gov. tw/); 2. Survey of Municipal Solid Waste Management of Ministry of 
Environment, Japan (http: //www. env. qo. ipfrecvcle/waste tech/ippan/). 
17 PET bottle is made from Polyethylene Terephthalate. 
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-r, 2hfr 4.3 Descriptive statistics of waste and recycling amount (q / person. day) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Cases 
NRW 839.35 179.94 472.00 1491.00 108 
Japan cases 794.85 133.83 571.47 1180.62 72 
Taiwan cases 928.36 224.58 472.00 1491.00 36 
TOW 978.90 162.71 634.28 1639.89 108 
Japan cases 954.48 142.44 634.28 1295.18 72 
Taiwan cases 1027.74 189.99 635.92 1639.89 36 
PAW 81.86 68.74 0 325.92 108 
Japan cases 98.45 75.14 0 325.92 72 
Taiwan cases 48.68 35.98 0.82 148.83 36 
MEW 22.14 13.64 0.29 57.95 108 
Japan cases 24.01 11.64 2.52 52.86 72 
Taiwan cases 18.42 16.51 0.29 57.95 36 
GLW 11.34 11.03 0.02 49.32 108 
Japan cases 15.85 10.92 0.23 49.32 72 
Taiwan cases 2.32 2.00 0.02 6.92 36 
PTW 4.03 3.07 0 11.95 108 
Japan cases 3.41 2.44 0 9.84 72 
Taiwan cases 5.25 3.79 0.12 11.95 36 
PLW 5.77 8.95 0 36.35 108 
Japan cases 3.94 9.22 0 36.35 72 
Taiwan cases 9.44 7.18 0 28.99 36 
OTH 14.41 16.79 0 87.42 108 
Japan cases 13.98 15.56 0 56.23 72 
Taiwan cases 15.27 19.21 0 87.42 36 
TOR 139.55 94.43 2.09 419.45 108 
Japan cases 159.64 99.01 29.64 419.45 72 
Taiwan cases 99.38 69.89 2.09 241.17 36 
This thesis uses per capita Regional Gross Domestic Product (R-GDP) 
as proxy for real per capita income in each city and each year. Japanese 
cities' per capita GDP is unavailable but prefectural per capita GDP18 is a 
reasonable proxy because the Prefecture is a higher level of local government 
than the City and most selected cities are capitals of prefectures. However, 
the prefectural income statistics are only available to 2002. In order to use 
2003 dumping statistics, this thesis extrapolates from national GDP growth 
rate, 1.2%, to get 2003 prefectural per capita income. The function is: 
2003 per capita income = 2002 per capita income * 1.012 
Although Taiwanese cities' GDP per capita is also unavailable from 
government statistics, using the ratio of national and cities' per capita income 
18 Prefectural per capita GDP is from Prefectural Account, Economic and Social Research 
Institute, Cabinet Office, Japan (http: //www. esri. cao. co. ip/ip/sna/toukei. html#kenmin). 
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ý(pCI)19 to convert national per capita 
GDP20 to city's can be a suitable proxy. 
The function is: 
City's per capita GDP = (city's PCI / national PCI) * (national per capita GDP) 
To ensure that income data for each city and year in two countries are 
consistent, the nominal per capita R-GDP has to be converted into the same 
unit. It is firstly converted to real R-GDP based on the same year (1995 
prices) by Price Index21. Then, it is converted to the same currency. One 
conversion method uses actual exchange rates at 1995 to convert both 
Japanese Yen and Taiwanese Dollars to the US Dollars. The other uses 
purchasing-power-parity (PPP)22. Because commodity prices are different in 
different countries, the per capita income discounted by PPP can reflect 
commodity purchasing power. Therefore, the income, dumping and recycling 
data of Taiwanese and Japanese cities from 1998 to 2003 can be analysed 
together. The data on per capita income (INC, converted to US dollar by 
actual exchange rate at 1995, and PPPINC, converted to international dollars 
by purchasing-power-parity) are listed in Appendix 2 (pp. A4) and the 
descriptive statistics are given in Table 4.4. It shows that the average of INC 
in Japanese cities is double that in Taiwanese cities, but the average of 
PPPINC in Taiwan and Japan are very close. 
According to the empirical household waste disposal model, the dumping 
choice is also affected by population density (DEN). The data for DEN23 are 
also listed in Appendix 2 (pp. A4) and the descriptive statistics given in Table 
4.4. The population density of Japanese and Taiwanese cities is from 1239 to 
11690 people per squared kilometre and the average is 4873. 
14 National and cities' PCI is from Household Income and Expenditure Survey, Directorate General 
of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, R. O. C. (Taiwan) which is available to 2003. 20 National per capita GDP is from R. O. C. (Taiwan) Statistical Yearbook 2005 
(http: //eng. dgbas. gov. tw/). 
2' The General (price) Index of city area is from Japanese Statistical Yearbook 2005 
htt : //www. stat. go. ip/d atalnenkanlindex. htm), and the price index is from Consumer Price 
Index, R. O. C. (Taiwan) Statistical Yearbook 2005 (http: //encg. d- bas. gov. tw/). 22 Would Economic Outlook Database, International Monetary Fund 
(http: //www. imf. org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2005/02/data/index. htm ) 
23 The data source of population is the same as footnote 16. City territory data for Taiwanese 
cities is from Environmental Database, Environmental Protection Administration, Executive 
Yuan, R. O. C. (Taiwan), and for Japanese cities is from Japanese Local Governments 
(http: //uub. jp/). 
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4.4 Descriptive statistics of per capita income and population density 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Cases 
INC 31095.66 11161.82 13539.23 52054.74 108 
Japan cases 37995.87 6254.46 27564.47 52054.74 72 
Taiwan cases 17295.23 2772.00 13539.23 23656.80 36 
PPPINC 20946.24 3549.61 14676.60 30608.02 108 
Japan cases 20230.76 3330.16 14676.60 27716.36 72 
Taiwan cases 22377.20 3586.51 17517.54 30608.02 36 
DEN 4872.92 3130.94 1239.09 11690.07 108 
Japan cases 4313.62 3150.25 1239.09 11690.07 72 
Taiwan cases 5991.53 2811.83 2862.33 9831.20 36 
Note: 1.1995USD/person. year; 2. international dallors/person. year; 3. pepele/km1. 
Figure 4.1 and 4.2 are the waste and income (INC) of Taiwanese and 
Japanese cities. In contrast to the more general findings of the EKC studies 
(Cole et al., 1997; Shafik, 1994), non-recyclables do not increase as income 
grows, which indicates the effectiveness of existing policies to reduce the 
volume of RSW. 
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12 Japanese cities (1998-2003) 
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Fig 4.2 per capita NRW, TOW and income of 12 Japanese cities 
The data on waste management variables were obtained from the survey 
of cities' solid waste management authorities. The survey method and the 
questionnaire are in Appendix 3 (pp. A7). The questionnaire includes four 
parts: non-recyclables collection, recyclable material collection, bulky waste 
collection and penalty for illegal dumping. It elicits information of the 
development of policies in respect of each part from 1998 to 2005. Besides 
the price of each kind of waste, the survey yielded information on collection, 
classification methods and the frequency of collections. Since the data on 
dumping, recycling and income is from 1998 to 2003, only information on 
policy variables applied in this period was used. 
Questions about recyclables collection included frequencies and pricing 
of each recyclable material. Because some cities did not change policies 
from the beginning of the fiscal year (dumping statistics are based on the fiscal 
year), the value of a dichotomous policy dummy variable is 1 when the policy is 
adopted sometime in the fiscal year. Appendix 4 (pp. A12) lists all policy 
variables involving recyclables. The descriptive statistics of these variables are 
in Table 4.5. Most cities started to provide kerbside recycling (KR) for some 
materials before 2002. Kerbside recycling for paper is PAK, metal is MEK, 
4n 
C 
e "f s°e Z" 
Dun s ýS 
" 
"K ` !p 
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glass is GLK, 
PET bottle is PEK, and plastics is PLK. Kerbside recycling is 
free in most cases except Sendai City, Nagoya City, Kyoto City, Fukuoka City 
and Nagasaki City which charge for cans, jars, or PET bottles for kerbside 
recycling by demanding that residents use only authorised bags for collection. 
The 10 litre volume price for the jth material is PKR;. Because different 
charges are applied to different materials, the PKR in Table 4.5 and Appendix 4 
(pp. A12), is the maximum price applied in each city. There are fewer than 
three categories of recyclable waste (CR) in most cases, which are scrap paper 
(all kinds), cans (all kinds of tins, cans and bottles) and plastics. Most 
Taiwanese cities provided kerbside plastics recycling before 2003, which might 
be the reason that Taiwanese cities recycle more plastics than Japanese cities. 
In Japan, only Naha City provides municipal regular kerbside paper recycling 
and other cities let private companies or voluntary groups recycle paper. In 
Taiwan, all cities provide kerbside paper recycling but private paper recycling 
organisations are also operating. Besides these recyclable materials, some 
Taiwanese cities also provide kerbside kitchen waste collection (KWC), which 
is for public composting. Taichung City, Tainan City and Keelung City started 
from July 2002, January 2003 and July 2003 respectively. 
There are two kinds of recycling enforcement policies (REN) adopted in 
chosen cities. Many Japanese cities require their residents to use 
transparent bags for non-recyclables collection (TBG), but only Taipei City in 
Taiwan has done so since the adoption of unit-pricing in 2000. The policy of 
using transparent bag for non-recyclables lowers inspection cost of recycling. 
Another recycling enforcement policy, mandatory recycling policy (MR), has 
been adopted only in Taiwanese cities. Taichung City, Kaohsiung City, 
Keelung City and Tainan City started mandatory recycling from July 1998, 
January 2001, July 2001 and July 2003 respectively. 
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Table 4.5 Descriptive statistics of recyclable waste management variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Cases 
MR 0.12 0.33 0 1 108 
Japan cases 0 0 0 0 72 
Taiwan cases 0.36 0.49 0 1 36 
PAK' 0.35 0.48 0 1 108 
Japan cases 0.14 0.35 0 1 72 
Taiwan cases 0.78 0.42 0 1 36 
MW-K' 0.93 0.26 0 1 108 
Japan cases 1.00 0 1 1 72 
Taiwan cases 0.78 0.42 0 1 36 
GLK' 0.93 0.26 0 1 108 
Japan cases 1.00 0 1 1 72 
Taiwan cases 0.78 0.42 0 1 36 
-TT-K' 0.86 0.35 0 1 108 
Japan cases 0.90 0.30 0 1 72 
Taiwan cases 0.78 0.42 0 1 36 
PLK' 0.40 0.49 0 1 108 
Japan cases 0.21 0.41 0 1 72 
Taiwan cases 0.78 0.42 0 1 36 
KWC' 0.05 0.21 0 1 108 
Japan cases 0 0 0 0 72 
Taiwan cases 0.14 0.35 0 1 36 
CR2 2.69 1.74 0 7 108 
Japan cases 3.17 1.70 2 7 72 
Taiwan cases 1.75 1.42 0 5 36 
TBG' 0.57 0.50 0 1 108 
Japan cases 0.81 0.40 0 1 72 
Taiwan cases 0.11 0.32 0 1 36 
PKR 3 0.016 0.057 0 0.294 108 
Japan cases 0.024 0.068 0 0.294 72 
Taiwan cases 0 0 0 0 36 
Note: 1. policy adopted=l, policy not adopted=O; 2. categories of recyclable waste; 3. 
USD/1 Olitres. 
Questions about non-recyclables waste management included the pricing 
system, categories and frequency of collection. The data on non-recyclables 
policies applied in cities is listed in Appendix 5 (pp. A15). The survey 
confirmed that all cities provide kerbside non-recyclables collection in which 
the distance from each collection point (called Station in Japan) is no more 
than a few blocks. The categories of non-recyclables waste are only one 
(mixed) or two (burnable and non-burnable). Therefore, transportation and 
classification costs of non-recyclables waste dumping are similar in all cities. 
Between 1998 and 2003, six cities adopted unit-pricing through a 
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requirement that residents use authorised garbage bag for dumping. In 
Taiwan, only Taipei City uses unit-pricing through it's "Per Bag Garbage 
Collection Fee Policy" from July 2000. In Japan, five cities have started to 
use unit-pricing: Sendai City from April 1991, Chiba City from January 1995, 
Fukuoka City from December 1997, Kitakyushu City July 1998, and Nagoya 
City from August 2000. The price of garbage bag (PNR) is about 0.047US$ 
per 10 litres waste in Japanese cities, and 0.145US$ per 10 litres in Taipei City, 
reflecting the fact that the price in Taipei City includes full collection and 
treatment costs. The price content is on Appendix 8 (pp. A91). Because 
residents in cities without unit-pricing policy still have to use garbage bags for 
disposal, according to market survey, PNR in cases without unit-pricing are 
0.005 US$ in Japanese cases and 0.01 in Taiwanese cases. The 
non-recyclables waste collection frequency (FNR) in Taiwanese cases (5 to 7 
times per week) is much higher than Japanese cases (2 to 3 times per week). 
Table 4.6 provides descriptive statistics for PNR and FNR. 
Table 4.6 Descriptive statistics of Aarbage baq price and collection frequency 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Cases 
PNR' 0.024 0.030 0.005 0.152 108 
Japan cases 0.024 0.023 0.005 0.086 72 
Taiwan cases 0.023 0.040 0.010 0.152 36 
FNR 2 3.57 1.93 2 7 108 
Japan cases 2.25 0.44 2 3 72 
Taiwan cases 6.22 0.48 5 7 36 
Note: 1. USD/101itres; 2. times/week. 
Based on the empirical household waste disposal model, the dumping 
choice is also affected by the nominal fine for non-compliance with mandatory 
recycling (FIM) and illegal dumping (FIB), inspection effort for illegal dumping 
(EN), and unit-pricing enforcement (UEN). One of unit-pricing enforcements 
is on-time collection (OTC) which demands residents to hand garbage bags to 
haulers rather than just leave them at collection points like Japanese cases. 
Taiwanese cities gradually started to adopt on-time collection and all adopted it 
after 2003. Although both Japan and Taiwan have nominal penalties for 
illegal dumping and insufficient recycling in national waste management laws 
or local government laws/rules, the penalty is a range and the actual penalty 
depends on cities and cases. Therefore, the data of each city's nominal fine 
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(FIA, f and FIB) cannot be retrieved by questionnaire or national statistics. The 
data on inspection effort (EN) for Japanese cases is also unavailable. 
Therefore, the questionnaire directly asks waste management authority "if the 
city fines for illegal dumping (FI)? ". This tells us whether the authority at least 
tries to enforce the penalty or just warns and corrects illegal dumping 
behaviour when it is found. Almost all Taiwanese cities and approximately 
half of Japanese cities fine or try to fine for illegal dumping. The data of OTC 
and FI is listed in Appendix 5 (pp. Al 5) and the descriptive statistics of it is on 
Table 4.7. 
Table 4.7 Descriptive statistics of fining illegal dumpina and on-time collection 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Cases 
FI 1 0.65 0.47 0 1 108 
Japan cases 0.50 0.50 0 1 72 
Taiwan cases 0.94 0.23 0 1 36 
OTC2 0.27 0.45 0 1 108 
Japan cases 0 0 0 0 72 
Taiwan cases 0.81 0.40 0 1 36 
Note: 1. the authority tries to enforce (fine) =1, not try to enforce=O; 2. OTC adopted=1, not 
adopted=O. 
Three kinds of inspection effort (EN) data can be found for Taiwanese 
cases. The data on actual illegal dumping prosecution and inspection can 
be found in Taiwan Environmental Database (see footnote 16) including the 
prosecuted fines on illegal dumping of residential solid waste per 1000 
residents (USD, ENAF), the rate of local authority inspection times per 1000 
residents (ENA7), and the annual labour cost of inspection per 100000 
residents (people, ENAP). These data are listed in Appendix 6 (pp. A18) and 
the descriptive statistics are given in Table 4.8. The data covers inspections 
(enforcements) of overall city's waste management, including littering24 and 
violation of unit-pricing and mandatory recycling rules25 etc. They do not 
disaggregate by policy. Therefore, ENAF, ENAT and ENAP cannot fully 
represent the EN variable in Eq. 4-5. 
24 Discard waste not via municipal waste and recycling collection and/or at unauthorised 
places. 
25 Discard waste without using authorised garbage bag and/or discard recyclable materials as 
non-recyclables. 
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Table 4.8 Descriptive statistics of prosecution and inspection in Taiwanese cities 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Cases 
ENAF' 6.36 3.96 1.00 16.15 36 
ENATZ 28.00 89.00 0.97 543.64 36 
ENAP 3 4.06 2.59 0.51 14.32 36 
Note: 1. prosecuted fines per 1000 residents (USD/year); 2. authority inspection times per 1000 
residents (times/year); 3.1abour for inspection per 100000 residents (people/year). 
4.4 Summary 
Based on the theoretical models in Chapter 3 and some assumptions, this 
chapter has developed a set of reduced form empirical models. These are 
used in the next chapter to test the behavioural hypotheses coming out of the 
comparative static analysis of the theoretical models. Many variables in the 
empirical models have not been studied before, including the frequency of 
garbage collection (FNR), the price of kerbside recycling (PKR), on-time 
collection policy (OTC), transparent garbage bag policy (TBG), penalties for 
illegal dumping (FI), and inspection effort for illegal dumping (EN). The 
models will be estimated using city level data. The quality of dumping and 
recycling data is fair because it is obtained from city and national statistics and 
because the categories of dumping and recycling statistics are the same in 
Japan and Taiwan. The data on policy variables derive directly from 
questionnaires of city's waste management authorities, and most policy 
information can be verified through the literature. 
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Chapter 5 Estimations of Waste Disposal Models 
This Chapter provides estimations of waste disposal models set up in 
Chapter 4. The first part of the Chapter describes the methodology of the 
panel data estimation techniques used. The second part reports the results of 
the estimations including recyclables and non-recyclables. 
5.1 Methods of Model Estimation 
The data used in this thesis comprises a panel collected from 18 cities in 
Taiwan and Japan between 1998 and 2003. Two models are usually used to 
estimate panel data: Fixed Effects Model (FEM) and Random Effects Model 
(REM). The estimation methods and diagnostic tests applied derive from 
Maddala (2001). 
" Fixed Effects Model 
For simplicity, FEM for only one explanatory variable is 
y;, = a, + , ßx; 1 + u; t i=1,2,..., Nt=1,2,..., T (5-1) 
y; i is the per capita waste generation or recycling, and x,, is an explanatory 
variable, such as the waste collection price, in city i and year t. We assume 
u; l IN 
(o, 
a 2) . Define group means x; = 
Ex,, and y; =T I'vif 
Within-group sums of squares and sums of products are 
Wem= _ ýrýx, ý - x; Y, and W.., = 
Z"(y,, - Y; 
ýZ 
. 
Also let W= 2], WxT; W, = 1, W. j and Way =E W}y., . The estimations of 
the parameters a; and ß 
^^2 
Q=L,, 
 
(Y, 
1 - a; -P xi, I 
are obtained by minimising 
with respect to a; and 8. 
aQ 
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Substituting the expression for a; in the second equation, 8 can be 
A 
simplified as 8=WtW This method is also referred to as the "least 
squares with dummy variables" (LSDV) model. Therefore, the estimation 
often denoted ßLsDV or within-group estimation ß, y . 
The residual sum of 
squares is JV,, iv.. 
A In the case of several explanatory variables, W is a matrix and ß and 
Wem, are vectors. We get a; = y; - ß'x; and 8= WL'WX, . The residual 
sum of squares is then Wye, - Wyx 
(W. )-' Wem, . 
" Ordinary Least Square Model 
If we define x and y as deviation from the overall mean (rather than 
group means), overall sums of squares and sums of products are 
T_ý, 
" 
ýX, 
r - Xi JT xY =y 
-i (xi, 
- Xi 
XYrr 
- yt) and T= 
Er., 
r 
(Y; 
r - Yi . Y r, r Y 
If we consider the hypothesis a, = a2 = ... = a,,, =a then the model is 
y,, =a+ ßx, 1 + u; 1, 
in this case, a=y-8x and 8=T1T which means 
A no panel data specifics and known as ordinary least square estimations (ßoLs). 
" Random Effects Model 
In the random effects model, the a, in equation 5-1 are treated as 
random variables rather than fixed constants. The a; are assumed to be 
independent of the errors u1, and also mutually independent. This model 
became popular in econometrics following the paper by Balestra and Nerlove 
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(1966) on the demand for natural gas. We shall assume that a. - IID(O, 6ä 
and z' - IID(O, 6 
). IID stands for independent and identically distributed. 
For simplicity, REM for only one explanatory variable is the same as 
equation 5-1 except that a; are random variables. Since a, are random, 
the errors now are v;, = a, + u, and the presence of a; produces a 
correlation among the errors of the same cross-section unit though the errors 
from the different cross-section units are independent. Thus we have 
COV(u7, V1) = 6ü + 6ä for t=s cov(url, Vis) = 6ä for t#s 
cov(ui,, vjs)=0 for all t, sif i# j 
Since the errors are correlated, we have to use generalised least squares 
(GLS) to get efficient estimates. The GLS estimator can be written in the 
simple form 
AW+ BBB 6ü ýGrs 
W+ 6B,,, 'eü+ T6ä 
where W refers to within-group sums of squares and sums of products defined 
earlier. Thus B refers to between-group sums of squares and sums of 
products B =T -W Bam, =T -W and By = -W»,. 
In the case of several explanatory variables, W and B will be matrices, Wem, 
and B will be vectors, and 8GLs will be (w+OB,, yXWJ+OB.,, 
Because there are three models used to estimate panel data, two tests 
are usually used to choose a better model. 
0 Lagrange Multiplier Test (Breusch and Pagan Test) 
This test, proposed by Breusch and Pagan (1980), tests whether 6. =0. 
This is the case where the individual components do not exit and we can use 
the OLS method. If we denote the residuals from the least squares 
A 
regression by at;, and define 
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The Hausman Test is usually applied to test for fixed versus random 
effects models. Mundlak (1978) said that we can test the hypothesis: 
Ho: a, are not correlated with x11. 
H1: a, are correlated with xi,. 
Under Ho, GLS estimator (REM) is consistent and efficient. On the other 
A hand, the within-group estimator Q,, (FEM) is consistent whether the null 
hypothesis is valid or not since all time-invariant effects are subtracted out. 
Thus we can construct q= /3w- I3GLS . Also V(q) =V /awl - VI ßG I. I 
-I 
Hence we use m= q' V(ql 
A as a x2-statstic with d. f. k where k is the 
dimensionality of /3. 
5.2 Functional Form Test and Estimations of Recyclables Models 
Suitable functional forms for dumping and recycling models may be 
obtained from previous studies. However, only two studies (Houtven and 
Morris, 1999; Sterner and Bartelings, 1999) showed various functional form 
results, Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2004) used exponential functional form, and all 
other studies use linear models. Houtven and Sterner's papers showed that 
the choice of functional form was not unambiguous although exponential 
models did have a higher adjusted R square. One reason why linear models 
are most popular in waste empirical studies is that policy variables, such as 
kerbside recycling (KR), involve dichotomous or discrete variables which may 
have value of zero and cannot be logged. Only income (INC), density (DEN), 
prices (PNR and PKR) can be logged in exponential models. 
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The household's choice is based on the marginal cost of every disposal 
method. Because the recycling ratio reflects the choice between dumping 
and recycling, this thesis uses a reduced-form of recycling ratio (Eq. 4-10) to 
identify suitable functional forms. Two recycling enforcement policies, the 
policy of using transparent garbage bag (TBG) and mandatory recycling (MR), 
replace the REN in Eq. 4-10. 
Three kinds of functional form are tested, including Linear-linear, 
Log-linear and Log-log with Eq. 4-10. Table 5.1 reports estimates of the Fixed 
Effects Model (FEM, dummy of cities' fixed effects) of recycling rate. The 
Limdep result reports are in Appendix 7 (pp. A19). Four models are tested. 
This thesis uses Limdep 8 and NLOGIT 326 to run all estimations. All 
variables in Model I are linear, DEN is logged in Model 2, and only variables- 
PNR, FNR, INC and DEN are logged in Model 3 (Lin-log) and Model 4 (Log-log) 
because other variables have some zero value. All four models can reject 
that coefficients are jointly zero at 99% confidence level. Model 2 and Model 
3 have better adjusted R2 than Model 1. 
Since dependant variable is logged in Model 4, adjusted R2 cannot be 
compared with other models directly. According to the method suggested in 
Wooldridge (2003), regressing the actual recycling ratios (RR) on the 
exponential fitted values in Model 4 (exp(1og RR) ), and the squared of the 
correlation between actual recycling ratio (RR) and the fitted value of above 
regression (RR) can be compared with adjusted R2 obtained from model 
without logged dependant. The Limdep report of this supplement regression 
is shown in Appendix 7 (pp. A30). The squared correlation is 0.46 which is 
much lower than other models. Model 2 and 3 are better than Model 4. 
The coefficients of Model 2 and Model 3 have signs that are consistent 
with expectations (Table 4.1). The Lagrange multiplier test shows that these 
two models dominate the non-panel data model (only independent variables 
and a constant) is better at 1% significance. The Hausman Test result shows 
that these two FEM is better than REM at 1% significance. Both Model 2 and 
Model 3 may be suitable for household's dumping and recycling estimations 
26 Copyright of 1996-2003 Econometrics Software written by William H. Greene 
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gnd both will 
be tested for total recyclables (Eq. 4-9), disaggregated 
recyclables (Eq. 4-7), non-recyclables (Eq. 4-12) and total waste generation 
(Eq. 4-13). 
Besides functional forms, some alternative variables and estimation 
method are tested. When PPPINC in Model 2 and Model 3 is replaced by INC 
(per capita income counted in 1995 USD), the FEM estimations have similar 
results with original models but lower R2. When White's robust covariance 
matrix27 is used to estimate Model 2 and Model 3, the estimations are the 
same as in the original models. Therefore, correction for heteroscedasticity is 
unnecessary. 
Table 5.1 FEM estimates of recycling rate 
Dependent: recycling rate (RR) of per capita per day waste 
Independent Lin-lin, Model I Lin-fin, Model 2 Lin-log, Model 3 Log-log, Model 4 
PNR . 66792 . 62512 . 28445E-01 
^ . 27281 
^ 
(price of NR) (2.231)** (2.277)** (2.837)*** (2.240)** 
FNR -. 11607 -. 96950E-01 -. 63346 ^ -4.82901 ^ 
(frequency of NR) (-3.792)*** (-3.475)*** (-3.772)*** (-2.367)** 
KR -. 80310E-02 -. 13569E-01 -. 46958E-02 . 75991 
(kerbside rec. ) (-. 235) (-. 432) (-. 149) (1.989)** 
PPPINC . 71918E-05 . 96866E-05 . 15966 
^ 4.22509 ^ 
(PPP based inc. ) (. 909) (1.334) (1.035) (2.253)** 
TBG . 18272E-01 . 38412E-01 . 28361 E-01 . 
15083 
(transparent bag) (. 685) (1.584) (1.149) (. 503) 
DEN . 29895E-03 2.00720 
^ 2.01764 ^ 17.85602 ^ 
(density) (6.123)*** (7.732)*** (7.896)*** (5.752)*** 
FI -. 35634E-02 -. 49940E-01 -. 45647E-01 . 20220 
dumm of fine) (-. 073) (-1.096) (-1.032) (. 376) 
AIR . 63319E-01 . 62751 E-01 . 62516E-01 . 75881 (mandatory rec. ) (2.444)** (2.648)*** (2.661)*** (2.659)*** 
PKR . 53929E-02 -. 10069 -. 10601 -1.07470 (price of KR) (. 044) (-. 874) (-. 934) (-. 780) 
CR . 27885E-01 . 22891 E-01 . 18986E-01 . 77522E-01 (recycling cat. ) (3.534)*** (3.133)*** (2.573)** (. 865) 
adjusted RZ . 79162 . 82486 . 83027 . 75226 
F(27,80) 16.06 19.66 20.39 13.03 
Note: (a. ) *, ** and *** indicate significance at 0.1,0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. 
(b. ) A is coefficient of logged variable. (c. ) Limdep reports are on pp. A19. 
27 the classic correction for heteroscedasticity proposed by White (1980). In the OLS 
(including FEM) regression, if cases don't have equal error variance, it's called 
heteroscedasticity and correction is required. 
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To make sure the functional form is correct, no omitted variable, a popular 
lest of functional form misspecification, suggested by Ramsey (1969), is 
Regression Specification Error Test (RESET), which is based on the idea that 
nonlinear independent terms, if added to the proposed model, should not be 
able to explain the dependent. The original function, Model 2 and 3, is 
restricted regression and their residuals sums of squares are 0.12170 and 
o. 11794. Models that squared and cubic estimated recycling ratios are added 
are unrestricted regression and their residuals sum of squares are 0.11636 
and 0.11696 (Limdep result reports are in Appendix 7 (pp. A32)). The null 
hypothesis (Ho) is that restricted regression has no omitted variables. The 
calculation of test statistic is following. 
F_ 
(RSSR 
- RSSuR) /J 
RSSuR /(T - K) 
In this equation, J is one restricted number, T is 108 total observations, and K 
is 30 parameters to be estimated. The P-value of this statistic is 0.42 for 
Model 3 which shows the unrestricted model cannot reject the null hypothesis 
of correct functional form. The results of the RESET show Model 3 (Lin-log 
model) to be better than Model 2. Model 3 is particularly suitable for recycling 
ratio estimation. 
The FEM estimation of total recyclables is reported in Table 5.2. It can 
reject the hypothesis that coefficients are jointly zero at the 99% confidence 
level. The LM Test and Hausman Test show that this model can reject 
non-penal model and REM are better at 1% significance, respectively. The 
Limdep result report is in Appendix 7 (pp. A39). The implications of variables 
in the recycling ratio and total recyclables models will be discussed later. 
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Table 5.2 FEM estimates of total recyclables 
Independent TOR 
pNR 20.48963 ^ 
(price of NR) (1.883)* 
FNR -574.56364 ^ 
(frequency of NR) (-3.152)*** 
KR 11.43873 
(kerbside rec. ) (. 335) 
PPPINC 193.56270 ^ 
(PPP based inc. ) (1.155) 
TBG 41.21266 
(transparent bag) (1.538) 
DEN 1791.06553 ^ 
(density) (6.456)*** 
FI -47.71348 
(dummy of fine) (-. 993) 
MR 44.40290 
(mandatory rec. ) (1.741)* 
PKR -91.01401 
(price of KR) (-. 739) 
CR 18.43853 
(recycling cat. ) (2.302)** 
adjusted R2 . 80517 
F(27,80) 17.38 
Note: (a. ) *, ** and *** indicate significance at 0.1,0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. 
(b. ) ^ is coefficient of logged variable. (c. ) Limdep report is on pp. A39. 
The estimation of each kind of recyclable (Eq. 4-7) is based on the 
functional form of Model 2 or Model 3. The coefficient of PKR is unavailable in 
recyclable paper model because no city charges for paper recycling. 
According to the data, three Japanese cities including Sendai City at 2002, 
Nagoya City at 2000 and Nagasaki City at 2002 started to provide kerbside 
plastics container recycling with charge, and the amount of plastics recycling is 
zero before kerbside recycling is provided. Since the correlation between 
PKRplastics and KRpiastics is high, PKR in recyclable plastic has also been 
abandoned. The estimations for each kind of recyclable are reported in Table 
5.3 and the Limdep reports of these models appear in Appendix 7 (pp. A42). 
All models can reject that coefficients are jointly zero at 99% confidence level. 
The LM Test of shows that these panel data models are better than non-panel 
data models at the 1% significance level. The Hausman Test shows that 
these FEMs are better than REMs at I% significance except for the plastics 
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'15% significance) and glass models (15% significance). 
Table 5.3 FEM estimates of recyclable materials 
Dependent: per capita per day recycla Dependent: per capita per day recyclable 
P4 TV MEW GLW PTW PLW 
independen (paper) (metal) (glass) (PET bottles) (plastics) 
PNR 10.5897611 171.68137 60.63698 40.80697 . 70125 
" 
price of NR) (1.162) (3.385)*** (2.803)*** (3.679)*** (. 584) 
FNR -246.19722 " -16.55294 -. 82485 . 44375 -11.18275 " 
(freq. of NR) (-1.677)* (-3.359)*** (-. 392) (. 411) (-. 580) 
KR 44.80343 6.21815 2.01219 1.84535 13.37900 
kerbside rec. ) (2.096)** (1.175 (. 891) (2.219)** (7.691)*** 
PPPINC -12.39166 A . 46546E-02 -. 29281 E-03 . 52628E-03 -10.42644 " 
(PPP income) (-. 093) (3.541)*** (-. 522) (1.946)* (-. 615) 
TBG 62.53126 -5.05549 -1.32321 1.34199 1.35214 
(trans. bag) (2.917)*** (-1.325) (-. 813) (1.586) (. 471) 
DEN 1095.59704 " 114.53416 " 47.20572 " 58.04681 " 111.42355 " 
(density) (4.736)*** (2.438)** (2.356)** (5.559)*** (3.711)*** 
FI -54.10606 -. 16201 . 39397 . 57189 -4.70648 
(dummy of fine) (-1.348) (-. 019) (. 110) (. 320) (-. 918) 
MR 3.54324 12.46093 . 86346 3.36733 1.59576 
(mand. rec. ) (. 172) (2.852)*** (. 463) (3.772)*** (. 616) 
PKR na. -25.54755 -11.28778 . 43922 na. 
(price of KR) -1.198 (-1.241) (. 094) 
adjusted R2 . 72951 . 72110 . 92229 . 73546 . 72289 
F-statistics 12.54 11.64 49.85 12.44 12.17 
Note: (a. ) *, ** and *** indicate significance at 0.1,0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. 
(b. ) ^ is coefficient of logged variable. (c. ) Limdep reports are on pp. A42. 
All significant coefficients in paper, metal, glass, PET bottles and plastics 
models in Table 5.3 have signs that are consistent with expectations (Table 
4.1). The recycling ratio (Model 3), total recyclables and each recyclable 
material model show similar results. The implications of the coefficients are 
discussed below. 
1. price of non-recyclables collection (PNR) 
The coefficient of PNR is positive in all regressions, which is consistent 
with expectations (Table 4.1). The higher PNR raises marginal cost of 
dumping and increases recycling. PNR can significantly increase recycling 
ratio, total recyclables, recyclable metal, glass and PET bottles. The 
coefficient of PNR is highest in recyclable metal including all kinds of cans, tins, 
cutlery, cooking staff and metal container etc. which might be largest part of 
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waste composition of recyclables and one of most traditional and popular 
recyclable material. 
The coefficient of PNR is higher significant in recycling ratio model than in 
total recyclables model. The possible reason is that the higher PNR causes 
source reduction, in which the total waste generation is reduced, the recycling 
ratio is increased, but total recyclables is only increased slightly. 
2. frequency of non-recyclables collection (FNR) 
The coefficient of FNR is negative in models, which is consistent with 
expectations (Table 4.1). It's significant in the recycling ratio, total recyclables, 
recyclable paper and metal models. The higher FNR decreases marginal cost 
of dumping (less dumping preparation), which increases dumping and 
decreases recycling. The FNR is highly significant in recyclable metal model. 
One possible reason is that dumping recyclable metal is more troublesome 
than other materials because metal is the largest part of waste composition of 
recyclables. 
3. providing kerbside recycling (KR) 
KR is significant in recyclable paper, PET bottles and plastics models and 
the coefficient is positive which is consistent with expectations (Table 4.1). 
KR can decrease the marginal cost of recycling, which can increase the 
recycling amount. KR is insignificant in recyclable metal and glass. One 
possible reason is that 93% of all cases provide kerbside metal and glass 
recycling, and paper and plastics are the latest materials to be added into 
Japanese kerbside recycling systems. 
4. per capita income based on PPP (PPPINC) 
Purchasing power parity adjusted income slightly increases metal and 
PET bottles recycling, which is consistent with expectations (Table 4.1). 
Households with higher incomes may consume more goods and generate 
more recyclables. 
5. logged population density (LDEN) 
LDEN increase all kinds of recyclables, which is also consistent with 
expectations (Table 4.1). One explanation is that higher population density 
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increases the marginal cost of illegal dumping, which increases recycling. 
Another explanation might be that garbage treatment cost is higher in densely 
populated cities leading those cities to do more recycling promotions. 
6, mandatory recycling adopted (MR) 
MR, a recycling enforcement (REN), increases the recycling ratio, total 
recyclables, metal and PET bottles, all of which matches expectations (Table 
4.1). The reason for the insignificance of paper and glass recycling may be 
that paper and glass recycling have a very long history in Taiwan and many 
private organizations provide paper recycling. Households may not recycle 
more paper and glass after mandatory recycling adopted. 
7. fine for illegal dumping (F]) 
FI has no significant effect in any recyclable models. The reason is that 
while all cities have nominal fines for illegal dumping, only half of them are 
enforced in any measure, which may be ascribed to difficulty of detection. 
8. the policy of using transparent garbage bag (TBG) 
TBG, a recycling enforcement (REN), increases paper recycling, which is 
consistent with expectations (Table 4.1). The reason may be that paper takes 
more space in garbage bags and can be seen easily. Because TBG policy is 
mainly adopted in Japanese cases and all cases adopting MR are in Taiwan, 
this significant effect in recycling increasing is attributable to social pressure 
rather than mandatory recycling. 
9. the price of kerbside recycling (PKR) 
PKR has no significant effect on recycling. All cities that charge for 
kerbside recycling have the same price on non-recyclables collection. The 
relative price of kerbside recycling is zero, which decreases the negative effect 
of PKR. 
10. recycling categories (CR) 
CR has significant effect on recycling ratio and total recyclables models, 
which matches expectation (Table 4.1). CR increases materials that can be 
recycled. According to the data, recycling categories are increased by 
74 
jnaterials entered kerbside recycling later, such as kerbside paper and plastics 
recycling in Japan, and kitchen waste recycling in Taiwan. 
5,3 Estimations of Non-recyclables and Total Waste Generation Models 
The FEM estimations of Equation 4-12 and 4-13 (non-recyclables and 
total waste generation) are shown in Table 5.4. Two models are estimated for 
each equation. One includes only original variables and the other one 
includes an interaction term for enforcements. An assumption in Chapter 4 is 
that on-time collection (OTC) is a kind of unit-pricing enforcement (UEN) which 
can enforce unit-pricing by increasing the chance of being prosecuted. The 
interaction term INT, on-time collection and unit-pricing (or transparent bag), is 
added into the regressions. The Limdep result reports of these models are in 
Appendix 7 (pp. A56). 
These four models are suitable for describing household dumping 
behaviour. They all reject the hypothesis that coefficients are jointly zero at 
99% confidence level. The LM Test shows that these four panel data models 
are better than the non-panel models at the 99% confidence level. The 
Hausman Test shows that two FEM models of non-recyclables are better than 
REM models at the 99% confidence level and that two FEM models of total 
waste are better than REM models at the 80% confidence level. These four 
models show similar results and all significant coefficients have expected 
signs. The lower price of garbage collection and higher garbage collection 
frequency can significantly increase non-recyclables. Mandatory recycling 
can significantly decrease both non-recyclables and total waste. Two 
enforcements, the policy of using transparent garbage bag and on-time 
collection, have a barely significant effect on both non-recyclables and total 
waste. The interaction term INT is significant in two FEM estimations. 
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nie 5.4 FEM estimates of non-recyclables and total waste generation 
- NRW(non- NRW(non- TOW (total TOW (total 
enden 
[ 
recyclables) recyclables) waste) waste) 
p NR -2424.14809 -1675.41059 -1980.18947 -692.14558 
e of NR) -4.225)*** (-1.377)** (-3.275)*** -. 943) 
FNR 118.28808 112.41849 54.07069 43.97330 
(freq. of NR) (2.105)** 1.532)** (. 913) (. 773) 
KR 106.24069 103.38135 150.31215 145.39327 
(kerbside rec. ) (1.117) (. 808) (1.499) (1.512) 
PPPINC . 48117E-02 . 91928E-02 . 12481 E-01 . 20018E-01 
(PPP income) (. 322) (1.761) (. 792) (1.305) 
TBG -82.61071 -69.98588 2.74703 24.46538 
(trans. bag) (-1.914)* (. 812) (. 060) (. 553) 
DEN -3078.22610 A -3162.47787 A -1182.99816 A -1327.93546A 
(density) (-5.889)*** (-5.775)*** (-2.147)** (-2.503)** 
FI 11.40524 6.70256 -45.35186 -53.44183 
(dummy of fine) (. 116) (. 259) (-. 436) (-. 536) 
MR -264.95845 -260.36985 -223.57938 -215.68567 
(mand. rec. ) (-5.365)*** (-3.093)*** (-4.295)*** (-4.316)*** 
OTC -48.34895 -50.52695 -51.89429 -55.64108 
(on-time coil. ) (-. 453) (-. 453) (-. 461) (-. 516) 
INT na. -186.84161 na. -321.42131 
(OTC* TBG) (-2.016)* (-2.858)*** 
adjusted R2 . 79486 . 79952 . 72126 . 74393 
F-statistics 16.95 16.80 11.65 12.51 
Note: (a. ) "`, ** and *** indicate significance at 0.1,0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. 
(b. ) A is coefficient of logged variable. (c. ) Limdep reports are on pp. A56. 
The implications of of the findings in Table 5.4 are discussed below. 
1. price of non-recyclables collection (PNR) 
The coefficients of PNR are significant in models of non-recyclables and 
the model of total waste without interaction terms (Table 5.4). The garbage 
collection price elasticity of non-recyclables can be derived from the definition 
of elasticity by this equation. 
NRW'-NRW 
/ 
PNR'-PNR 
= 
ANRW 
X 
PNR 
x 
PNR 
NRW PNR APNR NRW 16PNR NRW 
(5-2) 
The marginal effect of PNR on non-recyclables (/3pvR) is -2424.15 in 
model without any interaction term. According to Table 4.3 and 4.6, PNR is 
0.024 and NRW is 839.35, so the price elasticity of non-recyclables at the 
average price is 0.069. PNR also significantly decreases total waste 
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generation (model without interaction term) but the price elasticity of total 
waste generation at the average price is only 0.049. The price of 
non-recyclables collection in the data is per 10 litres but the price elasticity is 
the same as per litre. Compared with other empirical studies on bag or tag 
waste pricing system (Table 2.1), the estimated price elasticity in this thesis is 
similar to that obtained by Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) but is lower than 
other studies including Hong (1999) in Korean survey. There may be two 
reasons for the low price elasticity calculated by whole data regression: 
a. The average PNR is very low; 
b. Some unit-pricing effects may be captured by cities' dummy variables in the 
FEM estimations, since there is no change in the price charged by those 
cities from 1998 to 2003. 
The data only includes the four cities that started to adopt unit-pricing 
during 1998 to 2003, which are Taipei, Nagoya, Nagasaki and Naha City. The 
price elasticity for each of these cities should be calculated by arc-elasticity 
which uses average price (PNR) and quantity (NRW) rather than original price 
(PNR) and quantity (NRr because the original price is close to zero which will 
make the elasticity unreasonable low (Eq. 5-3). 
Care -- 
ONRW 
X 
PNR 
= 
NRW'-NRW 
X 
(PNR'+PNR) /2 (5-3) 
APNR NRW PNR'-PNR (NRW'+NRW) /2 
The average price (PNR) is approximate half of unit-price. The price 
elasticities of non-recyclables are listed in Table 5.5. The price elasticity 
increases as the unit-price increases but may also increase over time. The 
price elasticity of demand is lower in the short run than in the long run28 (Begg 
et al., 2000). Households can change their consumption patterns which 
decrease waste generation in the long run. Linderhof et al. (2001) found 
higher elasticity for waste collection in long run as well. In Table 5.5, the 
elasticity in Nagoya City calculated over five years is higher than that in Naha 
City calculated over three years, despite the that fact that unit-prices are higher 
in Naha than in Nagoya. In the cases where unit-prices are relatively high, 
and where the scheme has been in force for a long time, the price elasticity 
ranges from 0.220, Nagoya, to 0.346, Taipei. 
2 The short run refers to the period immediately after prices change and before long-term 
adjustment can occur. The long run is the period necessary for complete adjustments to a 
price change. Its length depends on the type of adjustments consumers wish to make. 
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Takle 5.5 Price elasticity for non-recyclables 
data whole data Nagasaki from Nagoya from Naha from Taipei from 
2001 to 2003 1999 to 2003 2001 to 2003 1999 to 2003 
price at average unit-price: unit-price: unit-price: unit-price: 
PNR: 0.024 0.028 0.041 0.086 0.144 
NRW 0.069 0.092 0.220 0.114 0.346 
The significant negative coefficient of PNR in TOW estimation (without 
interaction term) is consistent with the results that PNR significantly increase 
recycling ratio (Table 5.1) but only slightly increase total recyclables (Table 5.2) 
because the higher PNR generates source reduction. This is illustrated in 
Figure 5.1. 
source reduction 
non-recyclables 
recyclables 
before UP after UP 
Fig 5.1 Composition of waste before and after unit-pricing 
2. per capita income based on PPP (PPPINC) 
PPPINC has insignificant effect on non-recyclables and total waste 
generation. These results show that among income groups in the range 
10000 to 30000 PPP based per capita income, waste management policies 
can be effective in preventing solid waste from increasing. 
3. policy of using transparent bag (TBG) and on-time collection (OTC) 
Only TBG can slightly decrease non-recyclables and OTC are insignificant 
in non-recyclables and total waste generation models. It shows that each of 
these two enforcements alone cannot decrease garbage disposal. 
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4 logged population density (LDEN) 
LDEN significantly decreases non-recyclables and total waste, which is 
consistent with expectations (Table 4.1). Households in high population 
density areas possess fewer physical commodities and generate less waste. 
This result is the same as that reported in Podolsky and Spiegel (1998). 
5. fine for illegal dumping (F]) 
Fl has no significant effect on non-recyclables and total waste. The 
reason may be the same as that reported for the recyclables models. All 
cities have nominal fines for illegal dumping but only half of them enforce it or 
try to do it. Whether cities try to fine illegal dumping or not, it does not have 
effect on waste. The lack of enforcement may be ascribed to the difficulty of 
detection. 
6. mandatory recycling adopted (MR) 
MR, a recycling enforcement (REN), decreases non-recyclables and total 
waste in every models (Table 5.5), which is consistent with expectation (Table 
4.1). These results show that mandatory recycling can not only increase 
recycling but also decrease waste generation. 
7. interaction term (INT) 
INT has significant negative effect on the amount of non-recyclables and 
total waste generation and PNR is also significant in NRW models, which 
means on-time collection does enforce unit-pricing, especially to 
non-recyclables. However, PNR is insignificant in the TOW model with 
interaction term, which means only where there is INT, Taipei's unit-pricing 
case, can the policy significantly decreases total waste generation, and 
unit-pricing in other cities has limited source reduction. Because Taipei is the 
only city with INT and their PNR are higher than other cities, this result cannot 
be taken to mean that enforcement is definitely the cause of source reduction 
in Taipei. 
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5.4 Empirical Study of Inspection Effort with Taiwanese Cases 
Whether or not the municipal authority fines illegal dumping (FI) is 
insignificant in all recyclables and non-recyclables models in the data including 
Japanese and Taiwanese cases. In this section, three illegal dumping29 
prosecution and inspection variables from Taiwan Environmental Database 
(see footnote 16) will replace FI one by one and be tested with Taiwanese data. 
These three variables includes the annual prosecuted fines per 1000 residents 
(USD, ENAF), the annual inspection times per 1000 residents (ENA7), and the 
inspection labours per 100000 residents (people, ENAP). Because no 
Taiwanese city charges residents for kerbside recycling, and because a high 
percentage of Taiwanese cities (81%) have adopted on-time collection which 
also has a high correlation (0.92) with providing kerbside recycling (KR), PKR 
and OTC are omitted from models for Taiwanese data. 
The following discussion focuses on ENAF because ENAT and ENAP 
aren't significant in all models. Table 5.6 lists FEM estimations for recycling 
ratio model. The Limdep estimation report is on Appendix 7 (pp. A68). This 
model rejects that coefficients are jointly zero at 99% confidence level and LM 
test shows that this panel data model (FEM) is better than OLS model at 90% 
confidence level. All significant variables have signs that are consistent with 
expectations (Table 4.1). 
29 As mentioned in section 4.3, the illegal dumping in the database includes waste disposal not 
via municipal waste and recycling collections and violation of unit-pricing and mandatory 
recycling rules. 
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Table 5.6 FEM estimations for recycling ratio model with ENAF 
RR 
PNR 1.1284 # 
FNR -. 4682E-01 
KR . 1999E-01 
PPPINC . 2980E-05 
LDEN 2.8422 # 
ENAF . 3969E-02 
MR . 6367E-01 # 
CR -. 1604E-01 
adj- R2 . 8126 
Note: (a. ) # indicates the coefficient is significant at higher than 90% confidence level. 
(b. ) Limdep report is on pp. A68. 
OLS estimations for recyclables and waste models are listed in Table 5.7 
because LM test shows that their panel data models aren't better than OLS 
models at 90% confidence level. The Limdep estimation reports are on 
Appendix 7 (pp. A71). ENAF has significant positive effect on NRW and TOW, 
which is consistent with expectations (Table 4.1). The inspection effort 
(prosecuted fine) can decrease illegal dumping, which may increase 
non-recyclables and total waste generation. However, ENAF has a negative 
effect in some recyclable models, which is unexpected. The possible reason 
is that ENAF data includes all kinds of violations of waste management 
laws/rules. The prosecuted fine is likely increased by fining incorrect 
recycling classifications and discarding recyclable materials at unauthorised 
time and places rather than littering, after unit-pricing or mandatory recycling 
policies adopted. When the cost of recycling is increased by this enforcement, 
the effect of ENAF is similar with PKR which is expected to have negative effect 
on recycling (Table 4.1). 
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Table 5.7 OLS estimations for recyclables and waste models with ENAF 
TOR ^ PAJV ^ MEW GLiV ^ 
PNR 51.6791 # 26.1430 # 201.5085 # . 1503E-01 
FNR -67.5755 -71.9202 1.1905 -3.4366 
KR 113.2071 # 39.8640 # 16.5419 # 2.5409 # 
PPPINC 3.7692 -13.9170 . 4966E-03 -. 6721 
LDEN -12.9194 -22.9757 # -13.0592 # -. 8271 
ENAF -35.1717 # -11.1098 -. 5413 -1.5159 # 
MR 48.9965 # 21.4647 # 5.2914 . 3582 
CR -20.6280 na. na. na. 
constant 507.0944 608.8932 96.0285 22.8473 
adj- R2 . 5036 . 4834 . 3316 . 4355 
PTW PLW A NRW TOJV 
PNR 24.3153 . 1530 -2003.7212 # -1148.6580 
FNR . 2413 30.8088 # 141.8978 # 121.3151 # 
KR 2.2739 7.8300 # 7.0694 90.8030 
PPPINC . 3162E-03 3.7658 . 3159E-02 . 1207E-02 
LDEN 2.1894 # . 9399 27.0971 -7.7916 
ENAF -. 5205 # -4.5054 # 17.9309 # 12.9980 # 
MR 2.1229 # 3.5202 -326.0787 # -284.0842 # 
CR na. na. na. na. 
constant -21.9233 -91.8919 -213.0118 288.9006 
adj- R2 . 5542 . 5076 . 5059 . 4307 
Note: (a. ) # indicates the coefficient is significant at higher than 90% confidence level. 
(b. ) ^ indicates Lin-log model in which PNR, FNR, PPPINC and ENAF are logged, and other 
models are Lin-lin model in which only DEN is logged, LDEN. 
(c. ) Limdep reports are on pp. A71. 
5.5 Summary of Empirical Study 
For the data including Japanese and Taiwanese cases, the FEM 
estimates of recycling ratio, total recyclables, recyclable materials and total 
waste generation are found adequate to explain household recycling and 
waste generation behaviours. All significant coefficients have expected signs. 
A summary of the estimated models is listed in Table 5.8. The higher price of 
non-recyclables collection (price of unit-pricing) can significantly increase 
recycling ratio, total recyclables, recyclable metal, glass and PET bottles. 
Unit-pricing combined with on-time collection enforcement can significantly 
decrease non-recyclables and total waste generation. The price elasticity of 
non-recyclables and total waste at the average price are 0.069 and 0.049, 
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respectively. When the unit-pricing price goes high and in the long run, the 
price elasticity may be as high as 0.220, like Nagoya's case, or 0.346, like 
Taipei's case. The higher frequency of non-recyclables collection decreases 
the recycling ratio, total recyclables, recyclable paper and metal, which may be 
caused by lowering marginal dumping cost. 
Mandatory recycling policy increases the recycling ratio, total recyclables, 
recyclable metal and PET bottles. The recycling categories significantly 
increase recycling ratio and total recyclables due to increasing materials that 
can be recycled. According to the data, recycling categories are increased by 
materials entered kerbside recycling later, such as kerbside paper and plastics 
recycling in Japan, and kitchen waste recycling in Taiwan. Mandatory 
recycling decreases non-recyclables and total waste generation as well. The 
policy of using transparent garbage bag only increases paper recycling. The 
reason probably is that paper takes more space in garbage bag and can be 
seen easily. 
Table 5.8 Summary of estimated models 
RRA TOR^ PAW^ PLW^ 
PNR . 28445E-01 # 20.48963 # 10.58976 . 70125 
FNR -. 63346 # -574.56364 # -246.19722 # -11.18275 
KR -. 46958E-02 11.43873 44.80343 # 13.37900 # 
PPPINC . 15966 193.56270 -12.39166 -10.42644 
TBG . 28361E-01 41.21266 62.53126 # 1.35214 
LDEN 2.01764 # 1791.06553 # 1095.59704 # 111.42355 # 
FI -. 45647E-01 -47.71348 -54.10606 -4.70648 
MR . 62516E-01 # 44.40290 # 3.54324 1.59576 
PKR -. 10601 -91.01401 na. na. 
CR . 18986E-01 # 18.43853 # na. na. 
NRW TOW MEW GLW PTW 
PNR -2424.1481 # -1980.1895 # 171.68137 # 60.63698 # 40.80697 # 
FNR 118.28808 # 54.07069 -16.55294 # -. 82485 . 44375 
KR 106.24069 150.31215 6.21815 2.01219 1.84535 # 
PPPINC . 48117E-02 . 12481E-01 . 46546E-02 # . 29281 E-03 . 52628E-03 
# 
TBG -82.61071 # 2.74703 -5.05549 -1.32321 1.34199 
LDEN -3078.2261 # -1182.9982 # 114.53416 # 47.20572 # 58.04681 # 
FI 11.40524 -45.35186 -. 16201 . 39397 . 57189 
MR -264.95845 # -223.57938 # 12.46093 # . 86346 3.36733 # 
PKR na. na. -25.54755 -11.28778 . 43922 
OTC -48.34895 -51.89429 na. na. na. 
Note: (a. ) # indicates the coefficient is significant at higher than 90% confidence level. 
(b. ) ^ is Lin-log model and others are Lin-lin model (only DEN is logged). 
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Concerning illegal dumping inspection efforts, whether or not the authority 
tries to fine illegal dumping is insignificant in all models. In Taiwanese data, 
the prosecuted penalty (fine) per 1000 residents has significant positive effect 
on non-recyclables and total waste generation because the average penalty 
can decrease illegal dumping, which may increase non-recyclables and total 
waste generation. 
Purchasing power based per capita income can slightly increase metal 
and PET bottles recycling. Population density increases all kinds of 
recyclables probably because the marginal cost of illegal dumping is increased 
in high density area. Population density also significantly decreases 
non-recyclables and total waste generation, which might be because 
households in high population density areas possess fewer commodities and 
generate less waste. Another possible reason is that cities with higher 
population density put more effort into promoting recycling and waste 
reduction. 
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Chapter 6 Policy Simulations 
In Chapter 5, waste and recycling models are estimated. Using these 
models we can simulate residents' waste generation and recycling behaviours 
when waste management policies are applied. This chapter simulates the 
effects of unit-pricing, garbage collection and mandatory recycling policies, and 
estimates the social cost of each policy. These estimates are then used to 
make policy recommendations. 
6.1 Simulation of Unit-pricing Policy 
In Table 5.8, the price of non-recyclables collection (PNR) is shown to 
increase recycling significantly, and to decrease non-recyclables and total 
waste generation. This section will simulate the application of unit-pricing 
policy on Hsinchu City because it didn't adopt unit-pricing or mandatory 
recycling policy during 1998 to 2003 and its non-recyclables per capita is 
relatively high. The data shows that the price of normal garbage bag in 
Taiwanese cities is 0.01 USD/10litres. Four scenarios are considered. The 
first applies unit-price to 0.144 USD/101itres which is the price in Taipei City, 
the second sets to 0.086 which is the highest unit-price in Japan, and the third 
sets to 0.041 which is the lowest unit-price in Japan. Because PNR has no 
significant effect on paper and plastics recycling, this simulation focuses on 
garbage and other recyclables. The models estimated in Chapter 5 (Table 
5.8) are used to calculate the short run effects. The impacts on garbage and 
recycling are listed in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Short run simulation results (impacts) of unit-pricing (UP) 
unit-price 
(USD/1Olitres) 
NRW 
(g/ . d. ) 
MEW 
(gl . d. ) 
GLW 
(g/ . d. ) 
PTWV 
(g/ . d. ) 
RR 
0.144 -324.836 23.005 8.125 5.468 0.076 
0.086 -184.235 13.048 4.608 3.101 0.061 
0.041 -75.149 5.322 1.880 1.265 0.040 
Table 6.1 shows short run decreases of non-recyclables and increases of 
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recycling subject to various unit-pricing schemes. For example, when 
unit-pricing policy is applied and the price is 0.041 USD/1 Olitres, per capita per 
day non-recyclables decrease by 75.149g, recyclable metal increases by 
5.322g, glass increases by 1.880g, PET bottles increase by 1.265g and the 
recycling ratio increases by 0.040 in short run (less then three years after 
adopted). The decrease of non-recyclables and the increase of recycling 
both diminish as unit-price falls. 
lt is expected that residents will dump less waste when the price of waste 
disposal is raised. Assume that the demand for garbage collection is linear in 
the simulation prices. According to Table 5.5, elasticity for long run and 
higher price would be higher than that for short run and lower price. Based on 
elasticities in Taipei and Nagoya, three elasticities for higher unit-prices in the 
long run are set in Table 6.2. The elasticity for unit-price 0.086 is the average 
of elasticities for 0.041 and 0.144. Assume that the original NRW is 991g 
which is the non-recyclables per capita of Hsinchu City in 2000. The 
non-recyclables after unit-pricing adopted (NRW') can be found by Eq. 5-3. 
£- 
ANRW 
X 
PNR 
- 
NRW'-NRW 
x 
(PNR'+PNR)/ 2 (5-3) 
°" APNR NRW PNR'-PNR (NRW'+NRW) /2 
Assume that the waste collection and treatment operation cost (WTC) is the 
same as in Taipei City which is 0.144 USD/101itres and 6.667E-05 USD/g. 
The price content is on Appendix 8 (pp. A91). Because unit-pricing 
decreases waste, the saving of WTC (a part of social benefit, SWTC) can be 
calculated by following equation. 
SWTC = ANRW(g) x WTC($ / g) (6-1) 
The long run unit-pricing simulation results and benefits of unit-pricing are 
listed in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 Long run unit-pricing simulation results and benefits 
unit-price 
(USD/10litres) elasticity NRW (g/p. d. ) NRit'' (g/p. d. ) 
SWTC 
(USD/p. d. ) 
0.144 0.346 991.000 532.367 0.031 
0.086 0.283 991.000 628.226 0.024 
0.041 0.220 991.000 757.219 0.016 
When the price of commodity or service is raised, consumer surplus 
decreases which is the cost of unit-pricing. The CSD can be illustrated by 
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Figure 6.1 and the calculation for CSD is Eq. 6-2. 
CSD = (NRW'+NRW) x (PNR'-PNR) /2 (6-2) 
PNR is assumed to be the original price in Taiwanese cities, 0.01 USD/10litres 
and 4.603E-06 USD/g (according to Taipei's case, Appendix 8,0.216 kg/litre). 
The unit-prices have to be counted in USD/g as well. NRW is 991g and NRW' 
are in Table 6.2. The costs of all pricing scenarios are listed in Table 6.3. 
P 
PNR' 
PNR 
0 
Q 
Fig 6.1 Consumer surplus decrease when price raises 
Table 6.3 Cost-benefit analysis for long run unit-pricing simulations 
unit-price 
(USD/1 Olitres) 
PNR (USD/g) PNR'(USD/g) 
CSD 
(social cost) 
SJVTC (partial 
social benefits) 
0.144 4.630E-06 6.667E-05 0.047 0.031 
0.086 4.630E-06 3.981 E-05 0.028 0.024 
0.041 4.630E-06 1.898E-05 0.013 0.016 
According to simulation results in Table 6.3, SWTC is slightly larger than 
CSD when unit-price is 0.041 USD/1 Olitres, it is slightly smaller when unit-price 
is 0.086 USD/101itres, and it is smaller than CSD when unit-price is 0.144 
USD/101itres. The WTC used for this simulation is from Taipei City and 
excludes land use and external costs (Appendix 8, pp. A91). The WTC for 
real social cost should be higher and the social benefit from waste decrease 
would be higher as well. If unit-pricing were adopted in cities in Taiwan, the 
original garbage collection fee collected from water consumption would be 
terminated which costs 144 NTD per household per month and 0.051 USD per 
person per day (Appendix 8, pp. A91). This can be regarded as a benefit for 
households, and that makes unit-pricing beneficial even when unit-price is 
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NRW' NRIV 
0.144 USD/101itres. Despite the reduction in the former garbage collection 
fee, the social benefits of unit-pricing, including externalities from waste 
reduction, are higher than the loss of consumer surplus providing that the 
unit-price is lower than 0.086 USD/1 Olitres. 
Besides the loss of consumer surplus, other costs of unit-pricing, such as 
administration cost and transaction cost, cannot be fully estimated, but some 
clues can be obtained about inspection efforts for policies. Two policy 
variables, whether adopting mandatory recycling (MR) and unit-pricing (NRU), 
are tested to explain each three inspection variables, ENAF, ENAP and ENAT 
(the data shown in Appendix 6, pp. A18). Limdep estimation reports for all 
three models are in Appendix 9 (pp. A92). Based on the LM test and 
Hausman test results, FEM estimations are chosen for ENAF model, and OLS 
estimations are chosen for ENAT and ENAP models. Both MR and NRU are 
insignificant in ENAT and ENAF models. Only ENAP is significantly affected by 
a policy variable - NRU and the model can reject that coefficients are jointly 
zero at 99% confidence level. That estimation is shown on Table 6.4. ENAP 
(inspection labours per 100,000 people) is significantly increased when 
unit-pricing is adopted. Therefore, when unit-pricing is adopted in a 368,000 
population city, waste management authority may need to increase 
approximate 16 inspection labours. That costs about 683 USD/day (40000 
NTD/month. person) which is relatively small comparing with CSD for unit-price 
0.086 (10482 USD/day). Since the average inspection times (ENAT) and 
average prosecuted fines (ENAF) don't increase after unit-pricing, the increase 
of inspection labours may not be necessary. The cost of specific garbage bag 
may be regardless because any waste is either pack in normal bag or specific 
bag which doesn't have much difference on cost. Therefore, social benefits 
for unit-pricing are likely higher than costs when unit-price is lower than 0.086 
USD/101itres. 
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Table 6.4 OLS estimates of pol 
Independent ENAP 
AIR . 63090 
(mandatory rec. ) (. 767) 
NRU 4.35293 
(unit-pricing) (3.465)*** 
constant 3.34410 
(6.382)*** 
adjusted RZ . 22272 
F(2,33) 6.01 
icy variables on inspection labours 
Note: (a. ) ", ** and *** indicate significance at 0.1,0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. 
(b. ) Limdep report is on pp. A92. 
6.2 Simulation of Mandatory Recycling and Transparent bag Policy 
In Table 5.8, it was shown that a mandatory recycling policy (MR) can also 
significantly increase recycling and decrease waste generation. This 
simulation uses the models estimated in Chapter 5 (Table 5.8) to calculate the 
effects. Because MR has no significant effect on glass, paper and plastics 
recycling, this simulation focuses on waste generation and other recyclables. 
Furthermore, using transparent garbage bag (TBG) is an enforcement of 
mandatory recycling which can further decrease non-recyclables. These 
effects are listed in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5 Simulation results (impacts) of mandatory recycling policy (MR) 
NRW(glp. d. ) TOW (gl . d. ) MEW (gl . d. ) PTW (g/p. d. ) RR 
MR -264.958 -223.579 12.461 3.367 0.063 
MR+TBG -347.569 - - - 
If mandatory recycling is applied on Hsinchu City in 2000, the non- 
recyclables per capita after adoption can be found by Table 6.5. Assume that 
the waste collection and treatment operation cost (WWTC) is the same as in 
Taipei City which is 0.144 USD/10litres and 6.667E-05 USD/g. The 
calculations for the saving of waste collection and treatment cost (SWTC) is the 
same as Eq. 6-1. The benefits for mandatory recycling simulations are in 
Table 6.6. The benefits of mandatory recycling (MR) and it plus transparent 
bag (MR+TBG) are similar as unit-price 0.041 and 0.086 USD/101itres. The 
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social cost of mandatory recycling is consumer surplus decrease (CSD) and 
the price is household's expected fine for insufficient recycling. However, the 
social cost cannot be estimated because there is no data for household's 
expected fine for insufficient recycling before and after adoption. The 
elasticities found in unit-pricing cases (Table 5.5) may be used to estimate CSD 
of mandatory recycling. If elasticities 0.220 and 0.283 which have similar 
effects as MR and MR+TBG, respectively, are chosen, the CSDs will be similar 
as unit-pricing as well. Then, MR and MR+TBG have similar cost-benefit 
results as unit-price 0.041 and 0.086 USD/101itres. 
Table 6.6 Benefits of mandatory recycling 
' 
SJVTC (partial 
NRit'(g/p. d. ) NRJi' (g/p. d. ) 
social benefits) 
MR 991.000 726.040 0.018 
MR+TBG 991.000 643.431 0.023 
Besides the consumer surplus decreases, mandatory recycling doesn't 
have significant enforcement costs according to the estimated model of 
inspection labour (Table 6.4). Comparing Table 6.3 and Table 6.6, adopting 
mandatory recycling can generate similar benefits as unit-price 0.041 and 
0.086 USD/101itres. However, mandatory recycling is one-off effect policy 
which is hard to further decrease waste, like rising unit-price. Considering 
cities adopted mandatory recycling, using transparent garbage bag can further 
enforce it. The cost of using transparent garbage bag is expected to be low 
because the prices of normal garbage bag and transparent one is very close. 
6.3 Simulation of Decreasing Garbage Collection Frequency 
In Table 5.8, the garbage collection frequency (FNR) can also significantly 
affect metal recycling and non-recyclables because the higher frequency can 
decrease garbage dumping labours. Taiwanese cities have much higher 
garbage collection frequency than Japanese cities. Hsinchu, Tainan, 
Kaohsiung and Taichung City provide 6 times collection per week, and 
Keelung City even provides 7 times. This section will simulate decreasing 
garbage collection frequency from 7 and 6 times per week to 5 in these 
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Taiwanese cities. Using the models estimated in Chapter 5 (Table 5.8) to 
estimate the effects. These effects are listed in Table 6.7. 
Table 6.7 Simulation result of decreasing garbage collection frequency (FNR) 
NRJV(g/p. d. ) MEW(glp. d. ) PAW(glp. d. ) RR 
6 to 5 times -118.288 16.553 44.887 0.115 
7 to 5 times -236.576 33.106 82.839 0.213 
The cost of decreasing garbage collection frequency is expected to be 
low because the disutility of keeping waste is expected to be low if the two 
non-collection days are not alongside. For example, Taipei City doesn't 
provide garbage collection on Wednesday and Sunday. This policy may have 
some other benefits, such as decreasing garbage collection labour costs. 
6.4 Summary of Simulations 
Three kinds of waste management policies are simulated in this chapter- 
unit-pricing, mandatory recycling and decreasing garbage collection frequency. 
Some conclusions can be found as following 
1. Ironically, decreasing the frequency of garbage collection from 7 or 6 
times per week to 5 yields a positive net benefit, simply because it tends 
to increase recycling and to decrease waste dumping by 118 to 236g per 
capita per day, and has few costs. 
2. The introduction of unit-pricing policy is beneficial once the benefit of 
offsetting the garbage fee based on water consumption is considered. 
3. Despite the offset of garbage fee, unit-prices of 0.041 USD/101itres yield 
net benefits, and unit-prices of 0.086 USD/10litres yield net benefits if 
externalities are considered. According to the data, inspection costs will 
increase when unit-pricing is adopted but the cost is lower than consumer 
surplus forgone. 
4. Mandatory recycling is beneficial, and is expected to have similar costs 
and benefits as a unit-price of 0.041 USD/10litres. 
5. Cities adopting mandatory recycling should use transparent garbage bags, 
since these can increase the effectiveness of mandatory recycling at very 
low cost. 
91 
Chapter 7 Conclusions 
This thesis develops and estimates a model of household waste disposal 
decisions using panel data on 18 cities in Taiwan and Japan. The model is 
then used to test a number of policy instruments, the results of which are 
reported in Chapter 6. This chapter summarises the main findings of the 
thesis and discusses the policy recommendations that fall out of these 
findings. A final section discusses ideas for further research. 
7.1 Conclusions 
Households trade off storing/composting waste against the three main 
waste discarding options: legal dumping, illegal dumping and recycling. 
Household's waste disposal decisions are based on the marginal private cost 
of each disposal option, which includes tariff, labour and disutility for 
storing/composting waste. Social disposal decisions are based on the 
marginal social cost of each disposal option, taking external environmental 
effects into account. Given the external effects of the different private 
options, especially illegal dumping, the social decision-maker - in this case 
the municipal authority - may be interested in identifying policy instruments 
that will change private waste disposal decisions. The household model 
developed in the thesis enables us to evaluate the potential effectiveness of 
alternative instruments in different socio-economic conditions. The main 
findings on the effectiveness of alternative instruments are as follows: 
1. The estimated models confirm that the higher frequency of 
non-recyclables collection, the less recycling and more waste dumping 
would be. This may be because the marginal private cost of dumping 
falls as the frequency of waste collection rises. 
2. In a city with unit-pricing on waste, a household does more recycling, 
illegal dumping and composting than it does under flat fee policy. 
Increasing the price of non-recyclables collection (price of unit-pricing) can 
significantly increase the recycling rate. The short run price elasticity of 
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non-recyclables and total waste are 0.069 and 0.049, respectively. As 
one would expect, the long run price elasticities are higher, the price 
elasticity for non-recyclables rising to 0.346. 
3. Applying a penalty on illegal dumping (fines) can prevent illegal dumping 
from increasing after unit-pricing is adopted, and the effect depends on 
both enforcement and the nominal fine. In Taiwan, increasing the penalty 
(fine) per 1000 residents has a significant positive effect on legal dumping 
(non-recyclables) and total waste generation because the higher penalty 
can decrease illegal dumping, which may increase non-recyclables. 
4. Mandatory recycling increases recycling and decreases non-recyclables 
disposals. 
5. Some troublesome wastes, such as kitchen waste, have a high disutility of 
storage and typically become a household's first choice for illegal dumping 
if composting and recycling are not available. The empirical study found 
that the more kerbside recycling materials (recycling categories) increases 
recycling and the categories are increased by materials entered kerbside 
recycling later, such as kitchen waste recycling for public compost in 
Taiwan. 
6. Using transparent garbage bags is a cost effective way of supporting 
mandatory recycling by lowering the inspection cost. It increases paper 
recycling and decreases waste disposal (non-recyclables). 
7. There is a minor positive correlation between per capita income (at PPP) 
and both metal and PET bottles recycling. 
8. There is much stronger positive correlation between population density 
and all kinds of recyclables. This is thought to be due to the fact that the 
marginal private and social cost of illegal dumping is increased in high 
density areas. Population density is significantly negatively correlated 
with both non-recyclables and total waste generation. This is thought to 
be because households in high population density areas typically 
consume less and generate less waste. 
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7.2 policy Recommendations 
Based on these findings, a number of policy recommendations follow. 
Many of these recommendations are generally intuitive, and would apply to 
MSW policy in any city. However, they do reflect the results of specific 
analyses of data from cities in Taiwan and Japan, and the details - of, for 
example, estimates of the short and long run price elasticity of household 
waste disposals - are especially relevant to those cities. Similarly, the 
effectiveness of particular mechanisms, such as the use of transparent bags 
for mandatory recyclables, may be greater in some settings than others. This 
needs to be taken into account in reading the findings. 
1. There are several very low cost mechanisms for supporting recycling 
efforts. All Taiwanese cities have already adopted on-time collection 
and mandatory recycling. In this case requiring residents to use 
transparent bags for garbage collection can improve recycling and 
decrease dumping, at negligible additional cost. 
2. Given the negative correlation between the frequency of garbage 
collection and recycling rates, there is scope in some cases to reduce 
collection costs and at the same time to increase recycling and decrease 
waste disposal. In particular, where cities have garbage collection more 
than 5 times per week, decreasing the garbage collection frequency can 
increase recycling and decrease waste disposal. 
3. Unit pricing of garbage disposal is a potentially effective mechanism for 
increasing recycling rates. However, the effectiveness depends upon 
the level of the charge. Cities that haven't adopt unit-pricing should 
consider adopting unit-pricing. In this study, a charge of 0.086 
USD/101itres was shown to yield positive net social benefits. 
4. There is more flexibility in unit pricing options where householders would 
benefit from a reduction in existing water consumption-based fees. For 
cities in Taiwan a unit-price of 0.144 USD/10litres would fully cover the 
cost of treatment, and still yield positive net social benefits due to the 
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offset of water consumption-based garbage fees. The unit-pricing 
policy provides waste management authority more variability than 
mandatory recycling which has only one-off effects. 
5. Kerbside collections of recyclables significantly increase the rate of 
recycling. Cities that do not provide kerbside paper, plastics and 
kitchen waste collections should consider doing so. This both increases 
recycling and may prohibit the illegal dumping of waste with high disutility 
of storing and potentially high social costs, such as kitchen waste. 
7.3 Further Research 
While the thesis has addressed some of the gaps in our understanding of 
MSW policies identified in the literature review, there are still a number of 
issues that have yet to be addressed, both in the specific case of Taiwan and 
Japan, and elsewhere. Concerning unit-pricing of MSW, the following 
research questions remain unanswered. 
1. The price elasticity of household waste disposals found in this thesis is 
very low, and this limits the effectiveness of price mechanisms for 
changing household waste disposal decisions. It may be that this is due 
to the fact that cities applying unit-pricing (except Taipei) have adopted 
very low unit-prices. If the study were extended to include household 
responses to a wider range of unit-prices, the elasticity estimates could be 
improved and clearer guidance could be given to municipal 
decision-makers about the changes in waste disposal patterns that could 
be brought about through this mechanism. 
2. We would expect to find a difference between the short and long run 
elasticity estimates. However, this was difficult to identify in the present 
study. Some unit-pricing effects may be captured by -city dummy 
variables in the Fixed Effect Model, but there was no change in the price 
charged by many cities within the time range of data. Hence, extending 
the longitudinal data might be expected to improve the quality of the 
elasticity estimates. 
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On enforcement, which is one of main topics in this thesis, the research 
; may be extended 
in the following ways: 
The incentive effects of penalties for non-compliance with regulations 
depends both on the nominal value of the penalty for non-compliance and 
the probability that infringement will be detected and successfully 
prosecuted. It has already been noted that detection of illegal dumping in 
the case of unit-pricing is facilitated by on-time collection. Other factors 
in enforcement have yet to be fully analysed. This requires interaction 
terms between existing variables in the models. It also requires the 
extension of both private and social decision models to include more 
policies on enforcement options. 
2. The penalty data used in this thesis refer to all kinds of waste 
management violations, which make the results ambiguous. If the 
penalty and/or inspection effort can be classified by regulation and waste 
stream, and if household surveys can be used to uncover the real 
incentive effects of penalties, as well as the penalties actually paid by 
households, the results should be more helpful to policy-makers. 
In fact the development of household surveys to generate data with which 
to estimate the household decision models is the most important and logical 
extension of the research. This would generate a database of household 
dumping and recycling behaviour. It would also make it possible to relate the 
results of the research more readily to survey-based research on MSW 
disposal decisions elsewhere. 
The natural extension of the research on social decisions is to identify the 
optimal policy, given data on the external environmental costs of different 
household decisions. While the research is motivated by the fact that 
household waste disposal does impose costs on society, estimation of these 
costs has been beyond the scope of the thesis. To identify the optimal level of 
unit prices (or other charging mechanisms) requires understanding of the 
social costs associated with legal versus illegal disposals, and of recycling. 
With data on external costs, and with the appropriate elasticity estimates, it 
would be possible to identify the level of charges that would yield the optimal 
distribution of effort between household disposal options. This does, however, 
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require research into the health and other consequences of different options, 
along with a valuation of these consequences. 
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Appendix I Data on Non-recyclables and Recyclables 
Cit Year NR{i' TOW PA{V ME{V GL{i' PTii' PL{i' OTH TOR 
Ja anese Cities 
Sapporo 1998 733 875 69.86 10.75 7.70 2.29 0.00 51.24 141.84 
1999 723 878 66.34 18.21 10.07 5.75 0.00 55.12 155.49 
2000 717 885 68.88 17.23 9.66 6.45 11.22 54.47 167.91 
2001 717 960 141.73 15.34 11.06 6.57 16.87 51.71 243.28 
2002 725 974 148.73 15.22 10.72 6.76 19.19 49.26 249.87 
2003 725 991 155.89 15.04 9.73 7.04 21.65 56.23 265.57 
Sendai 1998 803 991 83.08 43.01 36.65 3.84 0.00 21.42 188.00 
1999 793 977 83.13 41.99 33.95 4.50 0.00 19.75 183.32 
2000 849 1043 87.18 50.45 32.48 4.63 0.53 18.73 194.01 
2001 772 1062 183.17 30.57 32.35 5.90 1.77 36.48 290.24 
2002 716 1040 184.22 30.16 30.99 6.85 34.23 37.64 324.09 
2003 720 1040 186.51 27.30 29.57 7.21 36.35 33.28 320.22 
Chiba 1998 770 944 63.85 52.86 37.88 0.85 0.00 18.83 174.28 
1999 750 1000 146.95 46.95 35.03 1.24 0.00 20.12 250.29 
2000 801 1054 156.05 46.77 33.11 1.74 0.00 14.94 252.61 
2001 777 1125 243.51 47.69 34.19 5.84 0.00 16.48 347.72 
2002 772 1145 232.20 51.66 49.32 6.54 0.00 32.98. 372.71 
2003 774 1115 225.96 38.56 31.74 6.90 0.00 37.75 340.93 
Yokohama 1998 814 934 80.56 16.17 17.42 0.03 0.00 5.64 119.82 
1999 798 919 80.42 17.11 17.49 0.62 0.00 6.11 121.74 
2000 778 911 88.23 19.33 17.73 1.81 0.00 6.48 133.59 
2001 777 1015 183.08 18.20 17.30 3.00 0.99 15.16 237.74 
2002 763 981 164.13 16.17 15.95 5.33 1.04 15.94 218.55 
2003 749 965 165.23 16.10 15.24 6.07 1.05 11.61 215.32 
Nagoya 1998 967 1067 62.25 19.92 14.99 0.79 0.00 2.12 100.06 
1999 947 1080 83.73 21.18 22.91 1.94 0.00 2.69 132.45 
2000 771 973 127.15 22.08 27.74 4.87 15.51 4.49 201.83 
2001 571 970 305.80 20.86 28.41 7.35 27.44 8.81 398.66 
2002 585 988 313.68 18.41 26.69 6.63 29.37 9.04 403.82 
2003 668 1087 325.92 16.25 26.96 7.05 33.39 9.87 419.45 
Kyoto 1998 699 742 1.55 19.44 11.71 1.90 0.00 8.20 42.80 
1999 688 723 0.77 14.84 9.78 2.53 0.00 7.40 35.32 
2000 678 711 0.23 15.12 8.18 2.80 0.00 7.21 33.54 
2001 638 672 0.21 11.69 8.14 3.23 0.00 10.90 34.17 
2002 595 641 0.20 8.81 7.38 2.99 0.09 26.46 45.94 
2003 594 634 0.19 8.85 7.96 3.31 0.20 20.07 40.58 
Osaka 1998 820 850 0.20 18.47 9.70 1.27 0.00 0.00 29.64 
1999 849 901 23.05 16.98 9.47 1.78 0.00 0.46 51.74 
2000 846 900 24.10 17.47 9.35 2.19 0.00 0.49 53.59 
2001 794 876 50.83 17.50 8.70 2.57 0.98 1.02 81.60 
2002 714 797 51.07 16.10 9.11 3.01 2.21 0.98 82.48 
2003 711 801 54.46 15.13 10.59 3.39 4.81 1.07 89.46 
Kobe 1998 1127 1186 54.33 2.52 0.24 0.37 0.00 1.53 58.99 
1999 1160 1233 58.97 11.61 0.24 0.47 0.00 1.50 72.78 
2000 1181 1261 63.86 13.76 0.23 0.63 0.00 1.62 80.11 
2001 1140 1295 134.07 16.88 0.43 0.77 0.00 3.42 155.57 
2002 1121 1278 133.42 17.86 1.01 1.08 0.00 3.65 157.01 
2003 982 1157 143.86 18.54 2.27 1.69 0.00 8.09 174.45 
Al 
Cit Year NRW TOW PAW MEW GLW PTW PLW OTH TOR 
Kitak ushu 1998 916 993 44.48 22.22 8.89 1.77 0.00 0.34 77.69- 
1 UU9 911 945 0.00 22.74 7.78 2.72 0.00 0.27 33.53 
2000 911 1000 49.83 26.38 8.04 3.12 0.00 0.98 88.36 
2001 918 1052 101.70 19.03 10.19 2.67 0.00 0.37 133.96 
2002 912 1049 100.55 18.03 13.96 3.14 0.00 0.52 136.21 
2003 912 1058 104.27 16.44 20.93 3.58 0.00 0.56 145.78 
Fukuoka 1998 686 797 59.11 33.48 4.36 0.03 0.00 14.12 111.09 
1999 697 815 62.79 35.62 3.76 0.05 0.00 15.96 118.19 
2000 694 827 66.61 37.16 8.16 3.99 0.00 17.01 132.93 
2001 686 886 130.02 33.85 10.99 4.73 0.00 19.78 199.37 
2002 685 873 127.56 31.56 10.67 4.82 0.00 13.92 188.54 
2003 692 886 130.15 30.51 10.04 5.14 0.00 18.04 193.88 
Nagasaki 1998 893 989 35.14 36.06 20.95 2.72 0.00 0.43 95.29 
1999 891 987 34.63 37.24 20.25 3.17 0.00 0.83 96.11 
2000 899 995 37.73 33.43 19.55 4.05 0.00 0.91 95.68 
2001 868 1021 94.92 33.68 17.88 4.76 0.90 1.58 153.73 
2002 789 984 133.48 31.09 19.16 5.44 4.05 1.12 194.35 
2003 763 987 147.79 29.73 17.79 7.60 19.63 1.51 224.05 
Naha 1998 772 821 32.14 10.79 5.02 0.00 0.00 0.51 48.47 
1999 786 836 33.45 10.80 4.76 0.00 0.00 0.48 49.50 
2000 764 824 38.89 10.80 4.46 0.00 0.00 6.00 60.14 
2001 743 873 68.23 27.52 16.28 0.00 0.00 17.66 129.69 
2002 670 816 77.91 30.03 17.39 0.00 0.00 21.10 146.43 
2003 606 762 73.99 27.07 20.77 9.84 0.00 24.01 155.68 
Taiwanese Cities 
Taipei 1998 1420 1448 17.82 3.11 0.53 2.23 3.21 0.68 27.57 
1999 1285 1309 15.26 3.05 0.30 1.93 2.62 0.66 23.82 
2000 1009 1060 31.58 8.52 0.43 2.51 2.52 5.17 50.73 
2001 1034 1091 28.94 8.99 0.62 9.02 5.39 4.34 57.29 
2002 769 999 140.53 57.95 1.70 10.27 8.58 10.56 229.58 
2003 690 931 148.83 57.49 2.61 11.28 8.30 12.67 241.17 
Hsinchu 1998 1003 1011 6.41 0.73 0.07 0.18 0.02 0.12 7.52 
1999 1036 1044 6.63 1.01 0.12 0.25 0.05 0.34 8.41 
2000 991 1048 33.44 7.79 1.83 2.60 4.86 6.86 57.39 
2001 989 1126 66.83 39.58 3.99 7.29 11.36 7.74 136.80 
2002 911 1049 56.69 29.26 3.40 11.23 18.36 18.80 137.75 
2003 880 1012 55.01 35.29 6.92 8.40 17.78 8.77 132.17 
Tainan 1998 1147 1149 0.82 0.29 0.02 0.16 0.80 0.00 2.09 
1999 964 970 3.46 0.89 0.31 0.40 0.88 0.45 6.40 
2000 901 948 19.22 6.61 2.45 3.24 3.87 11.20 46.58 
2001 893 1017 50.97 11.82 4.04 6.13 6.78 44.48 124.22 
2002 891 1058 82.47 17.89 6.31 6.19 8.36 45.38 166.60 
2003 826 1005 94.25 17.99 6.28 9.89 11.25 39.27 178.93 
Kaohsiung 1998 1064 1087 7.51 4.12 1.35 2.16 6.55 1.77 23.46 
1999 1063 1105 17.46 7.39 0.48 3.91 9.77 3.18 42.18 
2000 1065 1136 29.85 11.99 0.89 7.39 14.04 6.35 70.52 
2001 867 955 37.33 11.30 1.22 11.95 17.86 8.42 88.08 
2002 806 915 45.27 21.83 3.48 11.01 16.98 10.68 109.25 
2003 792 958 59.26 36.63 4.72 9.73 16.17 39.19 165.70 
A2 
cit Year NRW TOW PAW MEW GLWV PTfV PLWV OTH TOR 
Keelung 1998 1105 1130 23.34 1.31 0.05 0.12 0.00 0.64 25.47 
1999 1028 1076 29.53 10.64 1.23 0.35 3.71 2.58 48.03 
2000 1491 1640 65.55 44.73 3.43 1.40 16.82 16.97 148.89 
2001 830 994 80.78 43.22 4.38 3.48 12.20 19.68 163.73 
2002 792 981 81.80 42.39 4.04 4.65 28.99 27.40 189.27 
2003 772 934 83.16 24.97 3.83 5.26 20.58 23.73 161.53 
Taichun 1998 1101 1124 15.04 4.18 0.31 2.03 1.35 0.45 23.36 
1999 927 989 39.73 9.47 0.75 4.27 6.01 1.28 61.52 
2000 556 665 59.83 15.23 1.62 7.41 14.09 10.40 108.59 
2001 556 719 68.56 17.82 3.03 7.48 12.85 53.71 163.46 
2002 495 681 58.98 25.41 1.77 4.67 7.35 87.42 185.59 
2003 472 636 90.25 22.26 4.89 8.56 19.65 18.32 163.92 
Note: 
1. Definition: NRJV: weight of non-recyclable waste; TOM: weight of total waste; PAW: weight 
of recyclable paper; MEW: weight of recyclable metal; GLW: weight of recyclable glass; 
PTWV: weight of recyclable PET bottle; PLW weight of recyclable plastic; OTH: weight of 
other recyclable waste; TOR: weight of total recyclable waste. 
2. Source: (a. ) Taiwanese cities: Environmental Database, Environmental Protection 
Administration, Executive Yuan, R. O. C. (Taiwan) (http: //edb. epa. gov. tw/); (b. ) Japanese 
cities: Survey of Municipal Solid Waste Management of Ministry of Environment, Japan 
(http: //www. env. go. jp/recycle/waste_tech/ippan/). 
3. Descriptive statistics of this data are in Table 4.3 (pp. 55). 
A3 
Appendix 2 Data on Income and Population Density 
Cit Year INC PPPINC DEN 
J a anese Ci ties 
Sap oro 1998 36986.41 19693.28 1601.89 
1999 37042.91 19723.36 1609.34 
2000 37281.58 19850.44 1618.37 
2001 37311.96 19866.62 1635.45 
2002 36832.26 19611.20 1646.60 
2003 37200.59 19807.31 1658.19 
Sendai 1998 38660.80 20584.80 1245.09 
1999 38789.69 20653.43 1251.59 
2000 38810.49 20664.50 1257.62 
2001 38907.83 20716.33 1264.66 
2002 38455.18 20475.32 1270.28 
2003 38839.73 20680.07 1274.48 
Chiba 1998 33899.74 18049.79 3149.74 
1999 34021.75 18114.75 3175.90 
2000 34597.35 18421.23 3202.22 
2001 33143.71 17647.24 3228.26 
2002 33630.84 17906.62 3257.53 
2003 33967.15 18085.68 3283.42 
Yokohama 1998 38985.53 20757.70 7702.54 
1999 38463.28 20479.63 7757.41 
2000 38953.50 20740.65 7834.16 
2001 37644.05 20043.44 7914.61 
2002 37349.23 19886.46 7995.17 
2003 37722.72 20085.32 8064.60 
Nagoya 1998 52054.74 27716.36 6437.82 
1999 51170.02 27245.29 6453.68 
2000 50837.92 27068.46 6466.37 
2001 50452.23 26863.10 6670.09 
2002 51106.46 27211.44 6696.51 
2003 51617.52 27483.56 6718.87 
Kyoto 1998 40038.88 21318.56 2287.38 
1999 39845.84 21215.77 2284.80 
2000 40771.70 21708.74 2283.56 
2001 38901.24 20712.82 2282.14 
2002 38279.02 20381.52 2406.30 
2003 38661.81 20585.34 2402.13 
Osaka 1998 48235.58 25682.86 11690.07 
1999 48419.35 25780.70 11151.69 
2000 48677.02 25917.90 11157.82 
2001 47504.83 25293.77 11225.09 
2002 47360.31 25216.82 11225.09 
2003 47833.91 25468.99 11245.72 
Kobe 1998 37796.33 20124.52 2642.70 
1999 36832.10 19611.11 2655.29 
2000 37155.52 19783.32 2670.27 
2001 35496.05 18899.74 2686.33 
2002 35593.42 18951.58 2697.95 
2003 35949.35 19141.10 2788.96 
A4 
Cit Year INC PPPINC DEN 
Kitak ushu 
E 
1998 37726.24 20087.20 2083.90 
1999 37085.51 19746.04 2078.37 
2000 37498.89 19966.15 2072.35 
2001 37369.32 19897.16 2066.08 
2002 37060.52 19732.74 2060.86 
2003 37431.13 19930.06 2054.04 
Fukuoka 1998 37726.24 20087.20 3739.97 
1999 37085.51 19746.04 3765.65 
2000 37498.89 19966.15 3791.96 
2001 37369.32 19897.16 3826.34 
2002 37060.52 19732.74 3864.42 
2003 37431.13 19930.06 3896.36 
Nagasaki 1998 30354.40 16162.09 1266.96 
1999 30087.24 16019.84 1259.26 
2000 30639.41 16313.84 1249.31 
2001 30424.85 16199.60 1247.93 
2002 30553.96 16268.34 1244.27 
2003 30859.50 16431.03 1239.09 
Naha 1998 27691.72 14744.35 7691.41 
1999 27564.47 14676.60 7729.93 
2000 27745.91 14773.21 7726.44 
2001 27809.48 14807.05 7773.38 
2002 27631.37 14712.22 7831.70 
2003 27907.69 14859.34 7894.72 
Taiwanese Ci ties 
Taipei 1998 11858.26 27661.14 9646.81 
1999 12027.57 27394.86 9713.04 
2000 11932.76 28001.76 9735.11 
2001 11971.58 28151.05 9690.96 
2002 12630.49 30587.61 9720.39 
2003 12966.81 30608.02 9665.21 
Hsinchu 1998 9162.95 21373.92 3400.69 
1999 9333.92 21259.61 3448.73 
2000 10180.86 23890.71 3535.18 
2001 10740.59 25256.40 3583.22 
2002 9845.13 23842.22 3640.86 
2003 10679.50 25208.86 3679.28 
Tainan 1998 7707.02 17977.75 4093.47 
1999 8013.25 18251.56 4127.63 
2000 8263.13 19390.51 4184.56 
2001 7771.17 18273.85 4218.72 
2002 7994.63 19360.81 4241.50 
2003 8633.16 20378.48 4269.96 
Kaohsiung 1998 8902.72 20766.90 9466.60 
1999 9294.20 21169.13 9564.26 
2000 9642.48 22627.32 9707.49 
2001 9828.21 23110.96 9727.02 
2002 8855.10 21444.64 9831.20 
2003 9423.94 22245.13 9824.69 
A5 
cit Year INC PPPINC DEN 
Keelung 1998 7865.48 18347.38 2862.33 
1999 8672.05 19752.07 2884.93 
2000 8855.64 20780.91 2922.59 
2001 7820.74 18390.39 2945.19 
2002 7233.49 17517.54 2945.19 
2003 7483.40 17664.48 2952.72 
Taichun 1998 9390.01 21903.57 5568.28 
1999 10189.31 23207.90 5690.66 
2000 9089.33 21329.29 5910.95 
2001 10206.21 23999.80 6021.09 
2002 8868.75 21477.70 6100.64 
2003 9733.09 22974.86 6174.06 
Note: 
Definition: INC: per capita income (1995 US dollars); PPPINC: PPP based income; DEN: 
population density (people per square kilometre). 
2. Source: (a. ) INC for Japanese cities is prefectural per capita GDP which is from Prefectural 
Account, Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Japan 
(http: //www. esri. cao. qo. ip/ip/sna/toukei. html#kenmin), converted to 1995 price by the 
General (price) Index of city area, Japanese Statistical Yearbook 2005 
(http: //www. stat. qo. ip/data/nenkan/index. htm), and converted to US dollars by the 
exchange rate of 1995. (b. ) INC for Taiwanese cities is city's per capita GDP which is 
converted from national per capita GDP (R. O. C. (Taiwan) Statistical Yearbook 2005 
(http: //eng. dgbas. gov. tw/)) by the ratio of national and cities' per capita income (PCI) 
(Household Income and Expenditure Survey, Directorate General of Budget, Accounting 
and Statistics, Executive Yuan, R. O. C. (Taiwan)). City's per capita GDP is converted to 
1995 price by Consumer Price Index (R. O. C. (Taiwan) Statistical Yearbook 2005) and 
converted to US dollars by the exchange rate of 1995. (c. ) PPPINC is converted to 
international dollars from INC by purchasing-power-parity (Would Economic Outlook 
Database, International Monetary Fund 
(http: //www. imf. org/external/pubs/fUweo/2005/02/data/index. htm)); (d. ) population data is 
from Environmental Database, Environmental Protection Administration, Executive Yuan, 
R. O. C. (Taiwan) and Survey of Municipal Solid Waste Management of Ministry of 
Environment, Japan, and the city territory data is from Environmental Database, 
Environmental Protection Administration, Executive Yuan, R. O. C. (Taiwan), and Website 
for Japanese Local Governments (http: //uub. jp/)). 
Descriptive statistics of this data are in Table 4.4 (pp. 57). 
A6 
Appendix 3 Survey for Residential Solid Waste Management 
Recipient: 6 waste management authorities in Taiwanese cities and 12 in 
Japanese cities are listed below: 
a. Mr. Li (Waste Management Section, Environmental Protection Bureau, 
Taipei City, Taiwan) 
b. Ms. P. Huang (Waste Management Section, Environmental Protection 
Bureau, Hsinchu City, Taiwan) 
c. Mr. J. Yen (Waste Management Section, Environmental Protection 
Bureau, Tainan City, Taiwan) 
d. Mr. C. Chang (Waste Management Section, Environmental Protection 
Bureau, Kaohsiung City, Taiwan) 
e. Mr. W. Liao (Waste Management Section, Environmental Protection 
Bureau, Keelung City, Taiwan) 
f. Mr. K. Ho (Waste Management Section, Environmental Protection 
Bureau, Taichung City, Taiwan) 
g. Ms. K. Uemura (General Administration Section, Cleaning Department, 
Environmental Affairs Bureau, Sapporo City, Japan) 
h. Mr. Okazaki (Waste Management Section, Waste Management 
Department, Environmental Affairs Bureau, Sendai City, Japan) 
i. Anonymous (Environmental Management Section, Environmental 
Management Department, Environmental Affairs Bureau, Chiba City, 
Japan) 
j. Mr. Sawada (Environmental Planning Section, General Administration 
Department, Resources Recycle Bureau, Yokohama City, Japan) 
k. Mr. Kamiya (Operations section, Management Department, 
Environmental Affairs Bureau, Nagoya City, Japan) 
I. Mr. K. Inoue (Recycling Society Section, Environmental Policy 
Department, Environmental Affairs Bureau, Kyoto City, Japan) 
M. Mr. Nakano (General Administration Department, Environmental 
Management Bureau, Osaka City, Japan) 
n. Mr. Fujioka (Environmental Policy Department, Environmental Affairs 
Bureau, Kobe City, Japan. 
o. Mr. N. Okita (Management Section, Waste Management Department, 
A7 
Environmental Affairs Bureau, Kitakyushu City, Japan) 
p. Anonymous (Residential Waste Management Section, Waste 
Management Strategy Department, Environmental Affairs Bureau, 
Fukuoka City, Japan) 
q. Ms. Y. Kosaka (Waste Management Strategy Department, Nagasaki 
City, Japan) 
r. Mr. Nakamoto (Environmental Policy Department, Environmental Affairs 
Bureau, Naha City, Japan) 
Survey method: 
a. Contact those waste management authorities above and invite them to 
join this survey on January 2005. 
b. Translate the questionnaire to Japanese and Chinese and sent it to the 
authorities via Post, Email or Fax with a survey invitation letter. 
c. Call the authorities and ask them reply the questionnaire on February 
2005. 
d. Contact with the authorities if they left some questions unanswered and 
explain the questions. 
e. Verify the 2004 data on their replied questionnaire with the current 
policies announced on authorities' websites. 
f. 100% questionnaires are retrieved on July 2005. 
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4 Data on Recyclable Management Variables 
CI Year MK FAA MCK (ALK t'IA YL/C AWL UA JBU t'KK 
Japanese Cities 
Sapporo 1998 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0.000 
1999 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0.000 
2000 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 3 1 0.000 
2001 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 3 1 0.000 
2002 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 3 1 0.000 
2003 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 3 1 0.000 
Sendai 1998 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0.000 
1999 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0.000 
2000 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0.000 
2001 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0.000 
2002 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 3 1 0.058 
2003 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 3 1 0.058 
Chiba 1998 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 7 1 0.000 
1999 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 7 1 0.000 
2000 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 7 1 0.000 
2001 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 7 1 0.000 
2002 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 7 1 0.000 
2003 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 7 1 0.000 
Yokohama 1998 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 0 0.000 
1999 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 0 0.000 
2000 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 1 0.000 
2001 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 1 0.000 
2002 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 1 0.000 
2003 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 1 0.000 
Nagoya 1998 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 0 0.000 
1999 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 0 0.000 
2000 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 7 1 0.041 
2001 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 7 1 0.041 
2002 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 7 1 0.041 
2003 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 7 1 0.041 
Kyoto 1998 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 0.000 
1999 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 0.000 
2000 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 0.294 
2001 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 0.294 
2002 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 0 0.294 
2003 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 0 0.294 
Osaka 1998 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0.000 
1999 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0.000 
2000 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0.000 
2001 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 3 1 0.000 
2002 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 3 1 0.000 
2003 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 3 1 0.000 
Kobe 1998 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0.000 
1999 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0.000 
2000 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0.000 
2001 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0.000 
2002 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0.000 
2003 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0.000 
A12 
Cit Year MR PAK MEK GLK PTK PLK KWC CR TBG PKR 
Kitakyushu 1998 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 1 0.000 
1999 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 1 0.000 
2000 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 1 0.000 
2001 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 1 0.000 
2002 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 1 0.000 
2003 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 1 0.000 
Fukuoka 1998 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0.000 
1999 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0.000 
2000 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0.046 
2001 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0.046 
2002 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0.046 
2003 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0.046 
Nagasaki 1998 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 0.000 
1999 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 0.000 
2000 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 0.000 
2001 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 5 0 0.000 
2002 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 5 1 0.028 
2003 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 5 1 0.028 
Naha 1998 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 0.000 
1999 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 0.000 
2000 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 0.000 
2001 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 0.000 
2002 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 0.000 
2003 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0.000 
Ta iwanese Cities 
Taipei 1998 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 3 0 0.000 
1999 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 4 0 0.000 
2000 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 1 0.000 
2001 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 1 0.000 
2002 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 1 0.000 
2003 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 0.000 
Hsinchu 1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000 
1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000 
2000 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0.000 
2001 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0.000 
2002 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 . 0.000 2003 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0.000 
Tainan 1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000 
1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000 
2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000 
2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000 
2002 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0.000 
2003 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 0.000 
Kaohsiung 1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000 
1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000 
2000 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0.000 
2001 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0.000 
2002 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0.000 
2003 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0.000 
A13 
ci Year MR PAK MEK GLK PTK PLK KTVC CR TBG PKR 
Keelung 1998 
1999 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0.000 
0.000 
2000 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0.000 
2001 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0.000 
2002 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0.000 
2003 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0.000 
Taichung 1998 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0.000 
1999 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0.000 
2000 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0.000 
2001 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0.000 
2002 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 0.000 
2003 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 0.000 
Note: 
Definition: MR: mandatory recycling policy applied; PAK: providing kerbside recycling for 
paper; MEK: kerbside recycling for metal; GLK: kerbside recycling for glass; PTK: kerbside 
recycling for PET bottle; PLK: kerbside recycling for plastic; KWC: kerbside kitchen waste 
collection; CR: category for recycling; TBG: using transparent bag policy; PKR: price of 
kerbside recycling collection. 
2. Source: (a. ) MR is from Question D. 2. in the questionnaire; (b. ) PAK, MEK, GLK, PTK, and 
PLK are from Question B. 1. and 2.; (c. ) KWC is from Question B. 7.; (d. ) CR is from 
Question B. 2.; (e. ) TBG is from Question A. 5.; (f. ) PKR is from Question B. 4. and 5. 
3. Descriptive statistics of this data are in Table 4.5 (pp. 60). 
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Appendix 5 Data on Non-recyclables Management Variables 
Cit Year PNR FI OTC FNR 
Japanese Cities 
Sapporo 1998 0.005 0 0 2 
1999 0.005 0 0 2 
2000 0.005 0 0 2 
2001 0.005 0 0 2 
2002 0.005 0 0 2 
2003 0.005 0 0 2 
Sendai 1998 0.057 0 0 3 
1999 0.057 0 0 3 
2000 0.057 0 0 3 
2001 0.057 0 0 3 
2002 0.057 0 0 3 
2003 0.057 0 0 3 
Chiba 1998 0.051 0 0 3 
1999 0.051 0 0 3 
2000 0.051 0 0 3 
2001 0.051 0 0 3 
2002 0.051 0 0 3 
2003 0.051 0 0 3 
Yokohama 1998 0.005 0 0 3 
1999 0.005 0 0 3 
2000 0.005 0 0 3 
2001 0.005 0 0 3 
2002 0.005 0 0 3 
2003 0.005 0 0 3 
Nagoya 1998 0.005 1 0 2 
1999 0.005 1 0 2 
2000 0.041 1 0 2 
2001 0.041 1 0 2 
2002 0.041 1 0 2 
2003 0.041 1 0 2 
Kyoto 1998 0.005 1 0 2 
1999 0.005 1 0 2 
2000 0.005 1 0 2 
2001 0.005 1 0 2 
2002 0.005 1 0 2 
2003 0.005 1 0 2 
Osaka 1998 0.005 1 0 2 
1999 0.005 1 0 2 
2000 0.005 1 0 2 
2001 0.005 1 0 2 
2002 0.005 1 0 2 
2003 0.005 1 0 2 
Kobe 1998 0.005 0 0 2 
1999 0.005 0 0 2 
2000 0.005 0 0 2 
2001 0.005 0 0 2 
2002 0.005 0 0 2 
2003 0.005 0 0 2 
A15 
City Year PNR FI OTC FNR 
Kitak ushu 1998 0.041 1 0 2 
1999 0.041 1 0 2 
2000 0.041 1 0 2 
2001 0.041 1 0 2 
2002 0.041 1 0 2 
2003 0.041 1 0 2 
Fukuoka 1998 0.046 1 0 2 
1999 0.046 1 0 2 
2000 0.046 1 0 2 
2001 0.046 1 0 2 
2002 0.046 1 0 2 
2003 0.046 1 0 2 
Nagasaki 1998 0.005 0 0 2 
1999 0.005 0 0 2 
2000 0.005 0 0 2 
2001 0.005 0 0 2 
2002 0.028 0 0 2 
2003 0.028 0 0 2 
Naha 1998 0.005 1 0 2 
1999 0.005 1 0 2 
2000 0.005 1 0 2 
2001 0.005 1 0 2 
2002 0.086 1 0 2 
2003 0.086 1 0 2 
Taiwanese Cities 
Taipei 1998 0.010 1 1 6 
1999 0.010 1 1 6 
2000 0.080 1 1 6 
2001 0.152 1 1 6 
2002 0.144 1 1 6 
2003 0.144 1 1 5 
Hsinchu 1998 0.010 0 0 6 
1999 0.010 0 0 6 
2000 0.010 1 1 6 
2001 0.010 1 1 6 
2002 0.010 1 1 6 
2003 0.010 1 1 6 
Tainan 1998 0.010 1 0 6 
1999 0.010 0 6 
2000 0.010 1 0 6 
2001 0.010 0 6 
2002 0.010 1 1 6 
2003 0.010 1 6 
Kaohsiung 1998 0.010 1 0 6 
1999 0.010 1 1 6 
2000 0.010 1 1 7 
2001 0.010 1 1 7 
2002 0.010 1 1 7 
2003 0.010 1 1 6 
A16 
City Year PNR FI OTC FNR 
Keelung 1998 0.010 1 1 7 
1999 0.010 1 1 7 
2000 0.010 1 1 7 
2001 0.010 1 1 7 
2002 0.010 1 1 7 
2003 0.010 1 1 7 
Taichung 1998 0.010 1 1 6 
1999 0.010 1 1 6 
2000 0.010 1 1 6 
2001 0.010 1 1 6 
2002 0.010 1 1 6 
2003 0.010 1 1 6 
Note: 
1. Definition: PNR: price of non-recyclable waste collection (per 10 litres); FI: if the authority 
enforces illegal dumping penalty; OTC: on-time collection policy; FNR: frequency of 
non-recyclables collection (per week). 
2. Source: (a. ) PNR is from Question A. 4. in the questionnaire; (b. ) PNR in cases without 
unit-pricing are 0.005 US$ in Japanese cases and 0.01 in Taiwanese cases, according to 
market survey; (c. ) FI is based on Question D. 3. If the authority gives any penalty to 
illegal dumping, the value is 1, and the value is 0 if the authority doesn't answer or zero 
penalty; (d. ) OTC is from Question D. 4. If the answer is "hand in", the value is 1; (e. ) FNR 
is from Question A. 2. 
3. Descriptive statistics for PNR and FNR are in Table 4.6 (pp. 61) and that for FI and OTC: 
are in Table 4.7 (pp. 62). 
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Appendix 6 Data on Illegal Dumping Inspection 
City Year ENAT ENAP ENAF 
Tai ei 1998 13.66 2.71 14.15 
1999 20.00 2.88 13.22 
2000 18.57 7.07 10.28 
2001 17.28 7.10 6.30 
2002 17.29 9.05 9.22 
2003 19.24 7.58 16.15 
Hsinchu 1998 4.15 5.08 10.07 
1999 5.48 3.62 10.28 
2000 2.89 3.26 3.19 
2001 33.60 5.09 1.94 
2002 31.95 3.43 3.52 
2003 543.64 3.66 3.19 
Tainan 1998 2.38 2.64 1.76 
1999 2.89 2.62 2.88 
2000 2.01 2.45 1.48 
2001 0.97 2.29 1.01 
2002 1.35 2.95 2.01 
2003 1.61 2.67 2.10 
Kaohsiung 1998 18.52 4.88 7.10 
1999 19.93 5.04 10.40 
2000 28.97 5.16 6.91 
2001 25.95 4.42 6.64 
2002 23.66 3.97 5.46 
2003 38.72 4.77 5.38 
Keelung 1998 4.30 3.42 5.85 
1999 6.07 1.57 10.48 
2000 4.23 0.77 5.88 
2001 6.28 14.32 10.30 
2002 2.19 0.51 1.69 
2003 5.33 0.51 4.58 
Taichung 1998 14.28 4.29 11.30 
1999 22.49 3.44 7.06 
2000 9.26 3.21 4.47 
2001 9.29 4.98 4.15 
2002 18.72 2.31 5.32 
2003 11.10 2.28 3.25 
Note: 
1. Definition: ENAT: annual inspection times per 1000 people; ENAP: the inspection labours 
per 100000 people; ENAF: annual prosecuted fines per 1000 people (USD). 
2. Source: Environmental Database, Environmental Protection Administration, Executive 
Yuan, R. O. C. (Taiwan) (http: //edb. epa. gov. tw/) 
3. Descriptive statistics of this data are in Table 4.8 (pp. 63). 
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Appendix 7 Limdep Estimation Reports for Models in Chapter 5 
A7-1. Estimation reports for the models in Table 5.1 
The first part of the Limdep report is OLS estimates, the second part is 
FEM estimates, and the third part is REM estimates. Two tests are used to 
choose models: Lagrange Multiplier test and Hausman test. The methods of 
each kind of model estimation and arithmetic of tests are shown in section 5.1 
(pp. 64). The Limdep reports of Model 1 to Model 4 are shown below. 
Model 2 (b. ) and Model 3 (c. ) have better R2 than Model 1 (a. ). The 
supplement regression (e. ) shows that the goodness-of-fit of Model 4 (d. ) isn't 
better than Model 2 and 3. The Lagrange multiplier test for Model 2 and 3 
show that the panel data models dominate the non-panel data models (only 
independent variables and a constant) at 1% significance. The Hausman 
Test results show that FEM is better than REM at 1% significance. Both FEM 
of Model 2 and Model 3 may be suitable for recycling ratio estimation. 
a. Lin-lin Modell 
LIMDEP Estimation Results Run log line 11 Page 1 
Current sample contains 108 observations. 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = RR Mean= . 
1439462333 
, 
S. D. = . 
93196 60402E-01 
Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 11, Deg. Fr .= 97 Residuals: Sum of squares= . 
4396492674 
. 
Std. Dev. = . 
06732 
Fit: R-squared= . 526933, Adjusted R-squared = . 47816 Model test: F[ 10,97] = 10.80, Prob value = . 00000 Diagnostic: Log-L = 143.9657, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = 103.5457 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = -5.299, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = -2.462 
Panel Data Analysis of RR [ONE way] 
U nconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Deg. Free. Mean Square 
Between . 490964 17. . 288803E-01 Residual . 438396 90. . 487106E-02 Total 
. 929360 107. . 868561E-02 
ý 
+-----+ +i+ -+ 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
A19 
PNR . 4231683541 FNR -. 4274741231E-03 
KR -. 6607793161E-03 
PPPINC . 1661266026E-05 TBG . 5286154758E-01 DEN -. 5636213075E-05 
Fl -. 2883131148E-01 
MR . 9876951406E-01 PKR -. 1265437733E-01 
CR . 2315594993E-01 Constant . 4282361923E-01 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means 
. 30875246 1.371 . 1737 . 24073777E-01 
. 66114661E-02 -. 065 . 9486 3.5740741 
. 
32130907E-01 -. 021 . 
9836 
. 
92592593 
. 23848025E-05 . 697 . 4877 20946.240 
. 24485430E-01 2.159 . 0333 . 57407407 
. 27665456E-05 -2.037 . 0443 4872.9226 
. 18091361E-01 -1.594 . 1143 . 64814815 
. 27707534E-01 3.565 . 0006 . 12037037 
. 13640638 -. 093 . 9263 . 15667493E-01 
. 49024462E-02 4.723 . 0000 2.6944444 
. 55118505E-01 . 777 . 4391 
multiply by 10 to + or -nn power .) 
LIMDEP Estimation Results Run log line 11 Page 2ý 
Current sample contains 108 observations. 
+--- ------------------ ------------+ 
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = RR Mean= . 
1439462333 
, 
S. D. = . 
9319660402E-01 
Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 28, Deg. Fr. = 80 
Residuals: Sum of squares= . 
1447898883 
, 
Std. Dev. = . 
04254 
Fit: R-squared= 
. 
844205, Adjusted R-squared = . 
79162 
Model test: F[ 27,80] = 16.06, Prob value = . 
00000 
Diagnostic: Log-L = 203.9432, Restricted (b=0) Log-L = 103.5457 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = -6.084, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = -3.258 
Estd. Autocorrelation of e(i, t) . 
188567 
+-- ------- -- ------ - ------- + 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
PNR 
. 6679236297 . 29933720 2.231 . 0279 . 24073777E-01** FNR -. 1160725055 . 30606238E-01 -3.792 . 0003 3.5740741*** KR -. 8031048834E-02 . 34215523E-01 -. 235 . 8149 . 92592593 PPPINC 
. 7191755346E-05 . 79130645E-05 . 909 . 3657 20946.240 TBG 
. 
1827190978E-01 
. 
26685912E-01 . 
685 
. 
4951 
. 
57407407 
DEN 
. 
2989539106E-03 
. 
48822822E-04 6.123 
. 
0000 4872.9226*** 
Fl -. 3563365540E-02 . 48723090E-01 -. 073 . 9418 . 64814815 MR 
. 
6331905934E-01 
. 
25912546E-01 2.444 
. 
0163 
. 
12037037** 
PKR 
. 5392949256E-02 . 12386789 . 044 . 9654 . 15667493E-01 CR 
. 2788469020E-01 . 78896803E-02 3.534 . 0006 2.6944444*** (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
1 -. 26693 . 17183 -1.55342 2 -. 04807 . 17965 -. 26760 3 -. 71317 . 21029 -3.39134 4 -2.06313 . 40747 -5.06321 
A20 
5 -1.83564 . 36360 -5.04850 6 -. 61490 . 18670 -3,29344 7 -3.32770 . 
56485 -5.89127 
8 -. 68682 . 
19578 -3.50803 
9 -. 54745 . 
16920 -3.23547 
10 -. 96013 . 
22302 -4.30511 
11 -. 21862 . 
14128 -1.54738 
12 -2.16160 . 37846 -5.71161 13 -2.49585 . 
51441 -4.85189 
14 -. 47963 . 
28669 -1.67301 
15 -. 63588 . 
28888 -2.20119 
16 -2.28906 . 
50627 -4.52140 
17 -. 13607 . 
27059 -. 50285 
18 -1.18848 . 
35005 -3.39516 
Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
Model Log-Likelihood Sum of Squares R-squared 
(1) Constant term only 103.54572 . 
9293599491D+00 
. 
0000000 
(2) Group effects only 144.11994 . 
4383956039D+00 
. 
5282822 
(3) X- variables only 143.96574 . 
4396492674D+00 
. 
5269333 
(4) X and group effects 203.94319 . 
1447898883D+00 
. 
8442047 
Hypothesis Tests 
Likelihood Ratio Test F Tests 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. F num. denom. Prob value 
(2) vs (1) 81.148 17 . 
00000 5.929 17 90 
. 
00000 
(3) vs (1) 80.840 10 . 
00000 10.805 10 97 
. 
00000 
(4) vs (1) 200.795 27 . 
00000 16.055 27 80 
. 
00000 
(4) vs (2) 119.647 10 . 
00000 16.222 10 80 
. 
00000 
(4) vs (3) 119.955 17 . 
00000 9.583 17 80 
. 
00000 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Random Effects Model: v (i , t) =e 
(i 
, t) + u(i) Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
180987D-02 
Var[u] _ . 
272259D-02 
Corr [v (i 
, t) ,v 
(i 
, s) 
]_ 
. 
600687 
Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) = 23.62 
(1 df, prob value = . 
000001) 
(High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model. ) 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) = 55.47 
(10 df, prob value = . 
000000) 
(High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) 
Reestimated using GLS coefficients: 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
294634D-02 
Var[u] _ . 
558132D-02 
Sum of Squares . 
490748D+00 
+-- ---+ 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. Er. IP[IZI>z] I Mean of XI 
A21 
PNR . 8036179258 . 26584476 3.023 . 0025 . 24073777E-01 
FNR -. 4016048962E-02 . 82841303E-02 -. 485 . 6278 3.5740741 
KR . 2765408146E-01 . 26588809E-01 1.040 . 2983 . 92592593 
PPPINC . 1612670698E-05 . 39877344E-05 . 404 . 6859 20946.240 
TBG . 5056465665E-01 . 22799136E-01 2.218 . 0266 . 57407407 DEN -. 4687451073E-05 . 49453425E-05 -. 948 . 3432 4872.9226 Fl -. 3767909718E-02 . 27180656E-01 -. 139 . 8897 . 64814815 MR . 8245133186E-01 . 23280971E-01 3.542 . 0004 . 12037037 PKR . 5029787688E-01 . 11477807 . 438 . 6612 . 15667493E-01 CR . 2325421463E-01 . 59198645E-02 3.928 . 0001 2.6944444 Constant . 2454716306E-02 . 75400506E-01 . 033 . 9740 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
b. Lin-lin Model 2 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
+----------------- ---- --- -------------T 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = RR Mean= . 1439462333 , S. D. = . 93196 60402E-01 Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 11, Deg. Fr .= 97 Residuals: Sum of squares= . 4490386390 , Std. Dev. = . 06804 Fit: R-squared= . 516830, Adjusted R-squared = . 46702 Model test: F[ 10,97] = 10.38, Prob value = . 00000 Diagnostic: Log-L = 142.8246, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = 103.5457 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = -5.278, Akaike Info. Crt. = -2.441 
Panel Data Analysis of RR [ONE way] 
U nconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Deg. Free. Mean Square 
Between 
. 
490964 17. 
. 
288803E-01 
Residual 
. 
438396 90. 
. 
487106E-02 
Total 
. 929360 107. . 868561E-02 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>tl I Mean of XI 
PNR 
. 4454236069 . 31532218 1.413 . 1610 . 24073777E-01 FNR -. 5111706526E-03 . 67285755E-02 -. 076 . 9396 3.5740741 KR -. 3430798441E-02 . 32588038E-01 -. 105 . 9164 . 92592593 PPPINC 
. 8799475857E-06 . 23526238E-05 . 374 . 7092 20946.240 TBG 
. 4992269935E-01 . 24804345E-01 2.013 . 0469 . 57407407 LDEN -. 1893250327E-01 . 13270253E-01 -1.427 . 1569 8.2698875 Fl -. 2996107616E-01 . 19259663E-01 -1.556 . 1231 . 64814815 MR 
. 9918763686E-01 . 28005254E-01 3.542 . 0006 . 12037037 PKR 
. 4870540575E-02 . 13767177 . 035 . 9719 . 15667493E-01 CR 
. 2348200141E-01 . 50234768E-02 4.674 . 0000 2.6944444 Constant 
. 1918382890 . 97809911E-01 1.961 . 0527 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power .) 
A22 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
+ ---- - ---- --- -------------T 
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables j 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none j 
Dep. var. = RR Mean= . 
1439462333 
, 
S. D. = . 9319660402E-01 
j 
j Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 28, Deg. Fr. = 80 j 
j Residuals: Sum of squares= . 
1216988317 
, 
Std. Dev. = . 
03900 j 
j Fit: R-squared= 
. 
869051, Adjusted R-squared = . 
82486 j 
j Model test: F[ 27,80] = 19.66, Prob value = . 
00000 j 
j Diagnostic: Log-L = 213.3248, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = 103.5457 ( 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = -6.258, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = -3.432 j 
j Estd. Autocorre l at i on of e (i , t) . 167919 
j 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
+ -- + --- -+--- --- +---- + +--- -+ 
PNR . 6251173108 . 27458809 2.277 . 0250 . 24073777E-01** FNR -. 9695039192E-01 . 27902252E-01 -3.475 . 0008 3.5740741*** KR -. 1356860474E-01 . 31400935E-01 -. 432 . 6666 . 92592593 PPPINC . 9686572562E-05 . 72631286E-05 1.334 . 1854 20946.240 TBG . 3841159101E-01 . 24243370E-01 1.584 . 1163 . 57407407 LOEN 2.007204586 . 25958946 7.732 . 0000 8.2698875*** Fl -. 4994046843E-01 . 45583656E-01 -1.096 . 2759 . 64814815 MR . 6275122131E-01 . 23693414E-01 2.648 . 0094 . 12037037*** PKR -. 1006943959 . 11517282 -. 874 . 3841 . 15667493E-01 CR . 2289127981E-01 . 73055253E-02 3.133 . 0023 2.6944444*** (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. I 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
1 -14.71247 1.92563 -7.64033 
2 -14.10858 1.86016 -7.58459 
3 -16.04140 2.09542 -7.65547 
4 -17.81678 2.33460 -7.63161 
5 -17.55044 2.27791 -7.70463 
6 -15.48371 2.00438 -7.72494 
7 -18.74126 2.42074 -7.74196 
8 -15.82501 2.05613 -7.69649 
9 -15.29310 1.97583 -7.74007 
10 -16.41295 2.13472 -7.68859 
11 -14.22044 1.85334 -7.67285 
12 -17.85098 2.31672 -7.70530 
13 -18.14324 2.38544 -7.60583 
14 -15.95942 2.13145 -7.48759 
15 -16.23383 2.16833 -7.48679 
16 -17.93502 2.38400 -7.52309 
17 -15.40261 2.07386 -7.42704 
18 -16.95795 2.25278 -7.52756 
A23 
Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
Model Log- Likelihood Sum of Squares R-squared 
(1) Constant term only 103.54572 . 9293599491D+00 . 0000000 (2) Group effects only 144.11994 . 4383956039D+00 . 5282822 (3) X- variables only 142.82463 . 4490386390D+00 . 5168302 (4) X and group effects 213.32484 . 1216988317D+00 . 8690509 
Hypothesis Tests 
Likelihood Ratio Test F Tests 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. F num. denom. Prob value 
(2) vs (1) 81.148 17 . 00000 5.929 17 90 . 00000 (3) vs (1) 78.558 10 . 00000 10.376 10 97 . 00000 (4) vs (1) 219.558 27 . 00000 19.664 27 80 . 00000 (4) vs (2) 138.410 10 . 00000 20.818 10 80 . 00000 (4) vs (3) 141.000 17 . 00000 12.658 17 80 . 00000 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
+ --- ---- - ----- --+ 
Random Effects Model: v (i , t) =e 
(i 
, t) +u (i) Estimates: Var[e] _ . 152124D-02 Var[u] _ . 310803D-02 Corr [v(i, t), v(i, s)] _ . 671387 Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) = 25.59 
(1 df, prob value = . 
000000) 
( (High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model. ) 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) = 79.64 
(10 df, prob value = . 
000000) 
(High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) 
( Reestimated using GLS coefficients: 
( Estimates: Var[e] _ . 291805D-02 Var[u] _ . 
640305D-02 
J Sum of Squares . 
522799D+00 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. Er. IP[IZI>zl I Mean of XI 
+----- +------ -+ ----------+- ---+ --- -+--- + 
PNR . 8379451509 . 24800662 3.379 . 0007 . 24073777E-01 FNR -. 6076412017E-02 . 84198137E-02 -. 722 . 4705 3.5740741 KR . 2760462211E-01 . 25321287E-01 1.090 . 2756 . 92592593 PPPINC . 1270004712E-05 . 39623428E-05 . 321 . 7486 20946.240 TBG . 4868637887E-01 . 21433972E-01 2.271 . 0231 . 57407407 LDEN -. 1268877613E-01 . 24015592E-01 -. 528 . 5973 8.2698875 Fl . 7250311498E-03 . 27839587E-01 . 026 . 9792 . 64814815 MR . 8150637936E-01 . 21713196E-01 3.754 . 0002 . 12037037 PKR . 5684940399E-01 . 10677292 . 532 . 5944 . 15667493E-01 CR . 2354715510E-01 . 56943844E-02 4.135 . 0000 2.6944444 Constant . 9569671032E-01 . 18247309 . 524 . 6000 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
A24 
c. Lin-log Model 3 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = RR Mean= . 
1439462333 
, 
S. D. = . 
9319660402E-01 
Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 11, Deg. Fr. = 97 
Residuals: Sum of squares= . 
4336598653 
, 
Std. Dev. = . 
06686 
Fit: R-squared= 
. 
533378, Adjusted R-squared = . 
48527 
Model test: F[ 10,97] = 11.09, Prob value = . 
00000 
Diagnostic: Log-L = 144.7064, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = 103.5457 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = -5.313, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = -2.476 
Panel Data Analysis of RR [ONE way] 
Unconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Deg. Free. Mean Square 
Between 
. 
490964 17. 
. 
288803E-01 
Residual 
. 
438396 90. 
. 
487106E-02 
Total 
. 
929360 107. 
. 
868561E-02 
+-- --+----- +--- ----+------+------+ ---+ 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
LPNR . 2305260522E-01 LFNR -. 1055207446E-01 
KR . 8745479651E-02 LPINC . 2231162392E-01 TBG . 3605235177E-01 LDEN -. 7668610694E-02 
Fl -. 4600935581E-01 
MR 
. 9587936247E-01 PKR 
. 3169721358E-01 CR 
. 
1948738985E-01 
Constant 
. 
3335325596E-01 
(Note: E+nn or E-nn means 
. 10324369E-01 2.233 . 0279 -4.3025594 
. 
25693529E-01 -. 411 . 
6822 1.1380865 
. 32140099E-01 . 272 . 7861 . 92592593 
. 47604536E-01 . 469 . 6403 9.9359444 
. 25759874E-01 1.400 . 1648 . 57407407 
. 14533398E-01 -. 528 . 5989 8.2698875 
. 
21371842E-01 -2.153 . 
0338 
. 
64814815 
. 26857828E-01 3.570 . 0006 . 12037037 
. 13416981 . 236 . 8137 .1 5667493E-01 
. 54227579E-02 3.594 . 0005 2.6944444 
. 43942862 . 076 . 9397 
multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
+ ------------ -------- -- --------- --+ 
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = RR Mean= . 
1439462333 
, 
S. D. = . 
9319660402E-01 
Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 28, Deg. Fr. = 80 
Residuals: Sum of squares= . 
1179371848 
, 
Std. Dev. = . 
03840 
Fit: R-squared= 
. 
873098, Adjusted R-squared = . 
83027 
Model test: F[ 27,80] = 20.39, Prob value = . 
00000 
A25 
Diagnostic: Log-L = 215.0203, Restricted (b=0) Log-L = 103.5457 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = -6.289, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = -3.463 
Estd. Autocorrelation of e(i, t) . 
147951 
+ýr _-+-r----+-------- -+ -+------- +------+ 
Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t) I Mean of XI 
LPNR . 2844541748E-01 . 10025489E-01 2.837 . 0055 -4.3025594*** LFNR -. 6334649096 . 16793688 -3.772 . 0003 1.1380865*** 
KR -. 4695787411E-02 . 31454297E-01 -. 149 . 8816 . 92592593 LPINC . 1596571030 . 15433223 1.035 . 3034 9.9359444 TBG . 2836062180E-01 . 24678785E-01 1.149 . 2533 . 57407407 LDEN 2.017642270 . 25554224 7.896 . 0000 8.2698875*** Fl -. 4564745180E-01 . 44238958E-01 -1.032 . 3047 . 64814815 MR . 6251553631E-01 . 23493444E-01 2.661 . 0091 . 12037037*** PKR -. 1060094813 . 11344937 -. 934 . 3524 . 15667493E-01 CR . 1898615420E-01 . 73784434E-02 2.573 . 0116 2.6944444** (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
1 -15.76723 2.49021 -6.33168 
2 -15.03673 2.44279 -6.15555 
3 -16.96552 2.61983 -6.47580 
4 -18.72914 2.82484 -6.63017 
5 -18.61888 2.79436 -6.66302 
6 -16.55448 2.55363 -6.48273 
7 -19.80607 2.90672 -6.81389 
8 -16.88809 2.59128 -6.51727 
9 -16.39009 2.52317 -6.49583 
10 -17.52025 2.64963 -6.61233 
11 -15.29002 2.41665 -6.32695 
12 -18.94077 2.77635 -6.82217 
13 -18.90095 2.89169 -6.53629 
14 -16.73866 2.67294 -6.26228 
15 -17.02378 2.68685 -6.33597 
16 -18.72838 2.87392 -6.51667 
17 -16.19124 2.60800 -6.20830 
18 -17.74377 2.76786 -6.41063 
Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
Model Log-Likelihood Sum of Squares R-squared 
(1) Constant term only 103.54572 . 
9293599491D+00 
. 
0000000 
(2) Group effects only 144.11994 . 4383956039D+00 . 5282822 (3) X- variables only 144.70644 . 4336598653D+00 . 5333779 (4) X and group effects 215.02029 . 1179371848D+00 . 8730985 
Hypothesis Tests 
Likelihood Ratio Test F Tests 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. F num. denom. Prob value 
A26 
(2) vs (1) 81.148 17 . 00000 5.929 17 90 . 00000 (3) vs (1) 82.321 10 . 00000 11.088 10 97 . 00000 (4) vs (1) 222.949 27 . 00000 20.386 27 80 . 00000 (4) vs (2) 141.801 10 . 00000 21.738 10 80 . 00000 (4) vs (3) 140.628 17 . 00000 12.598 17 80 . 
00000 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Random Effects Model: v(i, t) = e(i, t) + u(i) I 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
147421D-02 
Var[u] _ . 
299651D-02 
Corr [v (i 
, t) ,v 
(i 
, s) 
]_ 
. 
670251 
Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) = 22.50 I 
(1 df, prob value = . 
000002) 
(High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model. ) I 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) = 84.85 
(10 df, prob value = . 
000000) 
(High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) 
Reestimated using GLS coefficients: I 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
292680D-02 I 
Var[u] . 577772D-02 
I 
Sum of Squares . 497296D+00 
I 
lVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error Jb/St. Er. IP[IZI>z] I Mean of XI 
LPNR . 3287121626E-01 . 89380163E-02 3.678 . 0002 -4.3025594 LFNR -. 2012577919E-01 . 32438365E-01 -. 620 . 5350 1.1380865 KR . 4267710642E-01 . 25182179E-01 1.695 . 0901 . 
92592593 
LPINC . 2133881946E-01 . 81504372E-01 . 262 . 7935 9.9359444 TBG . 4389468714E-01 . 21931420E-01 2.001 . 0453 . 
57407407 
LDEN -. 1528149636E-02 . 23856326E-01 -. 064 . 9489 8.2698875 Fl -. 1299276604E-01 . 27423298E-01 -. 474 . 6357 . 64814815 MR 
. 7693235456E-01 . 21255409E-01 3.619 . 0003 . 
12037037 
PKR . 6592883248E-01 . 10508028 . 627 . 
5304 . 15667493E-01 CR . 1840292394E-01 . 57495988E-02 3.201 . 0014 2.6944444 Constant -. 7274601571E-02 . 76658510 -. 009 . 9924 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
d. Log-log Model 4 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = LRR Mean= -2.240670358 1 
S. D. = . 
9371663314 
A27 
Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 11, Deg. Fr. = 97 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 41.60161038 , 
Std. Dev. = . 
65489 
Fit: R-squared= . 
557317, Adjusted R-squared = . 
51168 
Model test: F[ 10,97] = 12.21, Prob value = . 
00000 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -101.7298, Restricted (b=0) Log-L = -145.7344 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = -. 750, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 2.088 
Panel Data Analysis of LRR [ONE way] 
Unconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Deg. Free. Mean Square 
Between 38.0660 17. 2.23918 
Residual 55.9101 90. . 621223 Total 93.9760 107. . 878281 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
LPNR . 1846262822 LFNR -. 1670447633 
KR 1.412344153 
LPINC -. 1772092644 
TBG 
. 
2629537693 
LDEN -. 6243075630E-01 
Fl -. 3451212134 
MR . 7750652674 PKR -. 3130048883 
CR 
. 
8922622425E-01 
Constant -. 5429540262 
(Note: E+nn or E-nn means 
. 10112161 1.826 . 0710 -4.3025594 
. 
25165421 -. 664 . 
5084 1.1380865 
. 31479488 4.487 . 0000 . 92592593 
. 
46626068 -. 380 . 
7047 9.9359444 
. 25230403 1.042 . 2999 . 57407407 
. 14234677 -. 439 . 6619 8.2698875 
. 
20932563 -1.649 . 
1024 
. 
64814815 
. 26305789 2.946 . 0040 . 12037037 1.3141207 -. 238 . 8122 . 15667493E-01 
. 
53112980E-01 1.680 
. 
0962 2.6944444 
4.3039656 -. 126 . 8999 
multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
+---------- ------- ---- ---+ 
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = LRR Mean= -2.240670358 , 
S. D. = . 
9371663314 
Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 28, Deg. Fr. = 80 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 17.40687936 , Std. Dev. = . 46646 Fit: R-squared = . 814773, Adjusted R-squared = . 75226 Model test: F[ 27, 80] = 13.03, Prob value = . 00000 Diagnostic: Log-L = -54.6810, Restricted (b=0) Log-L = -145.7344 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = -1.295, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 1.531 Estd. Autocorre l at i on of e (i , t) . 296780 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
LPNR 
. 
2728129722 
. 
12179814 2.240 
. 
0274 -4.3025594** 
LFNR -4.829011975 2.0402396 -2.367 . 0199 1.1380865** KR 
. 
7599052539 
. 
38213346 1.989 
. 
0495 
. 
92592593** 
LP I NC 4.225094629 1.8749587 2.253 
. 
0265 9.9359444** 
TBG 
. 
1508304054 
. 
29981880 
. 
503 
. 
6160 
. 
57407407 
LDEN 17.85602364 3.1045437 5.752 . 0000 8.2698875*** 
A28 
FI . 2022009977 . 53745235 . 376 . 7076 . 64814815 MR . 7588142433 . 28541827 2.659 . 0092 . 12037037*** PKR -1.074697932 1.3782791 -. 780 . 4374 . 15667493E-01 CR . 7752195503E-01 . 89639584E-01 . 865 . 3893 2.6944444 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
1 -171.71355 30.25321 -5.67588 
2 -165.88344 29.67711 -5.58961 
3 -182.27462 31.82797 -5.72687 
4 -198.19877 34.31851 -5.77527 
5 -198.64360 33.94826 -5.85136 
6 -179.47154 31.02366 -5.78499 
7 -208.65412 35.31327 -5.90866 
8 -181.45662 31.48111 -5.76398 
9 -177.67362 30.65363 -5.79617 
10 -187.82597 32.18998 -5.83492 
11 -166.74547 29.35951 -5.67944 
12 -199.50937 33.72950 -5.91498 
13 -202.14438 35.13072 -5.75406 
14 -182.39049 32.47308 -5.61667 
15 -184.59292 32.64208 -5.65506 
16 -199.86659 34.91479 -5.72441 
17 -177.08828 31.68419 -5.58917 
18 -191.48594 33.62637 -5.69452 
Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
Model Log- Likelihood Sum of Squares R-squared 
(1) Constant term only -145.73443 . 9397603840D+02 . 0000000 (2) Group effects only -117.69247 . 5591005663D+02 . 4050605 (3) X- variables only -101.72977 . 4160161038D+02 . 5573168 (4) X and group effects -54.68101 . 1740687936D+02 . 8147732 
Hypothesis Tests 
Likelihood Ratio Test F Tests 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. F num. denom. Prob value 
(2) vs (1) 56.084 17 . 
00000 3.604 17 90 
. 
00004 
(3) vs (1) 88.009 10 . 00000 12.212 10 97 . 00000 (4) vs (1) 182.107 27 . 00000 13.033 27 80 . 00000 (4) vs (2) 126.023 10 . 00000 17.696 10 80 . 00000 (4) vs (3) 94.098 17 . 00000 6.541 17 80 . 00000 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
I Random Effects Model: v(i, t) = e(i, t) + u(i) 
A29 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
217586D+00 
Var[u] _ . 
211297D+00 
Corr [v (i 
, t) ,v 
(i 
, s) 
]_ 
. 
492668 
Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) = 3.81 
(1 df, prob value = . 
050917) 
(High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model. ) 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) = 55.25 
(10 df, prob value = . 
000000) 
(High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) 
Reestimated using GLS coefficients: 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
350102D+00 
Var[u] _ . 
378648D+00 
Sum of Squares . 
4636210+02 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. Er. IP[IZI>zl I Mean of XI 
LPNR . 2701976837 . 10229634 2.641 . 0083 -4.3025594 LFNR -. 2089372806 . 31181466 -. 670 . 5028 1.1380865 
KR 1.629809122 . 28534257 5.712 . 0000 . 92592593 LPINC . 2832104932 . 77222729 . 367 . 7138 
9.9359444 
TBG . 3581874551 . 24893574 1.439 . 1502 . 57407407 LDEN -. 1279040352 . 21943466 -. 583 . 5600 8.2698875 F1 -. 4407842598E-01 . 27583865 -. 160 . 8730 . 
64814815 
MR . 7001726202 . 24679119 2.837 . 0046 . 12037037 PKR . 5532302280E-01 1.2257750 . 045 . 
9640 . 15667493E-01 CR . 6956483509E-01 . 62990897E-01 1.104 . 
2694 2.6944444 
Constant -4.555276495 7.2289315 -. 630 . 5286 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
e. Measure of the Goodness-of-fit in Model 4 
Since dependant variable is logged in Model 4, adjusted R2 cannot be 
compared with other models directly. According to the method suggested in 
Wooldridge (2003), the following steps can find the goodness-of-fit of Model 4. 
Firstly, run the regression of the actual recycling ratios (RR) on the exponential 
fitted values in Model 4 (MHT, exp(1ojRR)). 
LIMDEP Estimation Results Run log line 18 Page 1 
Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = RR Mean= . 
1439462333 
, 
S. D. = . 
9319660402E-01 
Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 1, Deg. Fr. = 107 
Residuals: Sum of squares= . 
5131394504 
, 
Std. Dev. = . 
06925 j 
Fit: R-squared= 
. 
447857, Adjusted R-squared = . 
44786 
Model test: F[ 1,107] = 86.79, Prob value = . 
00000 
A30 
Diagnostic: Log-L = 135.6189, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = 103.5457 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = -5.331, Akaike Info. Crt. = -2.493 
Model does not contain ONE. R-squared and F can be negative! 
Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic = . 
72942, Rho = . 
63529 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
+_--__--+ýý+----- -+ + ---+---- + 
MHT 1.051492034 . 44696998E-01 23.525 . 0000 . 13149532 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
Secondly, the correlation between actual recycling ratio (RR) and the fitted 
value of above regression (RR) is 0.68. 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Descriptive Statistics 
All results based on nonmissing observations. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Cases 
All observations in current sample 
RR 
. 
143946233 
. 
931966040E-01 
. 
181721144E-02 
. 
410937087 108 
RRHT 
. 
138266280 
. 
742148629E-01 
. 
108518826E-01 
. 
268610387 108 
Correlation Matrix for Listed Variables 
RR RRHT 
RR 1.00000 . 68172 RRHT . 68172 1.00000 
Thirdly, the squared of the correlation is 0.46 which can be compared with 
adjusted R2 obtained from model without logged dependant. 
A31 
A7-2. Estimation reports for Regression Specification Error Test 
Regression Specification Error Test (RESET) is suggested by Ramsey 
(1969). The arithmetic of the test are shown in the main contest section 5.1 
(pp. 70). The Limdep reports of RESET for Model 2 and Model 3 are shown 
below. The P-value of RESET for Model 2 and 3 are 0.06 and 0.42, 
respectively. Those means that the unrestricted model of Model 3 cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of correct functional form, but Model 2 can do. 
Therefore, Model 3 is chosen for recycling ratio estimation. 
a. Estimation report for Model 2 Regression Specification Error Test 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = RR Mean= . 1439462333 , S. D. = . 93196 60402E-01 Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 13, Deg. Fr .= 95 Residuals: Sum of squares= . 3971960589 , Std. Dev. = . 06466 Fit: R-squared= . 572613, Adjusted R-squared = . 51863 Model test: F[ 12,951 = 10.61, Prob value = . 00000 Diagnostic: Log-L = 149.4493, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = 103.5457 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = -5.364, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = -2.527 Panel Data Analysis of RR [ONE way] 
U nconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Deg. Free. Mean Square 
Between . 490964 17. . 288803E-01 Residual . 438396 90. . 487106E-02 Total 
. 
929360 107. 
. 
868561E-02 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
PNR -5.812683347 1.8137468 -3.205 . 
0018 
. 
24073777E-01 
FNR 
. 2517468897E-01 . 10526155E-01 2.392 . 0187 3.5740741 KR 
. 2141731285 . 69519081E-01 3.081 . 0027 . 92592593 PPPINC -. 7174319766E-05 . 32331320E-05 -2.219 . 0289 20946.240 TBG -. 3227032377 . 11050844 -2.920 . 0044 . 57407407 LDEN 
. 9855384840E-01 . 36137494E-01 2.727 . 0076 8.2698875 Fl -. 6743827109E-01 . 21172873E-01 -3.185 . 0020 . 64814815 MR -. 4191144240 . 15433916 -2.716 . 0079 . 12037037 PKR -. 3290041295 . 16285399 -2.020 . 0462 . 15667493E-01 CR -. 1622702297 . 53007841E-01 -3.061 . 0029 2.6944444 YHATSQ 45.07471575 13.468600 3.347 . 0012 . 26536489E-01 YHATOB -79.58667708 25.626946 -3.106 . 0025 . 54799416E-02 
A32 
Constant -. 7073564337 . 27898293 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 
-2.535 . 0129 to + or -nn power. ) 
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( Current sample contains 108 observations. 
( Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables 
( Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = RR Mean= . 1439462333 , S. D. = . 9319660402E-01 Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 30, Deg. Fr. = 78 I 
Residuals: Sum of squares= . 1163629079 , Std. Dev. = . 03862 
( 
Fit: R-squared= . 874792, Adjusted R-squared = . 82824 Model test: F[ 29,78] = 18.79, Prob value = . 00000 
( 
Diagnostic: Log-L = 215.7460, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = 103.5457 ( 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = -6.263, Aka i ke Info. Crt. _ -3.440 ( 
Estd. Autocorrelation of e(i, t) . 152674 
( 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error (t-ratio (P[(T(>t] I Mean of X( 
i. --i- +--- + 
PNR -2.892527645 1.8941471 -1.527 . 1300 . 24073777E-01 FNR -. 6321349040E-01 . 33358645E-01 -1.895 . 0611 3.5740741 KR 
. 1003018968 . 68829082E-01 1.457 . 1483 . 92592593 PPPINC . 3264320598E-05 . 79614042E-05 . 410 . 6827 20946.240 TBG -. 1686896121 . 11230827 -1.502 . 1364 . 57407407 LDEN 2.094768789 . 26357589 7.947 . 0000 8.2698875 FI -. 8458560834E-01 . 48844053E-01 -1.732 . 0865 . 64814815 MR -. 2001280135 . 14103100 -1.419 . 1591 . 12037037 PKR -. 3164103411 . 16136232 -1.961 . 0528 . 15667493E-01 CR -. 7635109296E-01 . 53278193E-01 -1.433 . 1551 2.6944444 YHATSQ 24.23884786 12.862969 1.884 . 0625 . 26536489E-01 YHATQB -42.63540209 23.258381 -1.833 . 0699 . 54799416E-02 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error . t-ratio 
1 -15.36295 1.95099 -7.87445 
2 -14.77016 1.88647 -7.82950 
3 -16.73736 2.12299 -7.88385 
4 -18.53086 2.35883 -7.85595 
5 -18.21718 2.30047 -7.91889 
6 -16.12363 2.02833 -7.94920 
7 -19.41715 2.44100 -7.95459 
8 -16.48926 2.08102 -7.92364 
9 -15.93209 1.99854 -7.97185 
10 -17.06441 2.15630 -7.91375 
11 -14.88124 1.88156 -7.90898 
12 -18.53085 2.33884 -7.92310 
A33 
13 -18.85610 2.40658 -7.83522 
14 -16.70424 2.16098 -7.72994 
15 -16.98279 2.19749 -7.72825 
16 -18.72954 2.41343 -7.76056 
17 -16.16968 2.10634 -7.67669 
18 -17.73134 2.28261 -7.76800 
Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
I 
Model Log-Likelihood Sum of Squares R-squared 
(1) Constant term only 103.54572 . 
9293599491D+00 
. 
0000000 
(2) Group effects only 144.11994 . 
43839560390+00 
. 
5282822 
(3) X- variables only 149.44929 . 
3971960589D+00 
. 
5726133 
(4) X and group effects 215.74596 . 
1163629079D+00 
. 
8747924 
I 
Hypothesis Tests 
Likelihood Ratio Test F Tests 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. F num. denom. Prob value 
(2) vs (1) 81.148 17 . 
00000 5.929 17 90 
. 
00000 
(3) vs (1) 91.807 12 . 
00000 10.607 12 95 
. 
00000 I 
(4) vs (1) 224.400 29 . 
00000 18.792 29 78 
. 
00000 
(4) vs (2) 143.252 12 . 
00000 17.989 12 78 
. 
00000 
(4) vs (3) 132.593 17 . 
00000 11.073 17 78 
. 
00000 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
+-- ----------- - ---ý 
Random Effects Model: v(i, t) = e(i, t) + u(i) 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
149183D-02 
Var[u] _ . 
268918D-02 
Corr[v(i, t), v(i, s)] _ . 
643189 
Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) = 23.33 
(1 df, prob value = . 
000001) 
(High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model. ) 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) = 73.45 
(12 df, prob value = . 
000000) I 
(High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) I 
Reestimated using GLS coefficients: I 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
281651D-02 I 
Var[u] _ . 
658322D-02 I 
Sum of Squares . 
431267D+00 I 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. Er. IP[IZI>z] I Mean of XI 
+ -+---- +---------ý ---+ --+--_---i 
PNR -4.441773310 1.5464004 -2.872 . 0041 . 24073777E-01 FNR 
. 1810103813E-01 . 10215373E-01 1.772 . 0764 3.5740741 KR . 1878632074 . 54855360E-01 3.425 . 0006 . 92592593 PPPINC -. 6136151990E-05 . 43126288E-05 -1.423 . 1548 20946.240 TBG -. 2669572481 . 91434284E-01 -2.920 . 0035 . 57407407 LDEN 
. 8603809506E-01 . 36214512E-01 2.376 . 0175 8.2698875 Fl -. 4272512913E-01 . 29260871E-01 -1.460 . 1443 . 64814815 
A34 
MR -. 3329295465 . 11647993 -2.858 . 0043 . 12037037 
PKR -. 2718638244 . 13844303 -1.964 . 0496 . 15667493E-01 
CR -. 1228750741 . 42860604E-01 -2.867 . 0041 2.6944444 
YHATSQ 38.74383210 10.598165 3.656 . 0003 . 26536489E-01 YHATOB -71.90936667 19.519694 -3.684 . 0002 . 54799416E-02 
Constant -. 6484677697 . 26978720 -2.404 . 0162 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
-> CALC; list; ((. 1216988317-. 1163629079)11)/(. 1163629079/(108-30))$ 
Result = . 357675881353597800}01 
-> CALC; list; 1-Fds (. 35767588135359780D+01,1,78) $ 
Result = . 623059901870155500-01 
b. Estimation reports for Model 3 Regression Specification Error Test 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = RR Mean= . 
1439462333 
, 
S. D. = . 
9319660402E-01 
Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 13, Deg. Fr. = 95 
Residuals: Sum of squares= . 
4020357216 
, 
Std. Dev. = . 
06505 
Fit: R-squared= 
. 
567406, Adjusted R-squared = . 
51276 
Model test: F[ 12,95] = 10.38, Prob value = . 
00000 
Diagnostic: Log-L = 148.7953, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = 103.5457 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = -5.351, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = -2.515 
Panel Data Analysis of RR [ONE way] 
Unconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Deg. Free. Mean Square 
Between 
. 
490964 17. 
. 
288803E-01 
Residual 
. 
438396 90. 
. 
487106E-02 
Total 
. 
929360 107. 
. 
868561E-02 
+- ------------ ----------- -- -+ 
+------ +- -----+ ----+----- +- - -+-------+ (Variable Coefficient I Standard Error it-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
LPNR -. 1947929821 . 
93506057E-01 -2.083 . 
0399 -4.3025594 
LFNR 
. 7993095704E-01 . 51131631E-01 1.563 . 1213 1.1380865 KR 
. 
7781663769E-01 
. 
41344659E-01 1.882 
. 
0629 
. 
92592593 
LPINC -. 8296476313E-01 . 68372385E-01 -1.213 . 2280 9.9359444 TBG -. 2334310407 . 12075404 -1.933 . 0562 . 57407407 LDEN 
. 2068713307E-01 . 18307041E-01 1.130 . 2613 8.2698875 Fl 
. 2665536639E-02 . 31021102E-01 . 086 . 9317 . 64814815 MR -. 3269634456 . 19184658 -1.704 . 0916 . 12037037 PKR -. 3001646795 . 19522838 -1.538 . 1275 . 15667493E-01 CR -. 1066505118 . 50330426E-01 -2.119 . 0367 2.6944444 YHATSQ 36.54948220 17.230464 2.121 . 0365 . 26482443E-01 YHATOB -61.40501164 33.322372 -1.843 . 0685 . 54901739E-02 Constant -. 3710228340 . 45253761 -. 820 . 4143 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
+=- -_- -- -ý_ - -- -_ ___-_+ 
A35 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = RR Mean= . 
1439462333 
, 
S. D. = . 
9319660402E-01 
Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 30, Deg. Fr. = 78 
Residuals: Sum of squares= . 
1169592119 
, 
Std. Dev. = . 
03872 
Fit: R-squared= . 
874151, Adjusted R-squared = . 
82736 
Model test: F[ 29,781 = 18.68, Prob value = . 
00000 
Diagnostic: Log-L = 215.4699, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = 103.5457 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = -6.258, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = -3.435 
Estd. Autocor re l at i on of e (i , t) . 
140258 
+------ ----------- ------- --- I- 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
LPNR -. 1626479301E-01 . 12235406 -. 133 . 8945 -4.3025594 LFNR -. 6340530878 . 17771471 -3.568 . 0006 1.1380865 KR . 1718252677E-01 . 48870734E-01 . 352 . 7259 . 92592593 LPINC . 1156066469 . 19056820 . 607 . 5455 9.9359444 TBG -. 2832418859E-01 . 15509898 -. 183 . 8555 . 57407407 LDEN 2.041493399 . 25941001 7.870 . 0000 8.2698875 Fl -. 5268585154E-01 . 46962535E-01 -1.122 . 2647 . 64814815 MR -. 1076184413E-01 . 23761159 -. 045 . 9640 . 12037037 PKR -. 1613700154 . 21792572 -. 740 . 4608 . 15667493E-01 CR -. 5380065013E-02 . 62732238E-01 -. 086 . 9318 2.6944444 YHATSQ 5.921265908 21.837182 . 271 . 7869 . 26482443E-01 YHATQB -7.445196130 41.777603 -. 178 . 8589 . 54901739E-02 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
1 -15.74040 2.52842 -6.22539 
2 -14.99391 2.48128 -6.04281 
3 -16.96200 2.66055 -6.37538 
4 -18.72879 2.86485 -6.53744 
5 -18.60914 2.84194 -6.54804 
6 -16.52840 2.59776 -6.36255 
7 -19.79512 2.95371 -6.70179 
8 -16.87416 2.63025 -6.41541 
9 -16.34401 2.56761 -6.36546 
10 -17.48652 2.69486 -6.48884 
11 -15.27117 2.45297 -6.22557 
12 -18.93245 2.82119 -6.71080 
13 -18.86106 2.94071 -6.41378 
14 -16.69874 2.71864 -6.14232 
15 -16.98789 2.73199 -6.21814 
16 -18.70628 2.91991 -6.40646 
A36 
17 
18 
-16.14992 
-17.71427 
2.65233 -6.08896 
2.81257 -6.29826 
Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
Model Log-Likelihood Sum of Squares R-squared 
(1) Constant term only 103.54572 . 9293599491D+00 . 0000000 (2) Group effects only 144.11994 . 4383956039D+00 . 5282822 (3) X- variables only 148.79530 . 4020357216D+00 . 5674058 (4) X and group effects 215.46995 . 1169592119D+00 . 8741508 
Hypothesis Tests 
Likelihood Ratio Test F Tests 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. F num. denom. Prob value 
(2) vs (1) 81.148 17 . 
00000 5.929 17 90 . 
00000 
(3) vs (1) 90.499 12 . 
00000 10.384 12 95 . 00000 (4) vs (1) 223.848 29 . 
00000 18.682 29 78 . 
00000 
(4) vs (2) 142.700 12 . 
00000 17.864 12 78 . 
00000 
(4) vs (3) 133.349 17 . 
00000 11.183 17 78 . 00000 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Random Effects Model: v(i, t) = e(i, t) + u(i) 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 149948D-02 Var[u] _ . 273248D-02 Corr[v(i, t), v(i, s)] _ . 645677 Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) = 17.83 
(1 df, prob value = . 
000024) 
(High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model. ) 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) = 81.32 
(12 df, prob value = . 
000000) 
(High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) 
Reestimated using GLS coefficients: 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
297941D-02 I 
Var[u] _ . 
643549D-02 
Sum of Squares . 
440355D+00 j 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. Er. IP[IZI>z] I Mean of XI 
LPNR -. 1324237939 . 80891690E-01 -1.637 . 1016 -4.3025594 LFNR 
. 5575874533E-01 . 48898872E-01 1.140 . 2542 1.1380865 KR 
. 7386867232E-01 . 31728284E-01 2.328 . 0199 . 92592593 LPINC -. 8210386310E-01 . 93811878E-01 -. 875 . 3815 9.9359444 TBG -. 1686315708 . 10614997 -1.589 . 1121 . 
57407407 
LDEN 
. 2622422543E-01 . 26965966E-01 . 972 . 3308 8.2698875 Fl 
. 2089168780E-02 . 28263746E-01 . 074 . 9411 . 64814815 MR -. 2405955001 . 15819957 -1.521 . 1283 . 
12037037 
PKR -. 1784658521 . 16059493 -1.111 . 2664 . 15667493E-01 CR -. 6759049731E-01 . 42197106E-01 -1.602 . 1092 2.6944444 YHATSQ 29.63117712 14.815480 2.000 . 0455 . 26482443E-01 
A37 
Y BA OT -55.20304738 28.953277 -1.907 . 0566 . 54901739E-02 
Constant -. 1310653554 . 74855479 -. 175 . 8610 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
-> CALC; list; ((. 1179371848-. 1169592119)/l)/(. 1169592119/(108-30))$ Result = . 65220930408817070D+00 
-> CALC; list; 1-Fds (. 65220930408817070D+00,1,78) $ Result = . 42177991650756730D+00 
A38 
A7.3. Estimation report for the model in Table 5.2 
The LM test and Hausman test results show that FEM estimates can 
reject non-penal model and REM are better at 1% significance, respectively. 
Therefore, FEM estimates are chosen. 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = TOR Mean= 139.5495552 , S. D. = 94.43354965 Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 11, Deg. Fr. = 97 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 420811.6843 , Std. Dev. = 65.86551 Fit: R-squared= . 558987, Adjusted R-squared = . 51352 Model test: F[ 10,97] = 12.29, Prob value = . 00000 Diagnostic: Log-L = -599.7071, Restricted (b=0) Log-L = -643.9158 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 8.472, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 11.309 
Panel Data Analysis of TOR [ONE way] 
U nconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Deg. Free. Mean Square 
Between 538973.17.31704.3 
Residual 415221.90.4613.56 
Total 954193.107.8917.70 
(Variable I Coefficient Standard Error It-ratio IPLITI>t] I Mean of XI 
LPNR 17.68902231 10.170277 1.739 . 0852 -4.3025594 LFNR 14.16891058 25.310052 
. 
560 
. 
5769 1.1380865 
KR 13.41602045 31.660407 . 424 . 6727 . 92592593 LPINC 25.83236964 46.894037 . 551 . 5830 9.9359444 TBG 42.44949979 25.375407 1.673 . 0976 . 57407407 LDEN -17.94087986 14.316486 -1.253 . 2132 8.2698875 Fl -46.06633897 21.052866 -2.188 . 0311 . 64814815 MR 59.32486016 26.456974 2.242 . 0272 . 12037037 PKR -23.24991662 132.16732 -. 176 . 8607 . 15667493E-01 CR 23.03926427 5.3418230 4.313 . 0000 2.6944444 Constant 15.44395675 432.87013 . 036 . 9716 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables 
A39 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = TOR Mean= 139.5495552 , 
S. D. = 94.43354965 
Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 28, Deg. Fr. = 80 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 138993.4538 , 
Std. Dev. = 41.68235 
Fit: R-squared= . 
854334, Adjusted R-squared = . 
80517 
Model test: F[ 27,80] = 17.38, Prob value = . 
00000 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -539.8881, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = -643.9158 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 7.691, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 10.516 
Estd. Autocorre l at i on of e (i , t) . 200415 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error it-ratio IP[ITI>t] ( Mean of XI 
LPNR 20.48962854 10.883720 1.883 . 0627 -4.3025594* LFNR -574.5636446 182.31310 -3.152 . 0022 1.1380865*** KR 11.43872778 34.146939 . 335 . 7384 . 92592593 LP I NC 193.5626952 167.54382 1.155 
. 
2508 9.9359444 
TBG 41.21266217 26.791410 1.538 . 1272 . 57407407 LDEN 1791.065533 277.41791 6.456 
. 
0000 8.2698875*** 
Fl -47.71348274 48.026029 -. 993 . 3229 . 64814815 MR 44.40289985 25.504598 1.741 
. 
0848 
. 
12037037* 
PKR -91.01400817 123.16120 -. 739 . 4617 . 15667493E-01 CR 18.43853377 8.0100743 2.302 . 0235 2.6944444** 
+= ______--___--__--_-----_+ 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. ý 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
1 -14551.21625 2703.38701 -5.38259 2 -13864.13808 2651.90732 -5,22799 
3 -15560.96177 2844.10493 -5.47130 4 -17169.30242 3066.65689 -5.59870 5 -17060.66473 3033.57111 -5.62395 
6 -15252.27538 2772.23296 -5.50180 
7 -18156.39286 3155.54668 -5.75380 
8 -15522.16197 2813.11040 -5.51779 9 -15084.32536 2739.16788 -5.50690 
10 -16105.88604 2876.45398 -5.59922 
11 -14100.80123 2623.52655 -5.37475 12 -17359.88421 3014.02358 -5.75970 
13 -17315.92865 3139.23480 -5.51597 14 -15374.51275 2901.75141 -5.29836 
15 -15608.49657 2916.85257 -5.35114 16 -17136.92592 3119.93920 -5.49271 
17 -14861.91522 2831.25690 -5.24923 18 -16302.37549 3004.80760 -5.42543 
Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
Model Log-Likelihood Sum of Squares R-squared 
(1) Constant term only -643.91584 . 
9541933971D+06 
. 
0000000 
(2) Group effects only -598.98481 . 
4152206617D+06 
. 
5648464 
(3) X- variables only -599.70707 . 
4208116843D+06 
. 
5589870 
A40 
ý4) X and group effects -539.88811 . 1389934538D+06 . 8543341 
Hypothesis Tests 
Likelihood Rat io Test F Te sts 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. F num. de nom. Prob value 
(2) vs (1) 89.862 17 . 00000 6.872 17 90 . 00000 (3) vs (1) 88.418 10 . 00000 12.295 10 97 . 00000 (4) vs (1) 208.055 27 . 00000 17.378 27 80 . 00000 (4) vs (2) 118.193 10 . 00000 15.899 10 80 . 00000 (4) vs (3) 119.638 17 . 00000 9.541 17 80 . 00000 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Random Effects Model: v(i, t) = e(i, t) + u(i) 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
173742D+04 
Var[u] _ . 
260085D+04 
Corr [v(i, t), v(i, s)] _ . 
599513 
Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) = 19.91 
(1 df, prob value = . 
000008) 
(High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model. ) 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) = 60.93 
(10 df, prob value = . 
000000) 
(High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) 
Reestimated using GLS coefficients: 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 294225D+04 Var[u] _ . 489972D+04 Sum of Squares . 461764D+06 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. Er. IP[IZI>zl I Mean of XI 
LPNR 25.05029076 9.4893915 2.640 . 0083 -4.3025594 LFNR 8.590247519 31.801912 . 270 . 7871 1.1380865 KR 54.55984206 26.555830 2.055 
. 
0399 
. 
92592593 
LPINC 38.38610980 79.967863 . 480 . 6312 9.9359444 TBG 52.71824262 23.197932 2.273 . 0231 . 57407407 LDEN -14.43073812 23.001723 -. 627 . 5304 8.2698875 Fl -24.30771523 27.564659 -. 882 . 3779 . 64814815 MR 52.97936553 22.678144 2.336 . 0195 . 12037037 PKR 45.06228561 112.38937 . 401 . 6885 . 15667493E-01 CR 19.06250748 6.0004928 3.177 . 0015 2.6944444 Constant -147.9817714 750.47759 -. 197 . 8437 
A41 
A7.4. Estimation reports for the models in Table 5.3 
The estimations of each kind of recyclable are shown below. The LM 
Test of shows that these panel data models are better than non-panel data 
models at the 1% significance level. The Hausman Test shows that these 
FEMs are better than REMs at 1% significance except for the plastics (5% 
significance) and glass models (15% significance). Therefore, FEM 
estimates of all models are chosen. 
a. Estimation report for recyclable paper model (PAIL) 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = PAW Mean= 81.85685369 , S. D. = 68.73 
894496 
Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 9, Deg. F r. = 99 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 263576.6805 , Std. Dev. = 
51.59836 
Fit: R-squared= 
. 478664, Adjusted R-squared = . 
43654 
Model test: F[ 8,99] = 11.36, Prob value = . 00000 Diagnostic: Log-L = -574.4437, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -609.6172 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 7.967, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 10.805 
Panel Data Analysis of PAW [ONE way] 
U nconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Deg. Free. Mean Square 
Between 283807.17.16694.6 
Residual 221772.90.2464.14 
Total 505580.107.4725.04 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error it-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
LPNR 24.34129149 6.8555244 3.551 . 0006 -4.3025594 LFNR -42.89642303 17.629723 -2.433 . 0168 1.1380865 PAK 47.38872857 15.759519 3.007 . 0033 . 
35185185 
LPINC 71.75250407 34.878737 2.057 . 0423 
9.9359444 
TBG 20.97055190 18.794208 1.116 . 2672 . 
57407407 
LDEN 5.220503490 10.585262 . 493 . 6230 
8.2698875 
F1 -78.89164638 15.281148 -5.163 . 0000 . 
64814815 
MR 27.85008738 19.331937 1.441 . 1528 . 
12037037 
Constant -501.6266312 327.87659 -1.530 . 1292 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
A42 
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = PAW Mean= 81.85685369 , 
S. D. = 68.73894496 
Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 26, Deg. Fr. = 82 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 104802.9807 , 
Std. Dev. = 35.75032 
Fit: R-squared= . 
792707, Adjusted R-squared = . 
72951 
Model test: F[ 25,82] = 12.54, Prob value = . 
00000 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -524.6415, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = -609.6172 I 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 7.369, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 10.197 
Estd. Autocor re l at i on of e (i , t) . 
279372 
+ -+----- -+------- ---r------+-----+ -+ 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
+ --+-- --+---- --+-----+ -+-----+ 
LPNR 10.58975566 9.1137687 1.162 . 2480 -4.3025594 LFNR -246.1972231 146.82469 -1.677 . 
0967 1.1380865* 
PAK 44.80343127 21.375506 2.096 . 
0386 
. 
35185185** 
LPINC -12.39166150 133.03966 -. 093 . 
9260 9.9359444 
TBG 62.53126309 21.439476 2.917 
. 
0044 
. 
57407407*** 
LDEN 1095.597037 231.33751 4.736 
. 
0000 8.2698875*** 
FI -54.10605617 40.140686 -1.348 . 
1807 
. 
64814815 
MR 3.543240417 20.657648 
. 
172 
. 
8642 
. 
12037037 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
1 -7706.96197 2262.06745 -3.40704 
2 -7325.97705 2218.14969 -3.30274 
3 -8308.82875 2383.55477 -3.48590 
4 -9294.76616 2570.24985 -3.61629 
5 -9106.92532 2536.24591 -3.59071 
6 -8087.32784 2319.57937 -3.48655 
7 -9844.99008 2643.94216 -3.72360 
8 -8267.67214 2355.66942 -3.50969 
9 -7979.19116 2291.26563 -3.48244 
10 -8621.08036 2408.50206 -3.57944 
11 -7413.05828 2194.66612 -3.37776 
12 -9478.55204 2518.92583 -3.76293 
13 -9433.75093 2620.59839 -3.59985 
14 -8296.86313 2417.56006 -3.43192 
15 -8445.10449 2429.61208 -3.47591 
16 -9375.38267 2602.29825 -3.60273 
17 -8016.19643 2357.27921 -3.40061 
18 -8838.82098 2504.71601 -3.52887 
Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
Model Log-Likelihood Sum of Squares R-squared 
(1) Constant term only -609.61715 . 
5055795534D+06 
. 0000000 
A43 
(2) Group effects only -565.11820 . 
2217721824D+06 
. 
5613506 
(3) X- variables only -574.44365 . 
2635766805D+06 
. 
4786643 
(4) X and group effects -524.64150 . 
1048029807D+06 
. 
7927072 
Hypothesis 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. 
(2) vs (1) 88.998 17 . 00000 (3) vs (1) 70.347 8 . 00000 (4) vs (1) 169.951 25 . 00000 (4) vs (2) 80.953 8 . 00000 (4) vs (3) 99.604 17 . 00000 
Tests 
F Tests 
F num. denom. Prob value 
6.775 17 90 . 00000 11.362 8 99 . 00000 12.543 25 82 . 00000 11.440 8 82 . 00000 7.308 17 82 . 00000 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Random Effects Model: v (i , t) =e 
(i 
, t) +u 
(i) 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
127809D+04 
Var[u] 
. 
138431D+04 
Corr[v(i, t), v(i, s)] _ . 
519948 
Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) = 26.13 
(1 df, prob value = . 
000000) 
(High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model. ) 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) = 30.97 
(8 df, prob value = . 
000142) ý 
(High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) 
Reestimated using GLS coefficients: 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 169341D+04 Var[u] _ . 236846D+04 Sum of Squares . 281997D+06 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. Er. IP[IZI>z] I Mean of XI 
LPNR 15.52559146 7.5926165 2.045 . 0409 -4.3025594 LFNR -28.05284346 24.372190 -1.151 . 2497 1.1380865 PAK 61.19955521 16.760721 3.651 . 0003 . 35185185 LP I NC 52.86863627 58.736503 
. 
900 
. 
3681 9.9359444 
TBG 57.00667657 19.092037 2.986 . 0028 . 57407407 LDEN -3.897992284 16.900037 -. 231 . 8176 8.2698875 Fl -54.83874614 22.207339 -2.469 . 0135 . 64814815 MR 17.33441347 18.460317 . 939 . 3477 . 12037037 Constant -333.2828251 560.44080 -. 595 . 5521 
b. Estimation report for recyclable metal model (MEW 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
A44 
0LS Without Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = MEW Mean= 22.14363827 , S. D. = 13.64 356089 Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 10, Deg. F r. = 98 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 10291.81120 , Std. Dev. = 10.24785 
Fit: R-squared= . 483283, Adjusted R-squared = . 43583 Model test: F[ 9,98] = 10.18, Prob value = . 00000 Diagnostic: Log-L = -399.3219, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = -434.9759 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 4.743, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 7.580 
Panel Data Analysis of MEW [ONE way] 
U nconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Deg. Free. Mean Square 
Between 10163.3 17.597.841 
Residual 9754.41 90.108.382 
1 Total 19917.7 107.186.147 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
PNR 272.1391809 45.210457 6.019 . 0000 . 24073777E-01 FNR -. 3594738282 . 99731652 -. 360 . 7193 3.5740741 MEK 19.50740306 4.7347821 4.120 . 0001 . 92592593 PPP I NC -. 6448150432E-03 . 34898457E-03 -1.848 . 0677 20946.240 TBG -6.017402933 3.7641093 -1.599 . 1131 . 57407407 LDEN -2.960024786 1.9496170 -1.518 . 1322 8.2698875 Fl -3.514502825 2.7438759 -1.281 . 2033 . 64814815 MR 2.574462234 4.2121130 . 611 . 5425 . 12037037 PKRME -36.08168219 20.756974 -1.738 . 0853 . 13100068E-01 Constant 42.69525548 14.393890 2.966 . 0038 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power .) 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables I 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none I 
Dep. var. = MEW Mean= 22.14363827 , 
S. D. = 13.64356089 I 
Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 27, Deg. Fr. = 81 I 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 4205.241132 , 
Std. Dev. = 7.20531 I 
Fit: R-squared= 
. 
788869, Adjusted R-squared = . 
72110 I 
Model test: F[ 26,811 = 11.64, Prob value = . 
00000 I 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -350.9910, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = -434.9759 I 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 4.173, Akaike Info. Crt. = 7.000 
Estd. Autocorrelation of e(i, t) -. 051514 I 
+-------+ -- +---- --- ++ (Variable Coefficient j Standard Error it-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
PNR 171.6813704 50.711793 3.385 . 0010 . 24073777E-01***+ FNR -16.55293666 4.9279795 -3.359 . 0011 3.5740741***- MEK 6.218146282 5.2919617 1.175 . 2428 . 92592593 
A45 
PPPINC . 4654564535E-02 . 13145361E-02 3.541 . 0006 20946.240***+ 
TBG -5.055488247 3.8162869 -1.325 . 1883 . 57407407 
LDEN 114.5341575 46.979018 2.438 . 0166 8.2698875**+ Fl -. 1620124427 8.4164769 -. 019 . 9847 . 64814815 MR 12.46093348 4.3691898 2.852 . 0053 . 12037037***+ PKRME -25.54755019 21.328551 -1.198 . 2339 . 13100068E-01 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
1 -892.60402 348.79238 -2.55913 
2 -837.83893 336.72473 -2.48820 
3 -921.70977 380.08172 -2.42503 
4 -1059.08323 422.79914 -2.50493 
5 -1088.46939 413.77333 -2.63059 
6 -941.11802 363.43011 -2.58954 
7 -1139.50030 438.64680 -2.59776 
8 -950.28752 372.24204 -2.55288 
9 -921.10803 357.91779 -2.57352 
10 -978.33972 386.44671 -2.53163 
11 -832.21612 335.97731 -2.47700 
12 -1048.68349 419.09659 -2.50225 
13 -1083.50205 431.94185 -2.50844 
14 -932.91662 385.40079 -2.42064 
15 -940.52491 391.91370 -2.39983 
16 -1042.98114 430.99943 -2.41991 
17 -870.30967 374.40270 -2.32453 
18 -1004.43439 407.51344 -2.46479 
I 
Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
Model Log-Likelihood Sum of Squares R-squared 
(1) Constant term only -434.97594 . 
199177026611+05 . 
0000000 
(2) Group effects only -396.42591 . 9754409147D+04 . 5102643 (3) X - variables only -399.32188 . 1029181120D+05 . 4832832 (4) X 
I 
and group effects -350.99097 . 
4205241132D+04 
. 
7888692 
Hypothes is Tests 
Likelihood Ratio Test F Tests 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. F num. denom. Prob value 
(2) vs (1) 77.100 17 . 00000 5.516 17 90 . 00000 
I 
(3) vs (1) 71.308 9 . 
00000 10.184 9 98 
. 
00000 I 
(4) vs (1) 167.970 26 . 00000 11.640 26 81 . 00000 
I 
(4) vs (2) 90.870 9 . 00000 11.876 9 81 . 00000 
I 
(4) vs (3) 96.662 17 . 
00000 6.896 17 81 . 
00000 I 
LIMDEP Estimation Results Run log line 46 Page 4 
Current sample contains 108 observa tions. 
A46 
Random Effects Model: v(i, t) = e(i, t) + u(i) 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
519166D+02 
Var[u] _ . 
531019D+02 
Corr [v 0, t), v 0, s) ]_ . 
505644 
Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) = 20.10 
(1 df, prob value = . 
000007) 
(High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model. ) 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) = 33.82 
(9 df, prob value = . 
000096) 
(High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) 
Reestimated using GLS coefficients: 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 698143D+02 Var[u] _ . 114568D+03 Sum of Squares . 117127D+05 
lVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. Er. IP[IZI>z] I Mean of XI 
PNR 252.9795604 
FNR -1.725286298 
MEK 16.97655867 
PPPINC . 3241337714E-03 TBG -5.258099134 
LDEN -5.411955888 
Fl -. 1380242952 
MR 7.806267256 
PKRME -29.97565473 
Constant 47.02865096 
(Note: E+ nn or E-nn means 
43.815639 5.774 . 0000 . 24073777E-01 1.2500634 -1.380 . 1675 3.5740741 4.0104176 4.233 . 0000 . 92592593 
. 58374489E-03 . 555 . 5787 20946.240 3.4435767 -1.527 . 1268 . 57407407 3.3505406 -1.615 . 1063 8.2698875 4.1694705 -. 033 . 9736 . 64814815 3.8569873 2.024 . 0430 . 12037037 19.032326 -1.575 . 1153 . 13100068E-01 25.133918 1.871 . 0613 
multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
c. Estimation report for recyclable glass model (GLW) 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. I 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = GLW Mean= 11.34223604 , 
S. D. = 11.02 621364 
Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 10, Deg. F r. = 98 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 7084.472219 , Std. Dev. = 8.50238 Fit: R-squared= . 455408, Adjusted R-squared = . 40539 Model test: F[ 9,98] = 9.11, Prob value = . 00000 Diagnostic: Log-L = -379.1560, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -411.9728 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 4.369, Akaike Info. Crt. = 7.207 
Panel Data Analysis of GLW [ONE way] 
U nconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Deg. Free. Mean Square 
Between 12021.7 17.707.160 
Residual 987.067 90.10.9674 
Total 13008.8 107.121.577 
A47 
Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
PNR 159.2442937 37.509972 4.245 . 0000 . 24073777E-01 FNR -2.814843185 . 82744828 -3.402 . 0010 3.5740741 GLK 4.024436389 3.9283289 1.024 . 3081 . 92592593 PPPINC -. 1287008597E-03 . 28954367E-03 -. 444 . 6577 20946.240 TBG -5.981648518 3.1229862 -1.915 . 0584 . 57407407 LDEN . 8989081964E-01 1.6175479 . 056 . 9558 8.2698875 Fl -8.882147601 2.2765244 -3.902 . 0002 . 64814815 MR 1.177905367 3.4946836 . 337 . 
7368 . 12037037 PKRGL -20.73179890 17.221536 -1.204 . 2316 . 13100068E-01 Constant 25.11582450 11.942247 2.103 . 0380 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power .) 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = GLW Mean= 11.34223604 , S. D. = 11.02621364 Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 27, Deg. Fr. = 81 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 765.2230484 , Std. Dev. = 3.07363 Fit: R-squared= . 941176, Adjusted R-squared = . 92229 Model test: F[ 26,811 = 49.85, Prob value = . 00000 Diagnostic: Log-L = -258.9793, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = -411.9728 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 2.469, Akaike Info. Crt. = 5.296 
Estd. Autocorre l at i on of e (i , t) . 102251 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
PNR 60.63697515 21.632541 2.803 . 0061 . 24073777E-01*** FNR -. 8248489082 2.1021682 -. 392 . 6956 3.5740741 GLK 2.012190820 2.2574351 
. 
891 . 
3749 
. 
92592593 
PPP I NC -. 2928133295E-03 . 56075232E-03 -. 522 . 6027 20946.240 TBG -1.323206380 1.6279445 -. 813 . 4183 . 57407407 LDEN 47.20572446 20.040221 2.356 . 0205 8.2698875** F1 
. 3939671943 3.5902848 . 110 . 9128 . 64814815 MR 
. 
8634621282 1.8638007 
. 
463 
. 
6442 . 
12037037 
PKRGL -11.28777719 9.0982929 -1.241 . 2177 . 13100068E-01 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power .) 
LIMDEP Estimation Results Run log line 50 Page 3 
Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
1 -332.83543 148.78719 -2.23699 
2 -300.01215 143.63940 -2.08865 
A48 
3 -340.35368 162.13454 -2.09921 
4 -399.67055 180.35686 -2.21600 
5 -383.98937 176.50665 -2.17550 
6 -349.73479 155.03133 -2.25590 
7 -423.24099 187.11713 -2.26190 
8 -365.71859 158.79031 -2.30315 
9 -344.84787 152.67989 -2.25863 
10 -377.31051 164.84971 -2.28882 
11 -313.22867 143.32057 -2.18551 
12 -408.50653 178.77743 -2.28500 
13 -426.04896 184.25694 -2.31225 
14 -373.51504 164.40354 -2.27194 
15 -381.79036 167.18181 -2.28368 
16 -422.58660 183.85492 -2.29848 
17 -365.66779 159.71200 -2.28954 
18 -400.20958 173.83631 -2.30222 
Test Statistics for the Cl assical Model 
Model Log-Likelihood Sum of Squares R-squared 
(1) Constant term only -411.97279 . 1300878043D+05 . 0000000 (2) Group effects only -272.72611 . 9870667064D+03 . 9241230 (3) X- variables only -379.15595 . 7084472219D+04 . 4554084 (4) 
I 
X and group effects -258.97931 . 7652230484D+03 . 9411764 I 
Hypothesis Tests 
Likelihood Ratio Test F Tests 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. F num. denom. Prob value 
(2) vs (1) 278.493 17 . 00000 64.478 17 90 . 00000 (3) vs (1) 65.634 9 . 00000 9.106 9 98 . 00000 (4) vs (1) 305.987 26 . 00000 49.846 26 81 . 00000 (4) vs (2) 27.494 9 . 00116 2.609 9 81 . 01067 (4) vs (3) 240.353 17 . 00000 39.347 17 81 . 00000 
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Current sample contains 108 observati ons. 
Random Effects Model: v(i, t) = e(i, t) + u(i) 
Estimates: Var[e] . 944720D+01 Var[u] _ . 628433D+02 Corr [v(i, t), v(i, s)] _ . 869316 Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) = 169.70 
(1 df, prob value = . 000000) (High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model. ) 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) = 13.82 
(9 df, prob value = . 129004) (High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) I 
Reestimated using GLS coefficients: 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 103514D+02 Var[u] . 154240D+03 Sum of Squares . 832480D+04 
I 
A49 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. Er. IP[IZI>z] I Mean of XI 
PNR 62.71013762 20.506554 
FNR -1.943074284 . 97996289 GLK 4.495509841 1.9682188 
PPPINC -. 2748814103E-03 . 42461652E-03 TBG -. 7244950943 1.5737157 
LDEN -1.160888983 3.0896141 
Fl -1.893551587 2.8107010 
MR . 
7727909235 1.7886589 
PKRGL -8.224709167 8.7477404 
Constant 29.63084054 24.064651 
(Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 
3.058 . 0022 . 24073777E-01 
-1.983 . 0474 3.5740741 2.284 . 0224 . 92592593 
-. 647 . 5174 20946.240 
-. 460 . 6452 . 57407407 
-. 376 . 7071 8.2698875 
-. 674 . 5005 . 64814815 
. 
432 
. 
6657 
. 
12037037 
-. 940 . 3471 . 13100068E-01 1.231 . 2182 to + or -nn power. ) 
d. Estimation report for recyclable PET bottles model (PTIV) 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = PTW Mean= 4.025185333 , S. D. = 3.066 788096 Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 10, Deg. F r. = 98 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 603.6105950 , Std. Dev. = 2.48179 Fit: R-squared= . 400201, Adjusted R-squared = . 34512 Model test: F[ 9,98] = 7.27, Prob value = . 00000 Diagnostic: Log-L = -246.1685, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -273.7712 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 1.907, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 4.744 
Panel Data Analysis of PTW [ONE way] 
U nconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Deg. Free. Mean Square 
Between 326.878 17.19.2281 
Residual 679.477 90.7.54974 
Total 1006.36 107.9.40519 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
PNR 32.98893604 10.890632 
FNR 
. 
2730949855 
. 
22534963 
PTK 2.284307999 . 86708664 PPPINC 
. 1335254862E-03 . 91489754E-04 TBG 
. 3701574581E-01 . 92183989 LDEN -. 2482271948 . 49309966 Fl -. 4465801283 . 68054471 MR 2.925004993 . 99247045 PKRPT 2.446974563 5.1180184 
Constant -. 5757492982 3.4946253 
(Note: E+ nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 
3.029 . 0031 ". 24073777E-01 1.212 . 2285 3.5740741 2.634 . 0098 . 86111111 1.459 . 1476 20946.240 
. 
040 
. 
9681 
. 
57407407 
-. 503 . 6158 8.2698875 
-. 656 . 5132 . 64814815 2.947 . 0040 . 12037037 
. 478 . 6336 . 14602584E-01 
-. 165 . 8695 to + or -nn power 
- -_-----+ +- ------=======---=----=======--===---- 
A50 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = PTW Mean= 4.025185333 , S. D. = 3.066788096 Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 27, Deg. Fr. = 81 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 201.5344294 , Std. Dev. = 1.57736 Fit: R-squared= . 799738, Adjusted R-squared = . 73546 Model test: F[ 26,81] = 12.44, Prob value = . 00000 Diagnostic: Log-L = -186.9321, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -273.7712 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 1.135, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 3.962 
Estd. Autocorre l at i on of e (i , t) . 
090527 
JVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error it-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
+- -+ - -+--------- +- -+- ----+-----+ 
PNR 40.80697446 11.091224 3.679 . 0004 . 24073777E-01*** FNR . 4437543901 1.0809186 . 411 . 6823 3.5740741 PTK 1.845354251 . 83176602 2.219 . 0288 . 86111111** PPPINC . 5262834595E-03 . 27041531E-03 1.946 . 0545 20946.240* TBG 1.341993187 . 84634823 1.586 . 1160 . 57407407 LDEN 58.04680875 10.442814 5.559 . 0000 8.2698875*** Fl . 5718895630 1.7860030 . 320 . 7495 . 64814815 MR 3.367330511 . 89266242 3.772 . 0003 . 12037037*** PKRPT . 4392239396 4.6734996 . 094 . 9253 . 14602584E-01 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
1 -438.14012 77.42162 -5.65914 
2 -426.64586 74.76708 -5.70633 
3 -481.00694 84.43145 -5.69701 
4 -532.94834 93.86732 -5.67768 
5 -524.61642 91.83369 -5.71268 
6 -461.76503 80.62250 -5.72750 
7 -557.56784 97.34012 -5.72804 
8 -472.07633 82.63883 -5.71252 
9 -457.12412 79.47472 -5.75182 
10 -492.54129 85.81969 -5.73926 
11 -421.59670 74.58734 -5.65239 
12 -530.56621 93.30043 -5.68664 
13 -551.32464 95.88444 -5.74989 
14 -486.50266 85.51623 -5.68901 
15 -494.57103 87.00646 -5.68430 
16 -543.69763 95.68016 -5.68245 
17 -477.77556 83.13690 -5.74685 
18 -519.02083 90.44176 -5.73873 
A51 
Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
Model Log-Likelihood Sum of Squares 
(1) Constant term only -273.77116 . 1006355247D+04 (2) Group effects only -252.56174 . 6794770046D+03 (3) X- variables only -246.16846 . 6036105950D+03 (4) X and group effects -186.93213 . 2015344294D+03 
Hypothesis Tests 
R-squared 
. 
0000000 
. 
3248140 
. 
4002013 
. 
7997383 
Likelihood Ratio Test F Tests 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. F num. denom. Prob value 
(2) vs (1) 42.419 17 . 00058 2.547 17 90 . 
00234 
(3) vs (1) 55.205 9 . 00000 7.265 9 98 . 00000 (4) vs (1) 173.678 26 . 00000 12.441 26 81 . 
00000 
(4) vs (2) 131.259 9 . 00000 21.344 9 81 . 
00000 
(4) vs (3) 118.473 17 . 00000 9.506 17 81 . 
00000 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
J Random Effects Model: v(i, t) = e(i, t) + u(i) J 
J Estimates: Var[e] _ . 248808D+01 
J 
J Var[u] _ . 367121D+01 
J 
Corr [v 0, t), v 0, s) ]_ . 
596045 J 
J Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) = 21.98 J 
J (1 df, prob value = . 
000003) J 
J (High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model. ) 
J Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) = 47.09 
J(9 df, prob value = . 000000) J (High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) 
J Reestimated using GLS coefficients: 
J Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
358869D+01 
Var[u] _ . 
813801D+01 
J Sum of Squares . 
710017D+03 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. Er. IP[IZI>z] I Mean of XI 
PNR 38.54512094 9.7991900 3.934 . 0001 . 24073777E-01 FNR 
. 3741571332 . 29366332 
1.274 . 2026 3.5740741 PTK 3.526693635 
. 
69929611 5.043 . 
0000 
. 
86111111 
PPPINC 
. 1724257692E-03 . 14366987E-03 1.200 . 
2301 20946.240 
TBG 1.365080416 . 78176355 
1.746 . 0808 . 57407407 LDEN -. 5369665744 . 85860918 -. 625 . 5317 8.2698875 Fl . 9650942792 . 99117582 . 974 . 3302 . 64814815 MR 3.651242246 . 83047387 
4.397 . 0000 . 12037037 PKRPT 4.459217035 4.2267049 1.055 . 2914 . 
14602584E-01 
Constant -2.361698838 6.3847968 -. 370 . 7115 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
A52 
e. Estimation report for recyclable plastics model (PLW) 
LIMDEP Estimation Results Run log line 25 Page 1 
Current sample contains 108 observations. ý 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = PLW Mean= 5.772585243 , S. D. = 8.947 573514 Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 9, Deg. F r. = 99 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 3472.472262 , Std. Dev. = 5.92246 Fit: R-squared= . 594637, Adjusted R-squared = . 56188 Model test: F[ 8,99] = 18.15, Prob value = . 00000 Diagnostic: Log-L = -340.6519, Restricted (b=0) Log-L = -389.4123 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 3.638, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 6.475 
Panel Data Analysis of PLW [ONE way] 
U nconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Deg. Free. Mean Square 
Between 3697.11 17.217.477 
Residual 4869.22 90.54.1024 
Total 8566.32 107.80.0591 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
LPNR . 9747766953 . 79327050 1.229 . 2221 -4.3025594 LFNR -2.403028297 2.0678968 -1.162 . 2480 1.1380865 PLK 14.78872313 1.6251531 9.100 . 0000 . 39814815 LP I NC -1.827728177 4.4716469 -. 409 . 6836 9.9359444 TBG -1.104056570 2.2238416 -. 496 . 6207 . 57407407 LDEN -1.318615590 1.2160024 -1.084 . 2808 8.2698875 Fl -1.268277397 1.6796895 -. 755 . 4520 . 64814815 MR 2.156564601 2.2624618 . 953 . 3428 . 12037037 Constant 37.07463471 42.228606 . 878 . 3821 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = PLW Mean= 5.772585243 , 
S. D. = 8.947573514 
Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 26, Deg. Fr. = 82 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 1819.170268 , Std. Dev. = 4.71010 Fit: R-squared= . 787637, Adjusted R-squared = . 72289 Model test: F[ 25,82] =1 2.17, Prob value = . 00000 Diagnostic: Log-L = -305.7416, Restricted (b=0) Log-L = -389.4123 
LogAmemi yaPrCrt. = 3.315, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 6.143 
Estd. Autocorrelation of e(i, t) . 181151 
A53 
+_------ -+- +--- --- +--+ --- _+__+ 
JVariabl eI Coefficient J Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITJ>t) I Mean of XI 
LPNR . 7012539094 1.2006656 . 584 . 5605 -4.3025594 LFNR -11.18274689 19.286416 -. 580 . 5633 1.1380865 PLK 13.37900052 1.7396295 7.691 . 0000 . 39814815*** LP I NC -10.42644322 16.962591 -. 615 . 5402 9.9359444 TBG 1.352138767 2.8702844 . 471 . 6386 . 57407407 LDEN 111.4235491 30.024352 3.711 . 0003 8.2698875*** Fl -4.706481064 5.1254247 -. 918 . 3607 . 64814815 MR 1.595757950 2.5904316 . 616 . 5393 . 12037037 
LIMDEP Estimation Results Run log line 25 Page 3 
Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
1 -708.19623 285.75405 -2.47834 
2 -671.28388 279.94789 -2.39789 
3 -784.63485 301.51013 -2.60235 
4 -880.62858 325.63252 -2.70436 
5 -850.01187 321.09436 -2.64723 
6 -743.66649 292.89518 -2.53902 
7 -924.40848 334.52944 -2.76331 
8 -766.88541 298.08322 -2.57272 
9 -734.15668 289.19960 -2.53858 
10 -802.36646 304.35574 -2.63628 
11 -683.32195 277.29233 -2.46427 
12 -883.95561 319.79885 -2.76410 
13 -898.50472 331.69918 -2.70879 
14 -779.62071 305.57718 -2.55131 
15 -798.04318 306.86417 -2.60064 
16 -888.04952 329.29834 -2.69679 
17 -755.00848 297.67354 -2.53636 
18 -839.90540 316.65387 -2.65244 
Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
Model Log-Likelihood Sum of Squares R-squared 
(1) Constant term only -389.41233 . 
8566320681D+04 
. 
0000000 
(2) G roup effects only -358.90743 . 
4869215236D+04 
. 
4315862 
(3) X - variables only -340.65187 . 
3472472262D+04 
. 
5946367 
(4) X 
ý 
and group effects -305.74161 . 
1819170268D+04 
. 
7876369 
J - Hypothesi s Tests 
Likelihood Ratio Test F Tests 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. F num. denom. Prob value 
(2) vs (1) 61.010 17 . 00000 4.020 17 90 . 00001 (3) vs (1) 97.521 8 . 00000 18.153 8 99 . 00000 (4) vs (1) 167.341 25 . 00000 12.165 25 82 . 00000 (4) vs (2) 106.332 8 . 00000 17.185 8 82 . 00000 (4) vs (3) 69.821 17 . 00000 4.384 17 82 . 00000 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Random Effects Model: v(i, t) = e(i, t) + u(i) 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
221850D+02 
Var[u] _ . 
128905D+02 
Corr [v(i, t), v(i, s)] _ . 
367507 
Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) = 15.85 
(1 df, prob value = . 
000069) 
(High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model. ) 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) = 16.20 
(8 df, prob value = . 
039567) 
(High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) 
Reestimated using GLS coefficients: 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
262487D+02 
Var[u] _ . 
209032D+02 
Sum of Squares . 
351740D+04 
+------------------ ---------+ 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. Er. IP[IZI>zl I Mean of XI 
+------ +- -- +----- +--- + 
LPNR . 9164403972 . 92607107 . 990 . 3224 -4.3025594 LFNR -1.612869804 2.7094416 -. 595 . 5517 1.1380865 PLK 14.57869501 1.5361673 9.490 . 0000 . 39814815 PING -3.260258095 6.5802043 -. 495 . 6203 9.9359444 TBG . 5837723513 2.4392131 . 239 . 8109 . 57407407 LDEN -1.220949065 1.8216556 -. 670 . 5027 8.2698875 Fl -. 9424758104 2.3371257 -. 403 . 6868 . 64814815 MR 2.994138103 2.2803922 1.313 . 1892 . 12037037 Constant 48.15291375 62.239715 . 774 . 4391 
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A7-5. Estimation reports for the models in Table 5.4 
The estimations of non-recyclables and total waste generation are shown 
below. The LM Test shows that panel data models are better than the 
non-panel models at the 99% confidence level. The Hausman Test shows 
that two FEM models of non-recyclables are better than REM models at the 
99% confidence level and that two FEM models of total waste are better than 
'REM models at the 80% confidence level. Therefore, FEM estimates of all 
models are chosen. 
a. Estimation report for non-recyclables model without interaction term 
LIMOEP Estimation Results Run log line 13 Page 1 
Current sample contains 108 observations. 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = NRW Mean= 839.3505422 , S. D. = 179.9 444335 Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 10, Deg. F r. = 98 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 2033854.974 , Std. Dev. = 144.06118 Fit: R-squared= . 412971, Adjusted R-squared = . 35906 Model test: F[ 9,98] = 7.66, Prob value = . 00000 Diagnostic: Log-L = -684.7842, Restricted (b=0) Log-L = -713.5490 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 10.029, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 12.866 
Panel Data Analysis of NRW [ONE-way] 
Unconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Deg. Free. Mean Square 
Between 
. 190112E+07 17.111831. Residual 
. 156354E+07 90.17372.7 Total 
. 346466E+07 107.32380.0 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
PNR -2084.477409 632.31279 -3.297 . 0014 . 24073777E-01 FNR 37.16916419 31.452828 1.182 . 2402 3.5740741 KR 
-82.01736480 118.86320 -. 690 . 
4918 
. 
92592593 
PPPINC 
. 1169834782E-02 . 50157326E-02 . 233 . 8161 20946.240 TBG 56.08538781 49.332405 1.137 . 2584 . 57407407 LDEN -16.63453050 27.587427 -. 603 . 5479 8.2698875 Fl -43.24577345 41.664761 -1.038 . 3018 . 64814815 MR 
-333.0634244 59.159330 -5.630 . 0000 . 12037037 OTC 180.4319130 127.68826 1.413 . 1608 . 26851852 Constant 933.1646590 246.34532 3.788 . 0003 (Note: E+ nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = NRW Mean= 839.3505422 , 
S. D. = 179.9444335 
Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 27, Deg. Fr. = 81 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 538041.3795 , 
Std. Dev. = 81.50145 
Fit: R-squared= . 
844706, Adjusted R-squared = . 
79486 
Model test: F[ 26,81] = 16.95, Prob value = . 
00000 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -612.9776, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = -713.5490 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 9.024, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 11.851 
Estd. Autocor re l at i on of e (i , t) . 
022495 
jVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
PNR -2424.148086 573.72486 -4.225 . 0001 . 24073777E-01*** FNR 118.2880812 56.197517 2.105 . 0378 3.5740741** KR 106.2406882 95.152651 1.117 . 2669 . 92592593 PPPINC . 4811723753E-02 . 14956453E-01 . 322 . 
7483 20946.240 
TBG -82.61071481 43.162496 -1.914 . 0585 . 57407407* LDEN -3078.226095 522.67362 -5.889 . 0000 8.2698875*** Fl 11.40523729 98.713916 . 116 . 9083 . 64814815 MR -264.9584484 49.386844 -5.365 . 0000 . 12037037*** OTC -48.34895137 106.78806 -. 453 . 6517 . 26851852 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
1 23144.39209 3889.19014 5.95095 
2 22413.39481 3755.66240 5.96789 
3 25291.12047 4236.84656 5.96933 
4 27905.12730 4712.83434 5.92109 
5 27450.55593 4615.35735 5.94766 
6 24064.80357 4061.57128 5.92500 
7 29129.35390 4891.26605 5.95538 
8 25086.56844 4149.82037 6.04522 
9 24146.57437 3991.64774 6.04927 
10 25817.61900 4310.07780 5.99006 
11 22441.08446 3746.02459 5.99064 
12 28035.49761 4670.12009 6.00316 
13 28666.53735 4814.43425 5.95429 
14 25284.34765 4295.83234 5.88579 
15 25846.80324 4367.61004 5.91784 
16 28418.97760 4802.69054 5.91730 
17 24750.69373 4171.76433 5.93291 
18 26817.43695 4541.26192 5.90528 
A57 
Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
Model Log- Likelihood Sum of Squares R-squared 
(1) Constant term only -713.54903 . 3464659909D+07 . 0000000 (2) Group effects only -670.58331 . 1563540868D+07 . 5487174 (3) X- variables only -684.78423 . 2033854974D+07 . 4129713 (4) X and group effects -612.97758 . 5380413795D+06 . 8447059 
Hypothesis Tests 
Likelihood Ratio Test F Tests 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. F num. denom. Prob value 
(2) vs (1) 85.931 17 . 00000 6.437 17 90 . 00000 (3) vs (1) 57.530 9 . 00000 7.660 9 98 . 00000 (4) vs (1) 201.143 26 . 00000 16.946 26 81 . 00000 (4) vs (2) 115.211 9 . 00000 17.154 9 81 . 00000 (4) vs (3) 143.613 17 . 00000 13.246 17 81 . 00000 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Random Effects Model: v(i, t) = e(i, t) + u(i) 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
664249D+04 
Var[u] _ . 
141111D+05 
Corr [v 0, t), v 0, s) ] . 
679936 
Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) = 40.14 
(1 df, prob value = . 
000000) 
(High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model. ) 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) = 46.46 
(9 df, prob value = . 
000000) 
(High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) 
Reestimated using GLS coefficients: 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
958663D+04 
Var[u] _ . 
350043D+05 
Sum of Squares . 
253341D+07 
+--- ----------- ------------+ 
+-----+---------+-----------+------+------+-----+ 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. Er. IP[IZI>z] I Mean of XI 
PNR -2492.856655 
FNR 68.29808719 
KR 60.12596176 
PPPINC 
. 
8134026422E-02 
TBG -84.55958904 
LDEN -27.89949947 
Fl -68.45090319 
MR -307.0406355 
OTC -57.26292150 
Constant 805.1814061 
(Note: E+ nn or E-nn means 
519.51131 -4.798 . 
0000 
. 
24073777E-01 
26.828818 2.546 . 0109 3.5740741 84.590239 . 711 . 4772 . 92592593 
. 84600709E-02 . 961 . 3363 20946.240 40.406402 -2.093 . 0364 . 57407407 50.939369 -. 548 . 5839 8.2698875 61.002065 -1.122 . 2618 . 64814815 45.475401 -6.752 . 0000 . 12037037 98.041784 -. 584 . 5592 . 26851852 397.44750 2.026 . 0428 
multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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b. Estimation report for non-recyclables model with interaction term 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = NRW Mean= 839.3505422 , 
S. D. = 179.9444335 
Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 11, Deg. Fr. = 97 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 2033206.445 , 
Std. Dev. = 144.77877 
Fit: R-squared= . 
413158, Adjusted R-squared = . 
35266 
Model test: F[ 10,97] = 6.83, Prob value = . 
00000 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -684.7670, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = -713.5490 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 10.047, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 12.885 
Panel Data Analysis of NRW [ONE way] 
Unconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Ueg. tree. Mean square 
Between . 190112E+07 
17. 111831. 
Residual . 156354E+07 
90. 17372.7 
Total . 346466E+07 
107. 32380.0 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
PNR -2187.042408 862.44563 -2.536 . 0128 . 24073777E-01 
FNR 38.83233274 32.993388 1.177 . 2421 3.5740741 KR -75.45018581 125.15384 -. 603 . 5480 . 92592593 
PPPINC . 9602697431E-03 . 
51796013E-02 . 185 . 8533 
20946.240 
TBG 56.75946934 49.726027 1.141 . 2565 . 
57407407 
LDEN -17.88660031 28.624036 -. 625 . 5335 8.2698875 Fl -40.92716855 43.898100 -. 932 . 3535 . 64814815 
MR -331.5865189 60.043976 -5.522 . 0000 . 
12037037 
OTC 170.8949922 139.30823 1.227 . 
2229 . 
26851852 
INT 23.48902514 133.53811 . 176 . 8607 . 
37037037E-01 
Constant 937.9761810 249.07899 3.766 . 
0003 
(Note: E+ nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power .) 
LIMDEP Estimation Results Run log line 17 Page 2 
Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = NRW Mean= 839.3505422 , 
S. D. = 179.9444335 
Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 28, Deg. Fr. = 80 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 519329.1315 , 
Std. Dev. = 80.57055 
Fit: R-squared= . 
850107, Adjusted R-squared = . 
79952 
Model test: F[ 27,80] = 16.80, Prob value = . 
00000 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -611.0661, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = -713.5490 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 9.009, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 11.835 
A59 
Estd. Autocorre l at i on of e (i , t) . 
040276 
lVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
PNR -1675.410594 718.44891 -2.332 . 0217 . 24073777E-01** 
FNR 112.4184875 55.663104 2.020 . 0462 3.5740741** 
KR 103.3813539 94.080909 1.099 . 2745 . 92592593 
ppPINC . 9192817710E-02 . 15009110E-01 . 
612 . 5416 20946.240 
TBG -69.98587963 43.312590 -1.616 . 1093 . 57407407 
LDEN -3162.477871 519.08120 -6.092 . 0000 8.2698875*** 
Fl 6.702555726 97.625725 . 069 . 9454 . 64814815 
MR -260.3698464 48.897505 -5.325 . 0000 . 12037037*** OTC -50.52695297 105.57614 -. 479 . 6333 . 26851852 
INT -186.8416050 110.04922 -1.698 . 0927 . 37037037E-01* (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
+___= ______=____ =_______=______________+ 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
1 23679.06457 3857.64434 6.13822 
2 22889.33017 3723.33351 6.14754 
3 25862.37559 4201.94692 6.15486 
4 28580.18719 4675.94074 6.11218 
5 28061.10697 4576.79140 6.13117 
6 24641.38997 4029.51733 6.11522 
7 29806.39531 4851.81454 6.14335 
8 25665.02673 4116.54573 6.23460 
9 24678.97893 3958.49621 6.23443 
10 26397.74039 4274.52747 6.17559 
11 22971.73177 3716.40422 6.18117 
12 28708.22905 4633.75122 6.19546 
13 29406.72617 4779.37051 6.15285 
14 25904.39101 4262.44018 6.07736 
15 26499.85269 4334.82314 6.11325 
16 29133.62830 4766.45756 6.11222 
17 25381.38550 4140.81154 6.12957 
18 27483.45414 4506.49863 6.09863 
Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
Model Log-Likelihood Sum of Squares R-squared 
(1) Constant term only -713.54903 . 
3464659909D+07 . 
0000000 
(2) Group effects only -670.58331 . 
1563540868D+07 
. 
5487174 
(3) X- variables only -684.76701 . 
2033206445D+07 
. 
4131584 
(4) X and group effects -611.06610 . 
5193291315D+06 . 
8501068 
Hypothesis Tests 
Likelihood Ratio Test F Tests 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. F num. denom. Prob value 
(2) vs (1) 85.931 17 . 
00000 6.437 17 90 . 
00000 
(3) vs (1) 57.564 10 . 
00000 6.829 10 97 . 
00000 
A60 
(4) vs (1) 204.966 27 . 00000 16.804 27 80 . 00000 
(4) vs (2) 119.034 10 . 00000 16.086 10 80 . 00000 
(4) vs (3) 147.402 17 . 00000 13.718 17 80 . 00000 
LIMDEP Estimation Results Run log line 17 Page 4 
Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Random Effects Model: v (i , t) =e 
(i 
, t) +u 
(i) 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 649161D+04 Var[u] _ . 144693D+05 Corr [v 0, t), v 0, s) ]_ . 690299 Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) = 39.71 
(1 df, prob value = . 000000) (High values of LM favor FEM/REM o ver CR model. ) 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) = 49.01 
(10 df, prob value = . 000000) (High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) 
Reestimated using GLS coefficients : 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
959070D+04 
Var[u] _ . 411734D+05 Sum of Squares . 256367D+07 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. Er. IP[IZI>z] I Mean of XI 
+ + 
-----+ -- -- 
+--- 
---+- ----- -+ 
+ 
PNR -2067.539490 671.41951 -3.079 . 0021 . 24073777E-01 FNR 68.90008820 26.690468 2.581 . 0098 3.5740741 KR 52.59978987 84.141005 . 625 . 5319 . 92592593 PPPINC . 1000090138E-01 . 86574688E-02 1.155 . 2480 
20946.240 
TBG -81.10462643 40.276808 -2.014 . 0440 . 57407407 LDEN -27.11009345 51.397571 -. 527 . 5979 8.2698875 Fl -73.16413090 61.223338 -1.195 . 2321 . 64814815 MR -305.7016950 45.069500 -6.783 . 0000 . 12037037 OTC -51.41840497 97.362423 -. 528 . 5974 . 26851852 INT -102.9859458 102.97256 -1.000 . 3172 . 37037037E-01 Constant 757.2824180 404.31270 1.873 . 0611 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
c. Estimation report for total waste model without interaction term 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. I 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = TOW Mean= 978.9000974 , 
S. D. = 162.7061772 
Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 10, Deg. Fr. = 98 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 1671797.571 , 
Std. Dev. = 130.61072 
A61 
Fit: R-squared= . 409810, Model test: F[ 9,98] = 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -674.1984, 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 
Panel Data Analysis of TOW 
Unconditional ANOVA (N 
Source Variation Deg 
Between . 
187443E+07 
Residual 958215. 
Total . 283264E+07 
Adjusted R-squared = . 35561 7.56, Prob value = . 00000 Restricted (b=0) Log-L = -702.6732 
9.833, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 12.670 
[ONE way] 
o regressors) 
Free. Mean Square 
17.110260. 
90.10646.8 
107.26473.3 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
PNR -1335.742549 573.27608 -2.330 . 0219 . 24073777E-01 FNR 67.95762819 28.516194 2.383 . 0191 3.5740741 KR 71.37263050 107.76538 . 662 . 5093 . 92592593 PPPINC . 5413898248E-02 . 45474322E-02 1.191 . 2367 20946.240 TBG 113.9161468 44.726420 2.547 . 0124 . 57407407 LDEN -35.89834237 25.011691 -1.435 . 1544 8.2698875 Fl -90.74610972 37.774676 -2.402 . 0182 . 64814815 MR -262.4864437 53.635842 -4.894 . 0000 . 12037037 OTC 46.58787626 115.76648 . 402 . 6882 . 26851852 Constant 898.0660408 223.34497 4.021 
. 
0001 
(Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
LIMDEP Estimation Results Run log line 29 Page 2 
Current sample contains 108 observations. ý 
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = TOW Mean= 978.9000974 , 
S. D. = 162.7061772 
Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 27, Deg. Fr. = 81 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 597707.4360 , 
Std. Dev. = 85.90171 
Fit: R-squared= 
. 
788993, Adjusted R-squared = . 
72126 
Model test: F[ 26,81] = 11.65, Prob value = . 
00000 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -618.6565, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = -702.6732 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 9.130, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 11.957 
Estd. Autocorre l at i on of e (i , t) . 
060645 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
PNR -1980.189474 604.70026 -3.275 . 0015 . 24073777E-01*** FNR 54.07068771 59.231621 . 913 . 3635 3.5740741 KR 150.3121490 100.28994 1.499 . 1371 . 92592593 PPPINC 
. 1248085470E-01 . 15763952E-01 . 792 . 4304 20946.240 TBG 2.747031740 45.492840 . 060 . 9520 . 57407407 LDEN -1182.998164 550.89277 -2.147 . 0342 8.2698875** Fl -45.35186400 104.04348 -. 436 . 6639 . 64814815 MR -223.5793813 52.053240 -4.295 . 0000 . 12037037*** OTC -51.89428865 112.55355 -. 461 . 6458 . 26851852 
A62 
(Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
+:: ====Z==- ===_-_ -----___--__-ý____--_- __======+ 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. ý 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
1 9177.98038 4099.16752 2.23899 
2 9012.22661 3958.43061 2.27672 
3 10177.68161 4465.59391 2.27913 
4 11009.64575 4967.28026 2.21643 
5 10928.60638 4864.54050 2.24659 
6 9391.68785 4280.85552 2.19388 
7 11367.44409 5155.34551 2.20498 
8 10083.82455 4373.86918 2.30547 
9 9664.40157 4207.15681 2.29713 
10 10229.15228 4542.77890 2.25174 
11 8993.73236 3948.27246 2.27789 
12 11083.56032 4922.25988 2.25172 
13 11448.11491 5074.36556 2.25607 
14 10084.91599 4527.76433 2.22735 
15 10399.70223 4603.41731 2.25913 
16 11354.31402 5061.98780 2.24305 
17 10055.97319 4396.99788 2.28701 
18 10660.54745 4786.44465 2.22724 
Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
Model Log-Likelihood 
(1) Constant term only -702.67320 
(2) Group effects only -644.14295 
(3) X- variables only -674.19842 
(4) X and group effects -618.65654 
Hypoth& 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. 
(2) vs (1) 117.061 17 . 
00000 
(3) vs (1) 56.950 9 . 
00000 
(4) vs (1) 168.033 26 . 
00000 
(4) vs (2) 50.973 9 . 
00000 
(4) vs (3) 111.084 17 . 
00000 
Sum of Squares R-squared 
. 
2832643110D+07 
. 
0000000 
. 9582148082D+06 . 
6617241 
. 
1671797571D+07 
. 
4098100 
. 
5977074360D+06 
. 
7889930 
sis Tests 
F Tests 
F num. denom. Prob value 
10.356 17 90 . 00000 7.561 9 98 
. 
00000 
11.649 26 81 
. 
00000 
5.428 9 81 
. 
00001 
8.562 17 81 
. 
00000 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Random Effects Model: v(i, t) = e(i, t) + u(i) 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 737910D+04 Var[u] _ . 968005D+04 Corr [v(i, t), v(i, s)] _ . 567440 Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) = 54.15 
A63 
(1 df, prob value = . 000000) (High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model. ) 
Fixed vs. Ra ndom Effects (Hausman) = 12.66 I 
(9 df, prob value = . 178560) (High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) 
Reestimated using GLS coefficients: 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 791619D+04 Var[u] _ . 244557D+05 Sum of Squares . 187841D+07 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. Er. IP[IZI>z] I Mean of XI 
+ +- --ý ---ý- ---+ ----+ -- + 
PNR -1769.970031 531.80925 -3.328 . 0009 . 24073777E-01*** FNR 67.70383637 26.678783 2.538 . 0112 3.5740741** KR 128.9540080 87.541067 1.473 
. 
1407 
. 92592593 PPPINC . 
9102955838E-02 
. 
76423161E-02 1.191 
. 
2336 20946.240 
TBG 19.56492176 41.583105 . 471 . 6380 . 57407407 LDEN -35.31231669 44.197684 -. 799 . 4243 8.2698875 Fl -97.73633797 56.219429 -1.738 . 0821 . 64814815* MR -253.5899593 46.712928 -5.429 . 0000 . 12037037*** OTC -30.03929211 101.10776 -. 297 . 7664 . 26851852 Constant 852.1925025 346.78112 2.457 . 0140 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
d. Estimation report for total waste model with interaction term 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = TOW Mean= 978.9000974 , S. D. = 162.7 061772 Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 11, Deg. F r. = 97 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 1613792.947 , Std. Dev. = 128.98465 Fit: R-squared= . 430287, Adjusted R-squared = . 37155 Model test: F[ 10,971 = 7.33, Prob value = . 00000 Diagnostic: Log-L = -672.2916, Restricted (b=0) Log-L = -702.6732 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 9.816, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 12.654 
Panel Data Analysis of TOW [ONE way] 
U nconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Deg. Free. Mean Square 
Between 
. 187443E+07 17.110260. Residual 958215.90.10646.8 
Total . 283264E+07 107.26473.3 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IPEITI>t] I Mean of XI 
PNR -365.7556595 768.36025 -. 476 . 6351 . 24073777E-01 FNR 52.22856171 29.394094 1.777 . 0787 3.5740741 
A64 
KR 9.264917610 111.50064 . 083 . 9339 . 92592593 PPPINC . 7395815489E-02 . 46145515E-02 1.603 . 1122 20946.240 TBG 107.5411626 44.301347 2.427 . 0170 . 57407407 LDEN -24.05715573 25.501401 -. 943 . 3478 8.2698875 Fl -112.6738274 39.109196 -2.881 . 0049 . 64814815 MR -276.4539665 53.493697 -5.168 . 0000 . 12037037 OTC 136.7812964 124.11091 1.102 . 2731 . 26851852 INT -222.1425108 118.97026 -1.867 . 0649 . 37037037E-01 Constant 852.5620842 221.90662 3.842 . 0002 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = TOW Mean= 978.9000974 , 
S. D. = 162.7061772 
Model size: Observations = 108, Parameters = 28, Deg. Fr. = 80 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 542330.6011 , Std. 
Dev. = 82.33549 
Fit: R-squared= 
. 
808543, Adjusted R-squared = . 
74393 
Model test: F[ 27,801 = 12.51, Prob value = . 
00000 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -613.4064, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -702.6732 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 9.052, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 11.878 
Estd. Autocorre l at i on of e (i , t) . 038463 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
PNR -692.1455830 734.18685 -. 943 . 3481 . 24073777E-01 FNR 43.97329784 56.882429 . 773 . 4413 3.5740741 KR 145.3932714 96.141793 1.512 . 1337 . 92592593 PPPINC . 2001759670E-01 . 15337892E-01 1.305 . 1949 20946.240 TBG 24.46538030 44.261371 
. 
553 
. 
5817 
. 
57407407 
LDEN -1327.935456 530.45191 -2.503 . 0140 8.2698875** Fl -53.44182921 99.764260 -. 536 . 5934 . 64814815 MR -215.6856659 49.968627 -4.316 . 0000 . 12037037*** OTC -55.64107799 107.88884 -. 516 . 6072 . 26851852 INT -321.4213132 112.45989 -2.858 . 0052 . 37037037E-01*** (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power .) 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
1 10097.77088 3942.14776 2.56149 
2 9830.97235 3804.89479 2.58377 
3 11160.40475 4293.99243 2.59907 
4 12170.94297 4778.36930 2.54709 
5 11978.92981 4677.04804 2.56122 
6 10383.58233 4117.78569 2.52164 
A65 
7 12532.15009 4958.09569 2.52761 
8 11078.93924 4206.72049 2.63363 
9 10580.29059 4045.20883 2.61551 
10 11227.12797 4368.16289 2.57022 
11 9906.59841 3797.81371 2.60850 
12 12240.85194 4735.25560 2.58505 
13 12721.45263 4884.06475 2.60469 
14 11151.56895 4355.81082 2.56016 
15 11523.13516 4429.77936 2.60129 
16 12583.71882 4870.86892 2.58346 
17 11140.94447 4231.51786 2.63285 
18 11806.28863 4605.21548 2.56368 
Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
II 
Model Log-Likelihood Sum of Squares R-squared 
(1) Constant term only -702.67320 . 2832643110D+07 . 
0000000 
(2) Group effects only -644.14295 . 9582148082D+06 . 
6617241 
(3) X- variables only -672.29156 . 1613792947D+07 . 
4302872 
(4) X and group effects -613.40635 . 
5423306011D+06 
. 8085426 II 
Hypothesis Tests 
Likelihood Ratio Test F Tests 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. F num. denom. Prob value 
(2) vs (1) 117.061 17 . 00000 10.356 17 90 . 00000 (3) vs (1) 60.763 10 . 00000 7.326 10 97 . 00000 (4) vs (1) 178.534 27 . 00000 12.513 27 80 . 00000 (4) vs (2) 61.473 10 . 00000 6.135 10 80 . 00000 (4) vs (3) 117.770 17 . 00000 9.297 17 80 . 00000 
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Current sample contains 108 observations. 
Random Effects Model: v(i, t) = e(i, t) + u(i) I 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
677913D+04 I 
Var[u] _ . 
985791D+04 
Corr [v (i 
, t) ,v 
(i 
, s) 
] 
. 
592528 
Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) = 57.85 
(1 df, prob value = . 
000000) I 
(High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model. ) 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) = 14.63 
(10 df, prob value = . 
145992) I 
(High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) I 
Reestimated using GLS coefficients: I 
Estimates: Var[e] 
. 
744060D+04 I 
Var[u] 
. 
280592D+05 I 
Sum of Squares . 
182582D+07 I 
(Variable Coefficient Standard Error Ib/St. Er. IP[IZI>z] I Mean of XI 
PNR -650.5786532 671.25041 -. 969 . 
3324 
. 
24073777E-01 
A66 
FNR 67.24447974 25.876435 2.599 . 0094 3.5740741*** 
KR 104.8421636 84.766564 1.237 . 2161 . 92592593 
PPPINC . 1346085716E-01 . 77389503E-02 1.739 . 0820 20946.240* TBG 27.62602913 40.280266 . 686 . 4928 . 57407407 
LDEN -29.71402768 44.202660 -. 672 . 5014 8.2698875 Fl -109.9791342 55.706750 -1.974 . 0484 . 64814815 MR -251.2570014 45.043535 -5.578 . 0000 . 12037037*** OTC -6.721024326 97.858420 -. 069 . 9452 . 26851852 INT -269.7236316 102.89797 -2.621 . 0088 . 37037037E-01*** Constant 718.3882469 349.68710 2.054 . 0399 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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A7-6. Estimation reports for the model in Table 5.6 
The estimations for recycling ratio is shown below. LM test shows that 
this panel data model (FEM) is better than OLS model at 90% confidence level. 
FEM estimates are chosen. 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = RR Mean= . 
1054057975 
, 
S. D. = . 
8258526967E-01 
Model size: Observations = 36, Parameters = 9, Deg. Fr. = 27 
Residuals: Sum of squares= . 
9536064688E-01, Std. Dev. = . 
05943 
Fit: R-squared= 
. 
600519, Adjusted R-squared = . 
48215 
Model test: F[ 8,27) = 5.07, Prob value = . 
00064 
Diagnostic: Log-L = 55.7232, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = 39.2066 
LogAmemi yaPrCrt. = -5.423, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = -2.596 
Panel Data Analysis of RR [ONE way] 
Unconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Deg. Free. Mean Square 
Between . 338107E-01 5. . 676215E-02 Residual . 204901 30. . 683002E-02 Total . 238711 35. . 682033E-02 
+------+----------+-------+- ---+------+ --+ (Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
+--- +-------+----- + ---+----+-_ -+ 
PNR 
. 
9697276238 
FNR -. 3572870751E-01 KR 
. 
8934636962E-01 
PPPINC 
. 5904701500E-06 LDEN -. 1937968067E-01 ENAF -. 6146218315E-02 
MR 
. 8467334694E-01 CR -. 1308584538E-01 
Constant 
. 4202461705 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means 
. 
38895195 2.493 
. 
0191 
. 
23342584E-01 
. 27227554E-01 -1.312 . 2005 6.2222222 
. 42016511E-01 2.126 . 0428 . 77777778 
. 
66598629E-05 
. 
089 
. 
9300 22377.198 
. 
31579188E-01 -. 614 . 
5446 8.5890823 
. 
30868467E-02 -1.991 . 
0567 6.3602747 
. 28123408E-01 3.011 . 0056 . 36111111 
. 
14843596E-01 -. 882 . 
3858 1.7500000 
. 34585459 1.215 . 2348 
multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
A68 
Dep. var. = RR Mean= . 
1054057975 
, 
S. D. = . 
8258526967E-01 
Model size: Observations = 36, Parameters = 14, Deg. Fr. = 22 
Residuals: Sum of squares= . 
2811725203E-01, Std. Dev. = . 
03575 
Fit: R-squared= . 
882212, Adjusted R-squared = . 
81261 
Model test: F[ 13,22] = 12.68, Prob value = . 
00000 
Diagnostic: Log-L = 77.7062, Restricted (b=0) Log-L = 39.2066 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = -6.334, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = -3.539 
Estd. Autocorre l at i on of e (i , t) -. 155857 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error it-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
+-----+- -----+ ----------+-----+------ +--- ---+ 
PNR 1.128378903 . 30913656 3.650 . 0011 . 23342584E-01 FNR -. 4681827384E-01 . 29398085E-01 -1.593 . 1225 6.2222222 KR . 1998856803E-01 . 33738654E-01 . 592 . 5583 . 77777778 PPPINC . 2980363271E-05 . 76281816E-05 . 391 . 6990 22377.198 LDEN 2.842158846 . 43902007 6.474 . 0000 8.5890823 ENAF . 3969229477E-02 . 31521247E-02 1.259 . 2183 6.3602747 MR . 6366956034E-01 . 21754518E-01 2.927 . 0067 . 36111111 CR -. 1604101128E-01 . 13955419E-01 -1.149 . 2601 1.7500000 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. I 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient 
1 -25.90069 
2 -22.97705 
3 -23.41907 
4 -25.82385 
5 -22.35995 
6 -24.38074 
Standard Error t-ratio 
4.03852 -6.41341 
3.60100 -6.38075 
3.67627 -6.37034 
4.04594 -6.38265 
3.53169 -6.33123 
3.81737 -6.38679 
Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
Model Log-Likelihood Sum of Squares R-squared 
(1) Constant term only 39.20655 . 2387114368D+00 . 
0000000 
(2) Group effects only 41.95569 . 2049006976D+00 . 
1416385 
(3) X- variables only 55.72316 . 
9536064688D-01 
. 
6005192 
(4) X and group effects 77.70625 . 28117252030-01 . 8822124 
Hypothesis 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. 
(2) vs (1) 5.498 5 . 35813 (3) vs (1) 33.033 8 . 00006 (4) vs (1) 76.999 13 . 00000 (4) vs (2) 71.501 8 . 00000 (4) vs (3) 43.966 5 . 00000 
Tests 
F Tests 
F num. denom. Prob value 
. 990 5 30 . 44029 5.073 8 27 
. 00064 12.675 13 22 . 00000 17.290 8 22 . 00000 10.523 5 22 . 00003 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
A69 
Random Effects Model: v (i , t) =e 
(i 
, t) + u(i) Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
127806D-02 
Var[u] _ . 
225382D-02 
Corr[v(i, t), v(i, s)] _ . 
638137 
Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) = 2.73 
(1 df, prob value = . 
098495) 
(High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model. ) 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) _ . 
00 
(8 df, prob value = 1.000000) 
(High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) 
Reestimated using GLS coefficients: 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
390005D-02 
Var[u] _ . 
493970D-02 
Sum of Squares . 
119339D+00 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error lb/St. Er. IP[IZI>z) I Mean of XI 
PNR . 6964689875 . 27787987 2.506 . 0122 . 23342584E-01 FNR -. 6740251497E-01 . 24869878E-01 -2.710 . 0067 6.2222222 KR . 6887031161E-01 . 29343226E-01 2.347 . 0189 . 77777778 PPPINC . 6161307363E-05 . 59870140E-05 1.029 . 3034 22377.198 LDEN -. 1396425107E-01 . 54196615E-01 -. 258 . 7967 8.5890823 ENAF -. 7863994960E-02 . 23649861E-02 -3.325 . 0009 6.3602747 MR . 8510565214E-01 . 20690599E-01 4.113 . 0000 . 36111111 CR -. 9386493208E-02 . 11711697E-01 -. 801 . 4229 1.7500000 Constant . 4727542825 . 47923824 . 986 . 3239 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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A7-7. Estimation reports for the models in Table 5.7 
The estimations for total recyclables, recyclable paper, metal, glass, PET 
bottles, plastics, non-recyclables, and total waste generation are shown below. 
LM test shows that their panel data models aren't better than OLS models at 
90% confidence level. Therefore, OLS estimates of these models are 
chosen. 
a. Estimation report for total recyclables model 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. I 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = TOR Mean= 99.37692909 , S. D. = 69.89 294736 Model size: Observations = 36, Parameters = 9, Deg. F r. = 27 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 65476.53947 , Std. Dev. = 49.24487 Fit: R-squared= . 617042, Adjusted R-squared = . 50357 Model test: F[ 8,27] = 5.44, Prob value = . 00039 Diagnostic: Log-L = -186.1885, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -203.4654 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 8.017, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 10.844 
Panel Data Analysis of TOR [ONE way] 
U nconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Deg. Free. Mean Square 
Between 10185.6 5.2037.12 
Residual 160790.30.5359.68 
Total 170976.35.4885.02 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
LPNR 51.67907046 15.880023 3.254 
. 
0031 -4.3235659 
LFNR -67.57554579 148.98197 -. 454 . 6538 1.8252327 KR 113.2071235 35.053749 3.230 . 0032 . 77777778 LPINC 3.769199825 123.13429 . 031 . 9758 10.003885 LDEN -12.91936010 26.440266 -. 489 . 6291 8.5890823 LENAF -35.17168253 14.373351 -2.447 . 0212 1.6298306 MR 48.99648853 23.238376 2.108 . 0444 . 36111111 CR -20.62800197 12.674277 -1.628 . 1152 1.7500000 Constant 507.0944192 1354.0075 . 375 . 7109 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. ý 
A71 
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables 
ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = TOR Mean= 99.37692909 , 
S. D. = 69.89294736 
Model size: Observations = 36, Parameters = 14, Deg. Fr. = 22 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 31788.15376 , 
Std. Dev. = 38.01205 
Fit: R-squared= . 
814078, Adjusted R-squared = . 
70422 
Model test: F[ 13,22] = 7.41, Prob value = . 
00002 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -173.1817, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = -203.4654 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 7.604, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 10.399 
Estd. Autocorrelation of e(i, t) -. 108710 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
LPNR 42.89351468 16.279482 2.635 . 0136 -4.3235659 LFNR -321.2139243 197.73473 -1.624 . 1155 1.8252327 KR 49.40455765 36.305242 1.361 . 1844 . 77777778 LPINC 163.9913764 178.79088 . 917 . 3669 10.003885 LDEN 1714.027304 475.82565 3.602 . 0012 8.5890823 LENAF -2.255079807 18.605485 -. 121 . 9044 1.6298306 MR 54.24597210 23.350361 2.323 . 0277 . 36111111 CR -16.67409655 15.528586 -1.074 . 2921 1.7500000 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
1 -16598.48497 4300.27569 -3.85987 
2 -14822.59073 3866.53521 -3.83356 
3 -15062.83357 3925.51014 -3.83717 
4 -16526.04359 4301.55748 -3.84187 
5 -14391.47926 3785.29841 -3.80194 
6 -15697.63967 4076.87301 -3.85041 
Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
Model Log-Likelihood Sum of Squares R-squared 
(1) Constant term only -203.46544 . 
1709758432D+06 
. 
0000000 
(2) Group effects only -202.35986 . 
1607902561D+06 
. 
0595733 
(3) X- variables only -186.18850 . 
6547653947D+05 
. 
6170422 
(4) X and group effects -173.18173 . 3178815376D+05 . 8140781 
Hypothesis Tests 
Likelihood Rat io Test F Tests 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. F num. denom. Prob value 
(2) vs (1) 2.211 5 . 81922 . 
380 5 30 
. 
85839 
(3) vs (1) 34.554 8 . 00003 5.438 8 27 . 00039 (4) vs (1) 60.567 13 . 00000 7.410 13 22 . 00002 (4) vs (2) 58.356 8 . 00000 11.160 8 22 . 00000 (4) vs (3) 26.014 5 . 00009 4.663 5 22 . 00471 
A72 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Random Effects Model: v (i , t) =e (i , t) + u(j) Estimates: Var[e] _ . 144492D+04 Var[u] _ . 980141D+03 Corr [v(i, t), v(i, s)1 . 404172 Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) = 2.35 
(1 df, prob value = . 125189) (High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model. ) 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) . 00 (8 df, prob value = 1.000000) 
(High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) 
Reestimated using GLS coefficients: 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 261348D+04 Var[u] . 241317D+04 Sum of Squares . 745891D+05 +-- -------------------- ----4- 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error lb/St. Er. IP[IZI>z] I Mean of XI 
f-_- -_ý-ýý_-+- -+- +---- + 
LPNR 40.87527358 14.029146 2.914 . 0036 -4.3235659 LFNR -218.2465715 149.66651 -1.458 . 1448 1.8252327 KR 93.99731362 29.914866 3.142 . 0017 . 77777778 LPINC 86.00138087 125.75980 . 684 . 4941 10.003885 LDEN -25.53005721 40.906234 -. 624 . 5326 8.5890823 LENAF -40.04698667 13.233820 -3.026 . 0025 1.6298306 MR 58.67498915 21.265716 2.759 . 0058 . 36111111 CR -14.67648843 11.752777 -1.249 . 2118 1.7500000 Constant 30.04288043 1273.4802 . 024 . 9812 
b. Estimation report for recyclable paper model (PAW) 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = PAW Mean= 48.67685903 , 
S. D. = 35.98199839 
Model size: Observations = 36, Parameters = 8, Deg. Fr. = 28 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 18729.15971 , 
Std. Dev. = 25.86307 
Fit: R-squared= 
. 
586686, Adjusted R-squared = . 
48336 
Model test: F[ 7,28] = 5.68, Prob value = . 00037 Diagnostic: Log-L = -163.6595, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -179.5634 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 6.706, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 9.537 
Panel Data Analysis of PAW [ONE way] 
Unconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Deg. Free. Mean Square 
A73 
Between 5058.24 5. 1011.65 I 
Residual 40256.4 30. 1341.88 ( 
Total 45314.6 35. 1294.70 ( 
+ --+--------+ ---- 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error 
+-- -+----- 
It-ratio IP[IT(>t] 
+--- + 
I Mean of XI 
+----+- -+-- ----- +------+ -- + 
LPNR 26.14296960 7.2551359 3.603 . 0012 -4.3235659 LFNR -71.92015452 77.105442 -. 933 . 3589 1.8252327 PAK 39.86401668 16.180461 2.464 . 0202 . 77777778 LP I NC -13.91698588 63.249798 -. 220 . 8274 10.003885 LDEN -22.97567334 12.684274 -1.811 . 0808 8.5890823 LENAF -11.10980853 7.5125751 -1.479 . 1503 1.6298306 MR 21.46473663 12.108711 1.773 . 0872 . 36111111 Constant 608.8932115 686.80003 . 887 . 3829 
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Current sample contains 36 observat ions. 
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = PAW Mean= 48.67685903 , S. D. = 35.98 199839 Model size: Observations = 36, Para meters = 13, Deg. F r. = 23 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 10689.73148 , Std. Dev. = 21.55855 Fit: R-squared= . 764100, Adjuste d R-squared = . 64102 Model test: F[ 12,23] = 6.21, Prob value = . 00009 Diagnostic: Log-L = -153.5651, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = -179.5634 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 6.450, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 9.254 
( Estd. Autocorre l at i on of e (i , t) . 
012235 
+ -+-- --+ ------+ --+---- +-+ 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio (P[IT(>t] I Mean of XI 
LPNR 20.87339082 8.0536815 2.592 
. 
0148 -4.3235659 
LFNR -230.1972998 91.025977 -2.529 . 0171 1.8252327 PAK 9.845457113 15.471172 . 636 . 5295 . 77777778 LP I NC 175.2974878 94.894638 1.847 . 0749 10.003885 LDEN 554.4793027 248.37332 2.232 . 0335 8.5890823 LENAF 
. 
9362145730 10.455232 . 
090 
. 
9293 1.6298306 
MR 30.99848031 13.150218 2.357 . 0254 . 36111111 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t- ratio 
1 -6371.11616 2340.46774 -2. 72216 
2 -5757.72853 2108.24153 -2. 73106 
3 -5809.32423 2137.11140 -2. 71831 
4 -6307.43551 2333.50364 -2.70299 
A74 
5 -5569.00176 2060.89059 -2.70223 
6 -6049.87607 2219.29833 -2.72603 
Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
Model Log-Likelihood Sum of Squares R-squared 
(1) Constant term only -179.56339 . 4531464729D+05 . 0000000 (2) Group effects only -177.43289 . 4025640802D+05 . 1116248 (3) X- variables only -163.65951 . 1872915971D+05 . 5866864 (4) X and group effects -153.56515 . 1068973148D+05 . 7640999 
Hypothesis 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. 
(2) vs (1) 4.261 5 . 51248 (3) vs (1) 31.808 7 . 00004 (4) vs (1) 51.996 12 . 00000 (4) vs (2) 47.735 7 . 00000 (4) vs (3) 20.189 5 . 00115 
Tests 
F Tests 
F num. denom. Prob value 
. 
754 5 30 
. 
58990 
5.678 7 28 
. 
00037 
6.208 12 23 
. 
00009 
9.088 7 23 
. 
00002 
3.460 5 23 
. 
01777 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Random Effects Model: v(i, t) = e(i, t) + u(i) 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 464771D+03 Var[u] _ . 204128D+03 Corr [v(i, t), v(i, s)] _ . 305170 Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) = 1.59 
(1 df, prob value = . 
207438) 
(High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model. ) 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) _ . 
00 
(7 df, prob value = 1.000000) 
(High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) 
Reestimated using GLS coefficients: 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
674855D+03 
Var[u] _ . 
799934D+03 
Sum of Squares . 
209961D+05 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. Er. IP[IZI>z] I Mean of XI 
LPNR 22.89868703 7.1348034 3.209 . 0013 -4.3235659 LFNR -134.4480755 76.066051 -1.768 . 0771 1.8252327 PAK 34.12398007 13.931612 2.449 . 0143 . 77777778 LP I NC 45.42822454 67.162482 
. 676 . 4988 10.003885 IDEN -31.98279908 18.483605 -1.730 . 0836 8.5890823 LENAF -12.48454019 7.2449635 -1.723 . 0849 1.6298306 MR 27.90600459 11.763333 2.372 . 0177 . 36111111 Constant 197.0536392 675.89953 
. 
292 
. 
7706 
A75 
c. Estimation report for recyclable metal model (MEW) 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. ý 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables 
jOrdinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
I Dep. var. = MEW Mean= 18.42077024 , 
S. D. = 16.51089708 
1 Model size: Observations = 36, Parameters = 8, Deg. Fr. = 28 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 5102.099467 , Std. Dev. = 13.49881 
Fit: R-squared= . 465264, Adjusted R-squared = . 33158 Model test: F[ 7, 28] = 3.48, Prob value = . 00827 Diagnostic: Log-L = -140.2518, Restricted (b=0) Log-L = -151.5195 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 5.406, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 8.236 
Panel Data Analysis of MEW [ONE way] 
U nconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Deg. Free. Mean Square 
Between 1272.11 5.254.422 
Residual 8269.23 30.275.641 
Total 9541.34 35.272.610 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
PNR 201.5084774 
FNR 1.190502783 
MEK 16.54188848 
PPPINC . 4966485166E-03 LDEN -13.05921400 
ENAF -. 5412848866 
MR 5.291418145 
Constant 96.02854748 
(Note: E+ nn or E-nn means 
81.263676 2.480 . 0194 . 23342584E-01 6.1287216 . 194 . 8474 6.2222222 8.4324039 1.962 . 0598 . 77777778 
. 14722251E-02 . 337 . 7384 22377.198 6.5400650 -1.997 . 0557 8.5890823 
. 69571146 -. 778 . 4431 6.3602747 6.3515235 . 833 . 4118 . 36111111 69.660761 1.379 . 1790 
multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = MEW Mean= 18.42077024 , 
S. D. = 16.51089708 
Model size: Observations = 36, Parameters = 13, Deg. Fr. = 23 I 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 2505.131182 , 
Std. Dev. = 10.43641 
Fit: R-squared= 
. 
737445, Adjusted R-squared = . 
60046 
Model test: F[ 12,23] = 5.38, Prob value = . 
00028 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -127.4482, Restricted (b=0) Log-L = -151.5195 I 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 4.999, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 7.803 
Estd. Autocorre l at i on of e (i , t) -. 230607 
A76 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error it-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
PNR 169.9482283 83.977871 2.024 . 0523 . 23342584E-01 FNR -15.39129089 7.6382325 -2.015 . 0533 6.2222222 MEK 2.442244004 7.3805281 . 331 . 7431 . 77777778 PPP I NC . 4604713708E-02 . 20741539E-02 2.220 . 0344 22377.198 LDEN 258.2200388 124.27619 2.078 . 0467 8.5890823 ENAF . 3419382702 . 90966727 . 376 . 7097 6.3602747 MR 11.40758728 6.3103765 1.808 . 0810 . 36111111 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
1 -2411.34557 1145.55667 -2.10496 
2 -2112.57602 1018.31567 -2.07458 
3 -2144.26767 1039.00827 -2.06376 
4 -2367.11077 1144.25326 -2.06869 
5 -2022.63848 997.01117 -2.02870 
6 -2255.37583 1080.42871 -2.08748 
Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
Model Log-Likelihood Sum of Squares R-squared 
(1) Constant term only -151.51945 . 9541340280D+04 . 0000000 (2) Group effects only -148.94379 . 8269232730D+04 . 1333259 (3) X- variables only -140.25178 . 5102099467D+04 . 4652639 (4) X and group effects -127.44818 . 2505131182D+04 . 7374445 
Hypothesis 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. 
(2) vs (1) 5.151 5 . 39769 (3) vs (1) 22.535 7 . 00205 (4) vs (1) 48.143 12 . 00000 (4) vs (2) 42.991 7 . 00000 (4) vs (3) 25.607 5 . 00011 
Tests 
F Tests 
F num. denom. Prob value 
. 923 5 30 . 47977 3.480 7 28 . 00827 5.383 12 23 
. 
00028 
7.560 7 23 
. 
00009 
4.769 5 23 . 00390 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Random Effects Model: v(i, t) = e(i, t) + u(i) 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 108919D+03 Var[u] _ . 732991D+02 Corr [v (i , t) ,v (i , s) ]_ . 402261 Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) _ . 41 (1 df, prob value = . 522658) (High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model. ) 
A77 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) _ . 
00 
(7 df, prob value = 1.000000) 
(High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) 
Reestimated using GLS coefficients: 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 156524D+03 Var[u] _ . 446426D+03 Sum of Squares . 643512D+04 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error lb/St. Er. IP[IZI>z] I Mean of XI 
+------+-- +------+------+ -+ 
PNR 176.6114240 74.377149 
FNR -8.258590304 6.2396598 
MEK 13.40132494 6.7304354 
PPPINC . 
2012077051E-02 
. 
15363945E-02 
LDEN -19.66826919 10.173141 
ENAF -. 7482430607 . 63173375 MR 10.29149204 5.8187908 
Constant 180.2121296 89.844710 
(Note: E+ nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 
2.375 . 0176 . 23342584E-01 
-1.324 . 1856 6.2222222 1.991 . 0465 . 77777778 1.310 . 1903 22377.198 
-1.933 . 0532 
8.5890823 
-1.184 . 2362 6.3602747 1.769 
. 0769 . 36111111 2.006 . 0449 to + or -nn power. ) 
d. Estimation report for recyclable glass model (GLM 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = GLW Mean= 2.316719833 , S. D. = 1.996656490 Model size: Observations = 36, Parameters = 8, Deg. Fr. = 28 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 63.01147887 , Std. Dev. = 1.50014 Fit: R-squared= . 548409, Adjusted R-squared = . 43551 Model test: F[ 7,28] = 4.86, Prob value = . 00111 Diagnostic: Log-L = -61.1582, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -75.4678 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 1.012, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 3.842 
Panel Data Analysis of GLW [ONE way] 
U nconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Deg. Free. Mean Square 
Between 18.4299 5.3.68599 
Residual 121.102 30.4.03675 
Total 139.532 35.3.98664 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
ý--- +- -----+ ------ +------+- +--+ LPNR 
. 1503335250E-01 . 42081987 . 036 . 9718 -4.3235659 LFNR -3.436594226 4.4723493 -. 768 . 4487 1.8252327 GLK 2.540880753 . 93851581 2.707 . 0114 . 77777778 LPINC -. 6720968620 3.6686800 -. 183 . 8560 10.003885 LDEN -. 8271368147 . 73572631 -1.124 . 2705 8.5890823 LENAF -1.515901533 . 43575213 -3.479 . 0017 1.6298306 
A78 
MR . JbbZUZ4b3U . /UZ i41 JJ .IU AM . 
36111111 
Constant 22.84729895 39.836484 . 574 . 5709 
(Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = GLW Mean= 2.316719833 , 
S. D. = 1.996656490 
Model size: Observations = 36, Parameters = 13, Deg. Fr. = 23 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 25.88321916 , 
Std. Dev. = 1.06083 
Fit: R-squared= . 
814500, Adjusted R-squared = . 
71772 
Model test: F[ 12,23] = 8.42, Prob value = . 
00001 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -45.1432, Restricted (b=0) Log-L = -75.4678 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = . 
426, Akaike Info. Crt. = 3.230 
Estd. Autocorre l at i on of e (i , t) . 
001922 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t) I Mean of XI 
LPNR -. 9590473577E-01 . 39629646 -. 242 . 8105 -4.3235659 LFNR -11.94267701 4.4791035 -2.666 . 0124 1.8252327 GLK . 9390292727 . 76128797 1.233 . 2273 . 77777778 LPINC 7.246566395 4.6694682 1.552 . 1315 10.003885 LDEN 42.20796261 12.221674 3.454 . 0017 8.5890823 LENAF -. 3239833070 . 51446924 -. 630 . 5338 1.6298306 MR 1.513827467 . 64708107 2.339 . 0264 . 36111111 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
1 -440.20277 115.16709 -3.82230 
2 -394.37450 103.73997 -3.80157 
3 -399.57346 105.16056 -3.79965 
4 -436.83595 114.82441 -3.80438 
5 -383.41368 101.40998 -3.78083 
6 -418.02102 109.20473 -3.82787 
Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
Model Log-Likelihood Sum of Squares R-squared 
(1) Constant term only -75.46778 . 1395322999D+03 . 0000000 (2) Group effects only -72.91790 . 1211023729D+03 . 1320836 (3) X- variables only -61.15815 . 6301147887D+02 . 5484094 (4) X and group effects -45.14315 . 2588321916D+02 . 8145002 
A79 
(2) vs 
(3) vs 
(4) vs 
(4) vs 
(4) vs 
Hypothesis Tests 
Likelihood Ratio Test F Tests 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. F num. denom. 
(1) 5.100 5 
. 
40383 
. 
913 5 30 
(1) 28.619 7 
. 
00017 4.858 7 28 
(1) 60.649 12 
. 
00000 8.416 12 23 
(2) 55.549 7 
. 
00000 12.087 7 23 
(3) 32.030 5 
. 
00001 6.598 5 23 
Prob value 
. 48581 
. 00111 
. 00001 
. 00000 
. 00061 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Random Effects Model: v (i , t) =e 
(i 
, t) + u(i) Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
112536D+01 
Var[u] _ . 
112505D+01 
Corr[v(i, t), v(i, s)] _ . 
499932 
Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) _ . 13 (1 df, prob value = . 714908) (High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model. ) 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) _ . 00 (7 df, prob value = 1.000000) 
(High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) 
Reestimated using GLS coefficients: 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 189345D+01 Var[u] _ . 590968D+01 Sum of Squares . 809008D+02 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error lb/St. Er. IP[IZI>z] I Mean of Xl 
+----- +- +----------+-- -+ --- + 
LPNR -. 1522826956 . 36761120 -. 414 . 6787 -4.3235659 LFNR -9.154994306 3.9985079 -2.290 . 0220 1.8252327 GLK 2.175749718 . 69767269 3.119 . 0018 . 77777778 LPINC 3.796724664 3.6941155 1.028 
. 
3041 10.003885 
LDEN -1.623580810 1.1927790 -1.361 . 1735 8.5890823 LENAF -1.451977427 . 37885702 -3.833 . 0001 1.6298306 MR 1.393167998 
. 
60479818 2.304 
. 
0212 
. 
36111111 
Constant -5.497480468 36.180926 -. 152 . 8792 
e. Estimation report for recyclable PET bottles model (PTW) 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = PTW Mean= 5.251003166 , 
S. D. = 3.789667555 
Model size: Observations = 36, Parameters = 8, Deg. Fr. = 28 
A80 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 179.2849951 , Std. Dev. = 2.53042 
Fit: R-squared= . 643324, Adjusted R-squared = . 55416 Model test: F[ 7, 28] = 7.21, Prob value = . 00006 Diagnostic: Log-L = -79.9800, Restricted (b=0) Log-L = -98.5367 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 2.057, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 4.888 
Panel Data Analysis of PTW [ONE way] 
U nconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Deg. Free. Mean Square 
Between 91.9854 5.18.3971 
Residual 410.670 30.13.6890 
Total 502.655 35.14.3616 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
PNR 24.31529636 15.233299 1.596 . 1217 . 23342584E-01 FNR . 2412799453 1.1488608 . 210 . 8352 6.2222222 PTK 2.273872003 1.5806980 1.439 . 1614 . 77777778 PPPINC . 3162211651E-03 . 27597626E-03 1.146 . 2616 22377.198 LDEN 2.189351807 1.2259693 1.786 . 0850 8.5890823 ENAF -. 5204749678 . 13041474 -3.991 . 0004 6.3602747 MR 2.122895573 1.1906262 1.783 . 0854 . 36111111 Constant -21.92334695 13.058273 -1.679 . 1043 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. ý 
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = PTW Mean= 5.251003166 , 
S. D. = 3.789667555 
Model size: Observations = 36, Parameters = 13, Deg. Fr. = 23 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 71.63835640 , 
Std. Dev. = 1.76485 
Fit: R-squared= 
. 
857480, Adjusted R-squared = . 
78312 
Model test: F[ 12,231 = 11.53, Prob value = . 
00000 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -63.4678, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -98.5367 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 1.444, Akaike Info. Crt. = 4.248 
Estd. Autocor re l at i on of e (i , t) . 
078555 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[1TI>t] I Mean of XI 
PNR 48.83598940 14.201114 3.439 . 0018 . 23342584E-01 FNR 
. 5325127143 1.2916666 . 412 . 6832 6.2222222 PTK 
. 8104839677 1.2480874 . 649 . 5212 . 77777778 PPPINC 
. 7477836093E-03 . 35075071E-03 2.132 . 0416 22377.198 LDEN 63.48416527 21.015779 3.021 . 0052 8.5890823 ENAF -. 1446249479E-01 . 15382968 -. 094 . 9257 6.3602747 MR 3.671698860 1.0671190 3.441 . 0018 . 36111111 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
A81 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
1 -606.17311 193.71986 -3.12912 
2 -535.60936 172.20272 -3.11034 
3 -543.83416 175.70195 -3.09521 
4 -597.72770 193.49945 -3.08904 
5 -524.63695 168.60001 -3.11173 
6 -570.44273 182.70637 -3.12218 
Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
Model Log- Likelihood Sum of Squares R-squared 
(1) Constant term only -98.53673 . 
5026553063D+03 . 
0000000 
(2) Group effects only -94.89866 . 
4106698958D+03 
. 
1829990 
(3) X- variables only -79.98003 . 1792849951D+03 . 6433242 (4) X and group effects -63.46780 . 7163835640D+02 . 8574802 
Hypothesis Tests 
Likelihood Ratio Test F Tests 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. F num. denom. Prob value 
(2) vs (1) 7.276 5 . 20090 1.344 
5 30 . 27311 (3) vs (1) 37.113 7 . 00000 7.215 7 28 . 00006 (4) vs (1) 70.138 12 . 00000 11.532 12 23 . 00000 (4) vs (2) 62.862 7 . 00000 15.550 7 23 . 00000 (4) vs (3) 33.024 5 . 00000 6.912 5 23 . 00045 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Random Effects Model: v(i, t) = e(i , t) + u(i) Estimates: Var[e] _ . 311471D+01 Var[u] _ . 328832D+01 Corr [v(i, t), v(i, s)] _ . 513557 Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) _ . 45 (1 df, prob value = . 501433) (High values of LM favor FEM/REM o ver CR model. ) 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) _ . 
00 
(7 df, prob value = 1.000000) 
(High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) 
Reestimated using GLS coefficients : 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 467155D+01 Var[u] _ . 192863D+02 Sum of Squares . 227835D+03 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. Er. IP[IZI>zl I Mean of XI 
PNR 35.68732032 12.864023 2.774 . 0055 . 23342584E-01 
A82 
FNR -. 1064195682 1.1049438 
PTK 2.287296379 1.1475421 
PPPINC . 5368468478E-03 . 27624271E-03 
LDEN . 4521527085 2.0119132 
ENAF -. 3868566945 . 11020175 
MR 3.674039782 1.0035476 
Constant -11.46179986 17.457680 
(Note: E+ nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to 
-. 096 . 9233 6.2222222 1.993 . 0462 . 77777778 1.943 . 0520 22377.198 
. 225 . 8222 8.5890823 3.510 . 0004 6.3602747 3.661 . 0003 . 36111111 
-. 657 . 5115 + or -nn power. ) 
f. Estimation report for recyclable plastics model (PLYY) 
----------- -- 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = PLW Mean= 9.443412126 , S. D. = 7.180708038 
I 
Model size: Observations = 36, Parameters = 8, Deg. Fr. = 28 I 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 710.8930820 , Std. Dev. = 5.03875 Fit: R-squared= . 606086, Adjusted R-squared = . 50761 1 Model test: F[ 7,28) = 6.15, Prob value = . 00020 Diagnostic: Log-L = -104.7758, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -121.5450 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 3.435, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 6.265 
Panel Data Analysis of PLW [ONE way] 
Unconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Deg. Free. Mean Square 
Between 432.751 5.86.5503 
Residual 1371.94 30.45.7313 
Total 1804.69 35.51.5626 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
+-- -+- - -+----- -+- -+- -+ + 
LPNR . 1530131989 1.4134764 . 108 . 9146 -4.3235659 LFNR 30.80883217 15.022009 2.051 
. 
0497 1.8252327 
PLK 7.829999149 3.1523461 2.484 . 0192 . 77777778 LP I NC 3.765776721 12.322594 . 306 . 7622 10.003885 LDEN . 9399180658 2.4712040 . 380 . 7066 8.5890823 LENAF -4.505391110 1.4636318 -3.078 . 0046 1.6298306 MR 3.520249224 2.3590704 1.492 . 1468 . 36111111 Constant -91.89192035 133.80530 -. 687 . 4979 
LIMDEP Estimation Results Run log line 63 Page 2 
Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = PLW Mean= 9.443412126 1 S. D. = 7.180708038 
I 
A83 
Model size: Observations = 36, Parameters = 13, Deg. Fr. = 23 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 321. 6650840 , Std. Dev. = 3.73971 Fit: R-squared= . 821762, Adjusted R-squared = . 72877 Model test: F[ 12,23] = 8.84, Prob value = . 00001 Diagnostic: Log-L = -90.5016, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = -121.5450 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 2.946, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 5.750 
Estd. Autocorre l at i on of e (i , t) . 043500 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
LPNR . 4859789809 1.3970534 . 348 . 7305 -4.3235659 LFNR -13.20623249 15.790065 -. 836 . 4098 1.8252327 PLK 4.548867924 2.6837483 1.695 . 1008 . 77777778 LP I NC -. 6443330451E-01 16.461152 -. 004 . 9969 10.003885 LDEN 90.41759825 43.084743 2.099 . 0447 8.5890823 LENAF -5.326887697 1.8136448 - 2.937 . 0064 1.6298306 MR 4.476253999 2.2811377 1.962 . 0594 . 36111111 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
1 -791.29488 405.99550 -1.94902 
2 -698.90986 365.71176 -1.91109 
3 -721.42973 370.71975 -1.94602 
4 -784.57791 404.78746 -1.93825 
5 -676.06111 357.49790 -1.89109 
6 -748.42507 384.97653 -1.94408 
Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
Model Log-Likelihood Sum of Squares R-squared 
(1) Constant term only -121.54504 . 1804689877D+04 . 0000000 (2) Group effects only -116.61008 . 1371938399D+04 . 2397927 (3) X- variables only -104.77584 . 7108930820D+03 . 6060857 (4) X and group effects -90.50164 . 3216650840D+03 . 8217616 
Hypothesis Tests 
Likelihood Rat io Test F Tests 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. F num. denom. Prob value 
(2) vs (1) 9.870 5 . 07901 1.893 5 30 . 12525 (3) vs (1) 33.538 7 . 00002 6.154 7 28 . 00020 (4) vs (1) 62.087 12 . 00000 8.837 12 23 . 00001 (4) vs (2) 52.217 7 . 00000 10.728 7 23 . 00001 (4) vs (3) 28.548 5 . 00003 5.566 5 23 . 00167 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. ý 
A84 
Random Effects Model: v(i, t) = e(i, t) + u(i) 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 139854D+02 Var[u] _ . 114036D+02 Corr[v(i, t), v(i, s)] _ . 449154 Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) _ . 35 (1 df, prob value = . 552499) (High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model. ) 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) _ . 
00 
(7 df, prob value = 1.000000) 
(High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) 
Reestimated using GLS coefficients: 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
178691D+02 
Var[u] _ . 
796021D+02 
Sum of Squares . 
906471D+03 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. Er. IP[IZI>zl I Mean of XI 
+--- -+ ----- + --- ---+---- +------ +---- + 
LPNR . 5356301551 1.2828370 . 418 . 6763 -4.3235659 LFNR 4.123429200 13.879753 . 297 . 7664 1.8252327 PLK 7.191218809 2.4485256 2.937 . 0033 . 77777778 LP I NC . 8806255027 12.672693 . 069 . 9446 10.003885 LDEN 1.592605206 3.9177555 . 407 . 6844 8.5890823 LENAF -6.131796992 1.3165319 -4.658 . 0000 1.6298306 MR 4.651430721 2.1117579 2.203 . 0276 . 36111111 Constant -15.53473000 124.82148 -. 124 . 9010 
g. Estimation report for non-recyclables model (NRW) 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. ý 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = NRW Mean= 928.3611111 , S. D. = 224.5 779728 Model size: Observations = 36, Parameters = 8, Deg. F r. = 28 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 697735.2438 , Std. Dev. = 157.85790 Fit: R-squared= . 604735, Adjusted R-squared = . 50592 Model test: F[ 7,28] = 6.12, Prob value = . 00021 Diagnostic: Log-L = -228.7792, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -245.4867 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 10.324, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 13.154 
Panel Data Analysis of NRW [ONE way] 
U nconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Deg. Free. Mean Square 
Between 469119.5.93823.8 
Residual . 129612E+07 30.43203.8 Total 
. 176523E+07 35.50435.3 
A85 
jVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
PNR -2003.721167 950.31445 -2.108 . 0441 . 23342584E-01 
FNR 141.8977771 71.670554 1.980 . 0576 6.2222222 
KR 7.069400642 98.610297 . 072 . 9434 . 77777778 
PPPINC . 3159139562E-02 . 17216508E-01 . 183 . 8557 22377.198 
LDEN 27.09711700 76.480891 . 354 . 7258 8.5890823 ENAF 17.93092647 8.1357956 2.204 . 0359 6.3602747 MR -326.0787158 74.276046 -4.390 . 0001 . 36111111 Constant -213.0118139 814.62754 -. 261 . 7956 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
+-------- ---- --- --- + 
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = NRW Mean= 928.3611111 , S. D. = 224.5779728 Model size: Observations = 36, Parameters = 13, Deg. Fr. = 23 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 278823.5472 , Std. Dev. = 110.10342 Fit: R-squared= . 842047, Adjusted R-squared = . 75964 Model test: F[ 12,23] = 10.22, Prob value = . 00000 Diagnostic: Log-L = -212.2685, Restricted (b=0) Log-L = -245.4867 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 9.711, Akaike Info. Crt. = 12.515 
Estd. Autocorre l at i on of e (i , t) -. 
258087 
+------+-- ---+ - ----+ --+----+------+ 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
+-- +- --+-- --+------+----+-------+ 
PNR -4248.551378 885.96047 -4.795 . 
0000 
. 
23342584E-01 
FNR 68.63807531 80.582801 
. 
852 
. 
4013 6.2222222 
KR 117.1774166 77.864039 1.505 
. 
1432 
. 
77777778 
PPPINC 
. 
2643342435E-01 
. 
21882174E-01 1.208 
. 
2368 22377.198 
LDEN -6852.379284 1311.1048 -5.226 . 
0000 8.5890823 
ENAF -14.13840229 9.5969241 -1.473 . 
1515 6.3602747 
MR -218.7878518 66.574016 -3.286 . 
0027 
. 
36111111 
(Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
1 63204.00532 12085.54011 5.22972 
2 55985.88117 10743.15677 5.21131 
3 57241.00060 10961.46227 5.22202 
4 62965.01470 12071.78928 5.21588 
5 54846.93468 10518.39586 5.21438 
6 59411.49232 11398.44493 5.21225 
i ---- -----+ 
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Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
Model Log-Likelihood Sum of Squares 
(1) Constant term only -245.48674 . 1765234306D+07 (2) Group effects only -239.92632 . 1296115167D+07 (3) X- variables only -228.77916 . 6977352438D+06 (4) X and group effects -212.26847 . 2788235472D+06 
R-squared 
. 
0000000 
. 
2657546 
. 
6047351 
. 
8420473 
Hypothesis Tests 
Likelihood Rat io Test F Tests 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. F num. denom. Prob value 
(2) vs (1) 11.121 5 . 04904 2.172 5 30 . 08387 (3) vs (1) 33.415 7 . 00002 6.120 7 28 . 00021 (4) vs (1) 66.437 12 . 00000 10.218 12 23 . 00000 (4) vs (2) 55.316 7 . 00000 11.988 7 23 . 00000 (4) vs (3) 33.021 5 . 00000 6.911 5 23 . 00045 
LIMDEP Estimation Results Run log line 9 Page 4 
Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Random Effects Model: v(i, t) = e(i, t) + u(i) 
Estimates: Var[e] . 121228D+05 Var[u] 
. 
127964D+05 
Corr [v(i, t), v(i, s)] . 
513516 
Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) = 1.07 
(1 df, prob value = . 
301408) 
(High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model. ) 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) _ . 00 (7 df, prob value = 1.000000) 
(High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) 
Reestimated using GLS coefficients: 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
266441D+05 
Var[u] _ . 
171123D+05 
Sum of Squares . 
742132D+06 
JVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. Er. IP[IZI>z] I Mean of XI 
PNR -2851.625729 802.53764 -3.553 . 
0004 
. 
23342584E-01 
FNR 144.4877656 68.932687 2.096 . 0361 6.2222222 KR -4.697436477 71.591130 -. 066 . 9477 . 77777778 PPPING . 1131154702E-01 . 17233487E-01 . 656 . 5116 22377.198 LDEN -13.58218601 125.50910 -. 108 . 9138 8.5890823 ENAF 17.26789837 6.8750463 2.512 . 0120 6.3602747 MR -286.2614053 62.607602 -4.572 . 0000 . 36111111 Constant -43.37461807 1089.0675 -. 040 . 9682 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
h. Estimation report for total waste generation model (TOIL) 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = TOW Mean= 1027.738040 , S. D. = 189.9 931266 Model size: Observations = 36, Parameters = 8, Deg. F r. = 28 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 575400.4910 , Std. Dev. = 143.35277 Fit: R-squared= . 544565, Adjusted R-squared = . 43071 Model test: F[ 7,28] = 4.78, Prob value = . 00123 Diagnostic: Log-L = -225.3092, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -239.4663 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 10.131, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 12.962 
Panel Data Analysis of TOW [ONE way] 
Unconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Deg. Free. Mean Square 
Between 440422.5.88084.4 
Residual 822986.30.27432.9 
Total . 126341E+07 35.36097.4 
+- -+- -- +- -+ --+------ +---+ (Variable I Coefficient Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
+------+- -+----------r------+-------- ;-+ 
PNR -1148.657978 862.99269 -1.331 . 1939 . 23342584E-01 FNR 121.3151490 65.084946 1.864 . 0728 6.2222222 KR 90.80299015 89.549271 1.014 . 3193 . 77777778 PPPINC .1 207202183E-02 . 15634531E-01 . 077 . 9390 22377.198 LDEN -7.791638516 69.453274 -. 112 . 9115 8.5890823 ENAF 12.99800759 7.3882199 1.759 . 0895 6.3602747 MR -284.0842072 67.451026 -4.212 . 0002 . 36111111 Constant 288.9006078 739.77367 . 391 . 6991 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Least Squar es with Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = TOW Mean= 1027.738040 , 
S. D. = 189.9 931266 
Model size: Observations = 36, Parameters = 13, Deg. F r. = 23 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 280466.4868 , 
Std. Dev. = 110.42733 
Fit: R-squared= . 778008, Adjusted R-squared = . 
66219 
Model test: F[ 12,231 = 6.72, Prob value = . 00005 Diagnostic: Log-L = -212.3742, Restricted (b=0) Log-L = -239.4663 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 9.717, Akaike Info. Crt. = 12.521 
Estd. Autocorre l at i on of e (i , t) -. 310768 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[IT(>t] I Mean of XI 
+ ---+- 
PNR 
- +- ------+- --+----- 
-3458.450425 888.56686 -3.892 . 
0005 . 
+------+ 
23342584E-01 
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FNR 10.17951125 80.819866 . 126 . 9006 6.2222222 KR 136.3961660 78.093105 1.747 . 0913 . 77777778 PPPINC . 3825794746E-01 . 21946549E-01 1.743 . 0919 22377.198 LDEN -5104.718365 1314.9619 -3.882 . 0006 8.5890823 ENAF -11.78728968 9.6251570 -1.225 . 2306 6.3602747 MR -161.4468957 66.769869 -2.418 . 0221 . 36111111 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
1 47150.27941 12121.09423 3.88994 
2 41820.83021 10774.76176 3.88137 
3 42851.20479 10993.70949 3.89779 
4 47059.51374 12107.30294 3.88687 
5 41145.21355 10549.33963 3.90026 
6 44339.27668 11431.97770 3.87853 
Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
Model Log-Likelihood Sum of Squares R-squared 
(1) Constant term only -239.46628 . 1263408585D+07 . 0000000 (2) Group effects only -231.75096 . 8229864749D+06 . 3485983 (3) X- variables only -225.30923 . 5754004910D+06 . 5445650 (4) X and group effects -212.37422 . 2804664868D+06 . 7780081 
Hypothesis Tests 
Likelihood Rat io Test F Tests 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. F num. denom. Prob value 
(2) vs (1) 15.431 5 . 
00867 3.211 5 30 
. 
01937 
(3) vs (1) 28.314 7 . 00019 4.783 7 28 . 00123 (4) vs (1) 54.184 12 . 00000 6.717 12 23 . 00005 (4) vs (2) 38.753 7 . 00000 6.356 7 23 . 00032 (4) vs (3) 25.870 5 . 00009 4.837 5 23 . 00362 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Random Effects Model: v(i, t) = e(i, t) + u(i) 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
121942D+05 
Var[u] _ . 
835582D+04 
Corr [v(i, t), v(i, s)] _ . 
406609 
Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) . 
45 
(1 df, prob value = . 
503845) 
(High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model. ) 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) . 
00 
(7 df, prob value = 1.000000) 
(High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) 
Reestimated using GLS coefficients: 
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Estimates: Var[e] = 203033D+05 
Var[u] 
. 
232377D+05 
Sum of Squares . 
626705D+06 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. Er. IP[IZI>z] I Mean of XI 
PNR -2081.443868 787.74192 -2.642 . 0082 . 23342584E-01 FNR 98.44379561 66.150187 1.488 . 1367 6.2222222 KR 67.98010068 71.237426 . 954 . 3399 . 77777778 PPPINC . 1519375651E-01 . 16297076E-01 . 932 . 3512 22377.198 LDEN -56.42229765 108.29660 -. 521 . 6024 8.5890823 ENAF 11.98328502 6.6929477 1.790 . 0734 6.3602747 MR -231.4165536 61.622119 -3.755 . 0002 . 36111111 Constant 562.8838971 955.62795 . 589 . 5558 (Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. ) 
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Appendix 8 Unit-pricing in Taipei City 
Taipei City Council announced 'Autonomous Ordinance for Taipei City 
Waste Collection and Treatment Fee' on 28th April, 2000. That authorises the 
city government to sell specific garbage bag for collecting waste collection and 
treatment costs by Article 2, named 'Per Bag Garbage Collection Fee Policy', 
and the price should be calculated by following equation by Article 7. 
total cost of waste collection weight per litre 
unit-price and treatment (NTD) x (kg/litre) 
(per litre) = total waste treatment capacity 1000 
of incinerators (ton) x (kg/ton) 
and total waste treatment capacity of incinerators (ton) = 
total incinerators designed capacity (ton/day) x 365 x 85% 
In the "Statement of Price Calculation for Per Bag Garbage Collection 
Fee' announced by Taipei City government, the total cost of waste collection 
and treatment includes labour, management and operation costs of residential 
garbage collection and treatment, but excludes land use and external costs. 
According to the equation above, the unit-price is 0.5 NTD/litre. Unit-pricing 
started to apply and the garbage collection fee on the basis of each 
household's bi-monthly consumption of tap water was terminated on July 2000. 
The city government provided a simulation for a-household. The average 
garbage fee collected from water consumption bill per household is 144 NTD 
per month, and the household's payment for waste collection under unit-pricing 
will be 140 NTD when it has 3 people in house and each of them generates 
0.75 kg waste per day in house. Therefore, a household's payment will not 
be increased subjected to the unit-pricing scheme even when it doesn't reduce 
waste, but unit-pricing provides an incentive of waste reduction. 
After one year adoption, Taipei City government reduced garbage bag price 
by 10% to 0.45 NTD/litre and 0.144 USD/101 on July 2001 (Statement of Per Bag 
Garbage Collection Fee Reduction, Taipei City government). The reason for 
reduction is that recycling increased dramatically after unit-pricing adopted which 
increases the revenue from selling recycling materials. 
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Appendix 9 Limdep Estimation Reports for Models in Chapter 6 
Two policy variables, whether adopting mandatory recycling (MR) and 
unit-pricing (NRU), are tested to explain each three inspection variables: 
inspection labours (ENAP, A9-1), prosecuted fine (ENAF, A9-2), and inspection 
times (ENAT, A9-3). The estimation reports are shown below. 
A9-1. Estimation report for the regression of inspection labours 
Based on the LM test result, OLS estimates are chosen. Inspection 
labour (ENAP) is significantly increased by adopting unit-pricing (NRU). 
LIMDEP Esti mation Results Run log line 7 Page 1 
Current sample contains 36 observations. 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables ý 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = ENAP Mean= 4.055579294 , S. D. = 2.590 485542 Model size: Observations = 36, Parameters = 3, Deg. F r. = 33 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 172.1286464 , Std. Dev. = 2.28386 Fit: R-squared= . 267137, Adjusted R-squared = . 22272 Model test: F[ 2,33] = 6.01, Prob value = . 00593 Diagnostic: Log-L = -79.2468, Restricted (b=0) Log-L = -84.8411 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 1.732, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 4.569 
Panel Data Analysis of ENAP [ONE way] 
Unconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Deg. Free. Mean Square 
Between 43.5451 5.8.70902 
Residual 191.326 30.6.37755 
Total 234.872 35.6.71062 
IVariable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of Xf 
+--- +- - --+---------+-----+------ +---- + 
MR 
. 6309006906 . 82204600 . 767 . 4483 . 36111111 NRU 4.352929204 1.2563965 3.465 . 0015 . 11111111 Constant 3.344095244 . 52395357 6.382 . 0000 
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LI DM EP Estimation Results Run log line 7 Page 2 
Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = ENAP Mean= 4.055579294 , 
S. D. = 2.590485542 
Model size: Observations = 36, Parameters = 8, Deg. Fr. = 28 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 155.3116513 , 
Std. Dev. = 2.35517 
Fit: R-squared= 
. 
338738, Adjusted R-squared = . 
17342 
Model test: F[ 7,28] = 2.05, Prob value = . 
08375 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -77.3963, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = -84.8411 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 1.914, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 4.744 
Estd. Autocorre l at i on of e (i , t) -. 
350019 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[IT1>t] I Mean of XI 
MR 1.015496915 1.2029144 . 844 . 4045 . 36111111 NRU 4.903702210 2.0396405 2.404 . 0218 . 11111111 
LIMDEP Estimation Results Run log line 7 Page 3 
Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
1 2.79332 1.66536 1.67731 
2 4.02434 
. 
96150 4.18550 
3 2.43510 
. 
98218 2.47929 
4 4.20015 1.13412 3.70345 
5 3.00972 1.13412 2.65379 
6 2.40146 1.53996 1.55943 
Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
Model Log-Likelihood Sum of Squares R-squared 
(1) Constant term only -84.84114 . 
2348715370D+03 
. 
0000000 
(2) Group effects only -81.15011 . 
1913264421D+03 
. 
1853996 
(3) X- variables only -79.24680 . 
1721286464D+03 
. 
2671371 
(4) X and group effects -77.39625 . 
1553116513D+03 
. 
3387379 
Hypothesis Tests 
Likelihood Ratio Test F Tests 
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Chi-squared d. f. Prob. 
(2) vs (1) 7.382 5 . 
19374 
(3) vs (1) 11.189 2 . 00372 
(4) vs (1) 14.890 7 . 03744 
(4) vs (2) 7.508 2 . 02343 
(4) vs (3) 3.701 5 . 59320 
F num. denom. Prob value 
1.366 5 30 . 26500 
6.014 2 33 . 
00593 
2.049 7 28 . 08375 
3.246 2 28 . 05395 
. 606 5 28 . 69560 
LIMDEP Estimation Results Run log line 7 Page 4 
Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Random Effects Model: v(i, t) = e(i, t) + u(i) 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
431421D+01 
Var[u] _ . 
467139D+00 
Corr [v (i 
, t) ,v 
(i 
, s) 
]_ 
. 
097700 
Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) _ . 
72 
(1 df, prob value = . 
395670) 
(High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model. ) 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) _ . 
20 
(2 df, prob value = . 
904543) 
(High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM) .) 
Reestimated using GLS coefficients: 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 556524D+01 
Var[u] _ -. 149419D-01 
Sum of Squares . 172254D+03 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. Er. IP[IZI>z] I Mean of XI 
MR 
. 
7387700296 
. 
83027749 . 
890 
. 
3736 . 
36111111 
NRU 4.496063302 1.2973442 3.466 . 
0005 
. 
11111111 
Constant 3.289238639 . 
57134844 5.757 
. 
0000 
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pg. 2. Estimation report for the regression of prosecuted fine 
Based on the LM test and Hausman test results, FEM estimates are 
chosen for ENAF model. Both whether adopting mandatory recycling (MR) 
tand unit-pricing (NRU) are insignificant to prosecuted fine (ENAF). 
LIMDEP Estimation Results Run log line 4 Page 1. ý 
Current sample contains 36 observations. 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = ENAF Mean= 6.360274748 , S. D. = 3.956 561804 
Model size: Observations = 36, Parameters = 3, Deg. F r. = 33 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 468.7987205 , Std. Dev. = 3.76909 
Fit: R-squared= . 144377, Adjusted R-squared = . 09252 
Model test: F[ 2,33] = 2.78, Prob value = . 07632 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -97.2816, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = -100.0882 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 2.734, Akaike Info. Crt. = 5.571 
Panel Data Analysis of ENAF [ONE way] 
Unconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Deg. Free. Mean Square 
Between 292.216 5.58.4432 
Residual 255.687 30.8.52291 
Total 547.903 35.15.6544 
(Variable Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IPLITI>t] I Mean of XI 
+-----+-____ --+-- -----ý ------+------+--- + 
NR -. 5537232137 1.3566342 -. 408 . 6858 . 36111111 NRU 4.420753121 2.0734490 2.132 . 0405 . 11111111 Constant 6.069035562 
. 
86468801 7.019 
. 
0000 
LIMDEP Estimation Results Run log line 4 Page 2 
I Current sample contains 36 observations. 
1 Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables M Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
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Dep. var. = ENAF Mean= 6.360274748 , 
S. D. = 3.956561804 
Model size: Observations = 36, Parameters = 8, Deg. Fr. = 28 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 232.4926194 , 
Std. Dev. = 2.88155 
Fit: R-squared= . 575669, Adjusted R-squared = . 
46959 
Model test: F[ 7,281 = 5.43, Prob value = . 
00052 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -84.6579, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = -100.0882 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 2.317, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 5.148 
Estd. Autocorre l at i on of e (i , t) . 
027006 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
MR -1.580853251 1.4717610 -1.074 . 2903 . 36111111 NRU -3.195499151 2.4954921 -1.281 . 2090 . 11111111 
LIMDEP Estimation Results Run log line 4 Page 3 
Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
1 13.68529 2.03756 6.71651 
2 5.36424 1.17639 4.55993 
3 2.13609 1.20169 1.77757 
4 7.77325 1.38759 5.60198 
5 7.25183 1.38759 5.22621 
6 7.50647 1.88414 3.98404 
Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
Model Log-Likelihood Sum of Squares R-squared 
(1) Constant term only -100.08823 . 
5479033458D+03 
. 
0000000 
(2) Group effects only -86.36965 . 
2556874443D+03 
. 
5333348 
(3) X- variables only -97.28157 . 
4687987205D+03 
. 1443770 
(4) X and group effects -84.65790 . 
2324926194D+03 . 
5756686 
Hypothesis Tests 
Likelihood Ratio Test F Tests 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. F num. denom. Prob value 
(2) vs (1) 27.437 5 . 00005 6.857 5 
30 
. 
00023 
(3) vs (1) 5.613 2 . 
06041 2.784 2 33 . 
07632 
(4) vs (1) 30.861 7 . 00007 5.427 7 
28 
. 
00052 
(4) vs (2) 3.424 2 . 
18055 1.397 2 28 
. 
26412 
(4) vs (3) 25.247 5 . 
00012 5.692 5 28 
. 
00096 
+____. _-- --- -ý __-_------ - -_ =+ 
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LIMDEP Estimation Results Run log line 4 Page 4 
Current sample contains 36 observations. ý 
Random Effects Model: v(i, t) = e(i, t) + u(i) 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
830331D+01 
Var[u] 
. 
590271D+01 
Corr [v(i, t), v(i, s)] _ . 
415508 
Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) = 3.48 
(1 df, prob value = . 
062231) 
(High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model. ) 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) = 6.42 
(2 df, prob value = . 
040369) 
(High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) 
Reestimated using GLS coefficients: 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 867164D+01 Var[u] _ . 154121D+02 Sum of Squares . 546238D+03 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. Er. IP[IZI>Z] I Mean of XI 
MR -1.518232378 1.3377482 -1.135 . 2564 . 36111111 NRU -. 4163370304 2.1849274 -. 191 . 8489 . 11111111 Constant 6.954784999 1.2365983 5.624 
. 
0000 
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A9-3. Estimation report for the regression of inspection times 
Based on the LM test result, OLS estimates are chosen for ENAT model. 
Both whether adopting mandatory recycling (MR) and unit-pricing (NRU) are 
insignificant to inspection times (ENAT). 
LIMDEP Estimation Results Run log line 11 Page 1 
Current sample contains 36 observations. 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = ENAT Mean= 28.00723336 , 
S. D. = 89.00 141452 
Model size: Observations = 36, Parameters = 3, Deg. F r. = 33 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 272058.7746 , Std. Dev. = 90.79761 
Fit: R-squared= . 018702, Adjusted R-squared = -. 04077 
Model test: F[ 2,33] = . 31, Prob value = . 73234 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -211.8264, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -212.1662 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 9.097, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 11.935 
Panel Data Analysis of ENAT [ONE way] 
U nconditional ANOVA (No regressors) 
Source Variation Deg. Free. Mean Square 
Between 43464.0 5.8692.80 
Residual 233780.30.7792.66 
Total 277244.35.7921.25 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error it-ratio IP[ITI>t] I Mean of XI 
MR -24.78844195 32.681419 -. 758 . 
4535 
. 
36111111 
NRU -21.22139312 49.949543 -. 425 . 
6737 . 
11111111 
Constant 39.31654774 20.830399 1.887 
. 
0679 
LIMDEP Estimation Results Run log line 11 Page 2 
Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
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Dep. var. = ENAT Mean= 28.00723336 S. D. = 89.00141452 
Model size: Observations = 36, Parameters = 8, Deg. Fr. = 28 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 233752.6826 , 
Std. Dev. = 91.36909 
Fit: R-squared = . 156870, Adjusted R-squared = -. 05391 
Model test: F[ 7, 28] = . 74, Prob value = . 63706 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -209.0948, Restricted(b=0) Log-L = -212.1662 
LogAmem i yaPrCrt. = 9.230, Aka i ke Info. Crt. = 12.061 
Estd. Autocor re I at i on of e (i , t) . 
000492 
Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error It-ratio IP[ITJ>t] J Mean of XI 
MR 2.554289168 46.667119 . 
055 
. 
9567 
. 
36111111 
NRU 1.264867196 79.127951 . 
016 
. 
9873 
. 
11111111 
LIMDEP Estimation Results Run log line 11 Page 3 
Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Group Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
1 16.83029 64.60770 . 26050 
2 103.61975 37.30127 2.77791 
3 1.44468 38.10354 . 03791 4 24.68076 43.99818 
. 56095 
5 3.45654 43.99818 . 07856 6 11.63384 59.74282 . 19473 
Test Statistics for the Classical Model 
Model Log-Likelihood Sum of Squares R-squared 
(1) Constant term only -212.16619 . 
2772438125D+06 
. 
0000000 
(2) Group effects only -209.09688 . 
2337798260D+06 
. 
1567717 
(3) X- variables only -211.82637 . 
2720587746D+06 
. 
0187021 
(4) X and group effects -209.09479 . 
2337526826D+06 
. 
1568696 
Hypothesis Tests 
Likelihood Ratio Test F Tests 
Chi-squared d. f. Prob. F num. denom. Prob value 
(2) vs (1) 6.139 5 . 
29296 1.116 5 30 
. 
37321 
(3) vs (1) . 
680 2 
. 
71189 
. 
314 2 33 
. 
73234 
(4) vs (1) 6.143 7 . 
52318 
. 
744 7 28 
. 
63706 
(4) vs (2) . 
004 2 
. 
99791 
. 
002 2 28 
. 
99838 
(4) vs (3) 5.463 5 . 
36200 
. 
918 5 28 
. 
48399 
+-ýý - --- ------_------ -+ 
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Current sample contains 36 observations. 
Random Effects Model: v (i , t) =e 
(i 
, t) + u(i) Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
649313D+04 
Var[u] _ . 
106406D+04 
Corr[v(i, t), v(i, s)] _ . 
140801 
Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) _ . 
20 
(1 df, prob value = . 
658059) 
(High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model. ) 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) _ . 
40 
(2 df, prob value = . 
818984) 
(High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM). ) 
Reestimated using GLS coefficients: 
Estimates: Var[e] _ . 
840019D+04 
Var[u] _ . 
691865D+03 
Sum of Squares . 
272859D+06 
(Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. Er. IP[IZI>z] I Mean of XI 
MR -15.18787645 33.252792 -. 457 . 6479 . 36111111 NRU -12.31429027 52.378743 -. 235 . 8141 . 11111111 Constant 34.85999877 23.708781 1.470 . 1415 
Al 00 
